to be providing safeguards for the reasonable exercise of these emotions. These emotions are an important part of our humanity that we ought not hide from either. If they are more likely to damage if left unchecked, then it seems fit and proper to provide sufficient restraints upon their exercise. Perhaps Nussbaum will not be satisfied by any regulatory scheme that seeks to reincorporate disgust and shame into the law. Nevertheless, this project seems one well worth trying.

Martha Nussbaum has written an exciting book that provides her best arguments yet on the important relationship between emotions and law. I hope much more on the topic is to follow soon. Not only is much of this account novel, much of it is convincing. Hiding from Humanity will surely help retain her status as one of the most important and influential figures in the field. I recommend it without reservation.

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John Dewey and Environmental Philosophy
HUGH P. MCDONALD, 2004
Albany, State University of New York Press
vii + 227 pp., £44.25 (hb), £14.75 (pb)

Hugh McDonald’s recent book provides valuable commentary on one of the great thinkers of the 20th century. Over the course of five chapters, McDonald investigates three primary aspects of Dewey’s thinking relevant to environmental ethics: naturalism, instrumentalism, and holism. While the structure of the book is somewhat asymmetrical — his first chapter occupies a full third of the book — with a bit of page flipping his overarching project becomes clear. His first chapter, the behemoth, provides a nice, if not somewhat standard, overview of the environmental ethics literature, particularly as it pertains to intrinsic value. For those already familiar with the debate, it is a reasonably quick read; though nevertheless vital to the discussion that follows. Chapters two, three, and four cover the topics of naturalism, instrumentalism, and holism respectively, and contain most of the pith of the book. Chapter five summarizes McDonald’s reasoning about why these three topics make for good environmental reading. What becomes clear somewhere near the middle of the third chapter is that this book is less about Dewey and environmental philosophy and more about defending Dewey against those who think that he has nothing to contribute to environmental philosophy.

In the first chapter McDonald methodically lays out his targets. He begins by discussing three environmental intrinsic value theorists: Tom Regan, J. Baird Callicott, and Holmes Rolston III. This introduction is meant to offset Dewey’s position on intrinsic value, which McDonald addresses in the final chapter. In a brief ‘Prologue to Chapter Two’ he details the accusations of Bob Taylor, C. A. Bowers, and Eric Katz that Dewey, and pragmatism in general, cannot make for good environmental philosophy. He explains that Taylor accuses Dewey of supporting a human-oriented naturalism, focusing on the social aspects of Dewey’s theory. Bowers, by contrast, claims that Dewey gives privileged status to the scientific method; that Dewey does not give a
voice to other organisms in the environment. And Katz complains that pragmatism places the ‘value of the natural environment on the experiences of human beings interacting with nature’ (p. 62) and that this begets a relativism tied to human valuing. McDonald then proceeds systematically to dismantle each of these concerns in turn.

The first bugaboo that McDonald attempts to dispel is that Dewey's pragmatism is anthropocentric and therefore unfit for any value outside of human values. He tackles this monster in the second chapter, ‘Dewey’s Naturalism,’ in which he demonstrates, with compelling textual support, that Dewey views the metaphysics of nature as a process of continual change, in which and of which humans are inextricably caught up. McDonald explains that there is little sense to the claim that Dewey could be an anthropocentrist, since humans are for Dewey always ‘in and of’ the process of nature. If this is not enough, continues McDonald, Dewey does not isolate his behaviourism to the activities of rational beings, but rather includes a wide spectrum of creatures and entities. This behaviourism opens for Dewey the possibility of affixing value to the experience of nature; which, one might think, further qualifies Dewey for inclusion in the anthropocentric camp. Yet McDonald takes great pains to explain that even this behaviour-based experience is not limited to the experiences of human beings, but instead locates value in the activities of all organisms, in the web of relations between organisms. He writes: ‘the origin of value lies in its contribution to the survival of a species’ way of life’ (p. 87).

McDonald reserves his third chapter to address his second bugaboo — the charge that intrinsic value in Dewey's pragmatism is primarily instrumental. Where the concern in the previous chapter was over humans as the sole locus of value, here McDonald’s concern is to release Dewey from the charge that all value derives from nature’s use, whether to humans or to non-human organisms. This discussion plays off of a slightly different conception of intrinsic value than that of the previous chapter. McDonald clarifies that Dewey doesn’t speak of ‘ends,’ so much as he speaks of ‘ends-in-view’. Dewey argues that ends-in-view are instead relational, and therefore, that value is not static and ‘frozen’, as might be the case with an Aristotelian conception of ends, but rather is determined by the social process in which it is caught up. Values are sometimes ends and sometimes means to further ends. As he argues in Human Nature and Conduct, ‘Ends are literally endless, forever coming into existence as new activities occasion new consequences’ (p. 211). Dewey's notion of pragmatism as a political and social unfinished project applies, apparently, to all experiencing beings.

In the fourth chapter on ‘Dewey’s Holism’ McDonald seeks to establish Dewey as a moral holist, hitting yet his third and final bugaboo. According to McDonald, Dewey explains that value arrangements start with problem situations. Within a problem situation Dewey locates desire, which corresponds with ends-in-view, such that desire satisfaction occurs as an organism seeks to attain the end-in-view. Valuations, then, can be deliberated and reflected upon in making choices. What is unclear from McDonald’s explanation is how valuations can adhere to organisms that don’t appear to deliberate over choices. McDonald slides in and out of language here that suggests first that all organisms make choices with ends-in-view, but then that they are deliberating over choices. At times he attempts to overcome the problem by citing intelligence as the force at work in the background of value situations. ‘Intelligence and imagination are indispensable tools for resolving problematic situations by giving activity a positive direction’ (p. 114). If this is true, then it would appear that intelligence
could only be located in intelligent beings, which dramatically undercuts his earlier aims to demonstrate that Dewey was not anthropocentric.

Whether McDonald succeeds in defending the claim that Dewey can provide fertile ground for an environmental ethic is yet an open question. McDonald seems to want to hang much of his account on Dewey’s ‘refined’ and ‘naturalistic’ (p. xv) notion of intrinsic value. While I find myself sympathizing somewhat with Dewey’s and McDonald’s view, I for one am not convinced that a robust environmental ethic ‘must be based on the intrinsic value of the non-human’ (p. 143). Which brings me to this final point.

The book is intensely exegetical. Its topics hang together tightly, but I found that the best way to read the book is with a stiff cup of coffee, a bookmark embedded in the footnotes, and the original copies of Dewey by my side. In this sense, it provides a fantastically elaborate commentary that should interest Dewey acolytes and neophytes alike. The downside of this, however, is that it only periodically provides arguments in support of Dewey’s positions, and instead takes as its primary task that of explaining Dewey’s stance and defending him against the accusations of Taylor, Bowers, and Katz. One must either be intimately familiar with this debate or must be willing to do plenty of work to make sense of the claims in the book. This strategy — assertion and interpretation over argument — will be largely unsatisfying for those looking to be convinced that Dewey should be their cicerone.

The book is well suited to anyone interested in environmental ethics; or, ultimately, anyone interested in Dewey’s ethical thought. It could be used in a graduate-level course on pragmatism, particularly on environmental pragmatism, as it rigorously engages this central debate. It is not, however, a great primer on Dewey. It simply dives too deep and assumes too much foreknowledge to aid the uninitiated. Nor is it terribly persuasive that Dewey had it right on environmental matters. It simply assumes too defensive a posture to juggle the finer points of Dewey’s pragmatism. Perhaps the greatest contribution of the book, however, is that it is but one of few in the environmental ethics corpus that devotes the entirety of its investigation to an historical analysis and articulation of the views of a past-master in light of current problems in philosophy. Would only that there were more such books. McDonald’s book will hopefully provide motivation and inspiration to future environmental philosophers interested in tackling environmental philosophy from the perspective of what has already been said.

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