Homeland Security: The Science and Technology Policy Challenge

Executive Summary

In October 2002 more than 60 scientists, scholars, and security experts primarily from the Colorado Front Range region spent two days at the University of Colorado at a Symposium entitled “Science, Technology and Security: Knowledge for the Post-9/11 World.” Participants sought to foster new connections and thinking among the wealth of local experts on how better to integrate scientific and technological research with decision making in a diverse range of issues of homeland security. The overarching goal of the Symposium was to recommend practical and effective strategies for improving the two-way connections between science and technology and security policy. The Symposium focused on the application of these strategies in five substantive areas: information technology (IT) security, bioterrorism, water security, energy security, and critical infrastructure.

The Symposium was sponsored by University of Colorado at Boulder, Colorado Springs, Denver and its Health Sciences Center, the University of Colorado System, Rocky Mountain Institute for Biosecurity Research at Colorado State University, the Graduate School of International Studies at Denver University and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation.

This executive summary provides an overview of the broad themes that emerged from the Symposium. The report concludes that successful policies related to homeland security will require new thinking, and most importantly, practical strategies for implementation of the nation’s science and technology policies. As such, this report does not take on the task of prescribing particular research projects, but instead focuses on the broader challenge of improving the two-way connections between science and technology and security policy. The specific policy recommendations proposed in the five substantive breakout groups of the workshop can be found in the accompanying breakout group reports. The stakes are high. Failure to meet the challenge that homeland security poses for science and technology could lead to a less secure nation with profound implications for life and liberty.

The first broad theme is the interrelationship between strategic doctrine and science and technology policy. “Strategic doctrine” refers to the overarching policy framework that, in large degree, guides the foreign and domestic policies of the United States as they relate to our allies, enemies and others worldwide. As keynote speaker former Senator Gary Hart observed, globalization, information technology, the decline of the nation state (and, we might add, the rise of fundamentalism), change in the nature of conflict itself, and, of course, the tragic events of 9/11, all signify the need for a new strategic doctrine for American foreign policy. The Cold War strategic doctrine of “containment” largely determined the nation’s overarching science and technology priorities for many years following World War II. Today, however, we may be on the cusp of a fundamental reordering of this relationship toward one in which science and technology continues to provide opportunity, but the limitations of science and technology dictate the parameters of practical, feasible, and effective strategic doctrine. Some factors warranting a rethinking of this relationship include the changing nature of threats to security and the increased access to all forms of science and technology, both dangerous and benign.

The second broad theme is that to understand the potential contributions of science and technology to homeland security, it is necessary to understand the scientific, technological and policy challenges of risk and vulnerability management. As used here "vulnerability" describes inherent characteristics of a system that create the potential for harm but are independent of the probabilistic “risk” of the occurrence of any particular event. A further distinction is between the “risk” of an event, say a terrorist biological attack on a major city, and the “risk” of a particular outcome, say 1,000 deaths in a terrorist attack.

The Bush administration’s proposed strategic doctrine of “preemption” focuses on risk management: identifying and dealing with the threat of an event before it results in adverse consequences. But history and research in areas as varied as natural hazards to engineering to domestic policy making suggest that “surprise” – resulting from an inability to anticipate every eventuality – is endemic to policy making. We should not expect the challenges of homeland security to be any different. A reality of security-related decision making is that in many cases accurate assessment of risk is simply impossible. Consequently, in cases where decisions are made based on inaccurate, incomplete or uncertain assessments of risk, risk management strategies could very easily result in outcomes quite different than those intended. The current strategic doctrine of preemptive does not distinguish vulnerability from risk. Alternative approaches to strategic doctrine may include an emphasis on enhancing resilience through vulnerability reduction (which itself may constitute a form of preemption).

Recommendations from the Symposium for the practice of science and technology common across the various substantive areas are expressed as three imperatives:

• increase collaboration,
• consider both dangerous and useful research, and
• learn and then apply lessons of experience in research and in practice.

The first recommendation emphasizes the importance of collaboration between traditional sectors (public and private), collaboration across levels of government (local, state, federal), and collaboration across disciplines, specifically with greater attention to the contributions from the humanities and social sciences. The second recommendation offers approaches for dealing with “dangerous” research that need not involve excessive government interference with academic freedom. It also focuses on the need for research to result in products and services that are of use to decision makers. The final recommendation recognizes that a range of experience in other contexts may provide useful information for thinking about and responding to the challenges of homeland security.

The formulation and application of an effective homeland security policy requires asking difficult questions that lie at the heart of science and technology policy – in the words of Congressman Sherwood Boehlert regarding creation of the Homeland Security department:

Truth be told, I don't think anyone's yet even fully thought through the most basic question - in what ways do we want research related to homeland security to be different after this reorganization?

This report and accompanying documents reflect some initial efforts to think through that basic question.