

also writes as one sensitive to the rights of HIV-infected and affected individuals, often detailing how various federal and state policies have unfairly affected these individuals' lives. For example, he describes how the CDC requirement that HCWS disclose their HIV status to patients is punitive: "HCWS living with HIV/AIDS face the loss of their livelihood, professional status, and self-image" (Gostin 2004, 227).

Gostin's public policy arguments are evidence-based. His argument against the CDC policy forcing HCWS to disclose their HIV status to patients illustrates this point. He notes that:

Current policy and practice not only adversely affect the professional and personal interests of HCWS, but also may not be in the public interest. By denying talented health care professionals the opportunity to treat patients, the current policy may limit patients' ability to obtain care.

(Gostin 2004, 227)

He provides empirical scientific evidence which have concluded that the risk of HIV (and Hepatitis B) transmission from HCWS to patients is "exceedingly remote" (Gostin 2004, 221), and argues for a policy that would guarantee patients receive care in a safe environment while ensuring the privacy and dignity of HCWS. Throughout the book the author proposes the reform of ineffective federal policies governing HIV/AIDS and provides meticulous recommendations for doing so. For instance, he describes reforms that would continue to reduce the vertical transmission of HIV from mother to child, ensure that pregnant women provide voluntary consent for HIV testing, guarantee the privacy of pregnant women, and provide safeguards against nondiscriminatory practices aimed at these women. When he calls for a repeal of policies that outlaw needle-exchange programs, Gostin proposes comprehensive reforms that take into account drug paraphernalia and syringe prescription laws and training programs for health care professionals

and criminal justice personnel who deal with intravenous drug users.

"The AIDS Pandemic" is a well-written book that accomplishes its stated goal, to provide an extensive review of US HIV/AIDS laws and policies. The book's greatest strength is its comprehensiveness. It is ideal for legal scholars who might need an encyclopedia of sorts about laws pertaining to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. It will also appeal to AIDS activists interested in understanding current policies and promoting reformed policies to improve the lives of HIV-infected and affected individuals. Clinicians may find it less appealing or useful because of the significant focus on the law and because there is little guidance on how they can navigate the many statutes to meet the needs of their patients. He states that physicians have been convicted or had their licenses revoked for improperly prescribing drugs or drug paraphernalia to patients (Gostin 2004, 264), but he does not provide recommendations or list mechanisms through which physicians can otherwise make these services available to their patients. Philosophers may be disappointed because ethical analyses are less philosophical and rely more on societal norms. Perhaps this book's lasting value is that it depicts clearly how AIDS laws and policies have and continue to negatively impact on the lives of HIV-infected individuals. As a result, it silently urges its readers to challenge some of these outdated intrusions on HIV-infected individuals' lives. ■

REFERENCE

Gostin, L. O. 2004. *The AIDS Pandemic: Complacency, Injustice, and Unfulfilled Expectations*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

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DOI: 10.1080/15265160490907366

What We Want Animals to Want

Larry Carbone. 2004. *What Animals Want: Expertise and Advocacy in Animal Welfare Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press. 291 pp. \$29.95, hardcover.

Reviewed by Benjamin Hale, Stony Brook University

Larry Carbone's *What Animals Want* addresses the ethics of animal experimentation from the perspective of an insider (Carbone 2004). Carbone, a veterinarian whose extensive work with laboratory animals places him at once in the position of healer and executioner, physician and animal

psychologist, writes of the motivations, justifications, political arrangements and public policies at the center of the vivisection controversy. His inside view allows him to be both critical of the generalizations that predominate in the literature and to speak with an authority about what

animals want. More importantly, his long career allows him to present authoritatively the thesis that conditions in the laboratory have largely been determined by whichever group can most compellingly lay claim to knowing and understanding what animals want.

The book touches on areas specific to the wants and needs of animals used in experiments, but its overarching thesis is that much of the history of animal experimentation has been a struggle over who can best speak for the animals. Carbone begins the volume with an overview of the animal laboratory. From here he initiates a discussion of the presiding theories of animal welfare and animal ethics. He then devotes two chapters to a discussion of neurological distinctions between species and the muddle of these distinctions in the vivisection controversy. In the middle of the book he offers a systems explanation of the development of animal welfare legislation, arguing that as the picture of animals has changed, as the definition of pain has been revised, and as the struggle between expertise and advocacy has vacillated, so has animal welfare legislation. He ends the book with a case study, detailing the history and debate surrounding whether a rodent guillotine actually provides rats with a painless and quick death. The book functions at once to provide a helpful discussion of the history and sociology of animal issues in the laboratory and also to inform the more contentious theoretical debate on “what animals want” that motivated it.

Carbone should be commended for limiting himself to the singular issue of vivisection and the desires of animals. So many books that purport to speak for the animals discuss such a broad range of issues that they commit hasty generalizations about animal welfare that do not speak to the complex nuances of each issue. Indeed, the question of animals used for medical experiments differs importantly from the issue of animals used for cosmetic experiments, and this, in turn, differs importantly from the issue of animals used for psychological experiments.

For all of its merits, however, there are some areas on which a rigorous theorist might fault the book. Carbone focuses his “case studies on scientific facts, not as neutral objective statements about animals or the world, but as social constructions” (Carbone 2004, 7). He thus invokes a relativism that is unnecessary to the more pragmatic claims that he makes, and undercuts the strength of his thesis in the process. It becomes clear later in the book that he is more of a pragmatic pluralist than a relativist, hoping to have a multitude of voices chime in on the issue of animal welfare, but he walks a fine line, at times, between accepting the authority of multiple viewpoints and accepting any and all viewpoints.

His commitment to pragmatic pluralism rests on two suppositions: (a) that vivisection is occurring now, so that whatever ethical position we may hold, we must approach

the question from the standpoint of the vested interests and stakeholders, but also (b) that every person has a voice and a stake in this issue, such that no person can rightly be said to have an illegitimate understanding of the positions. Everyone has some idea of what animals “think, want, feel, suffer, know, enjoy, hate, fear, or long for,” (Carbone 2004, 244) he explains at the very end of his book. This latter assertion points to a further complication with his pragmatist position: He seems at once convinced of the authority of experts – he considers himself one, in fact – but also wary of self-styled experts; at once convinced of the importance of the contributions of animal advocates, but skeptical of the selfsame crowd.

At a few points in the book, Carbone reveals these prejudices by flippantly derogating the hard-won positions of animal advocates. He says at one point,

Antivivisectionists have the easy message: that animal research is bad because it hurts animals and must be stopped. Even a child can understand that. Research defenders have the more complex and difficult message: that animal research is good enough to outweigh whatever animal suffering it may entail. (Carbone 2004, 73)

Even a *child* can understand that? Many antivivisectionists, I am sure, would disagree with the purported ease of this argument. Most children do not in fact understand this, and even many adults have a difficult time accepting that hurting animals counts as a reason to say that animal research is bad. Carbone advances a variant of what is sometimes called the “Bambi” fallacy, reducing the arguments of animal advocates to touchy-feely tugs on the heartstrings of readers. Slips like these not only downplay the truly radical nature of animal advocacy, but also underdetermine its role in the development of pro-animal public policies.

The more important question that Carbone does not address, and that must be addressed, is what is so *special* about pain. He assumes unrealistically that readers will intuitively understand the alleviation of pain to be a good ethical reason upon which to act. With this as his governing assumption, he discusses instead the “scientization” of pain, explaining why a theorist or advocate must employ a good method for comparing types of pain (thus calling into question the voices that are acceptable as animal advocates).

Carbone concludes with some very strong statements about animal welfare. Among other things he urges theorists to focus on individual animals, and not classes of animals. He proposes that animal welfare must be conceived of more positively than negatively, as more than just the absence of suffering. He also encourages considering death as a serious harm to animals. Finally and most importantly, he urges other veterinarians to be animal advocates and

to draw on their own experiences, the experiences of animals, and the claims of non-specialists to learn what animals want.

What Animals Want is ambitious in its aims, covers the field well, and is a welcome addition to the sometimes overly general literature on animal rights. It is remarkable for its political history and for its analysis of individual policies, even if the theory that drives the analysis may be somewhat loose. In spite of its theoretical flaws, my tendency is to agree with Carbone on his pragmatism: Vivisection is here, it is occurring, and we must make sense of the way in which the world is now if we hope to make the world a better place in the interim. Researchers in the area of animal ethics and

vivisectionists themselves will find much of interest in this book, so long as they're not looking for answers about what animals want. Instead, they may be pleased to learn about the progressive development of animal welfare policy in the face of pressure from advocates and industry experts, each with competing positions on what animals want. ■

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Carbone, L. 2004. *What Animals Want: Expertise and Advocacy in Animal Welfare Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press.

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DOI: 10.1080/15265160490907375