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Bioterrorism Breakout Report
Thursday October 10, 2002
Chair: Bill Brown, Centre for Crop Biosecurity, Colorado State University,
Fort Collins, CO
Rapporteur: Lee Panella, Head, USDA-ARS Crops Research Laboratory, Fort
Collins, CO
Recorder: Betty Muller Brown: BCA Resources, Fort Collins, CO
Section 1-Discussions and problem identification
How to manage not only an outbreak of some sort but also public perception,
panic and over reaction. Where does that management come from? (i.e.,
what level)
Accurate, appropriate information is the key. The Department of Homeland Security
will need to have a spokesperson to deal with these problems. Experts need to
be on site to answer questions (CDC model), if we hope to limit that kind of
panic. Diagnostic tests must be developed before a crisis (or crises) not during
the crisis (or crises). They can never be 100% accurate and there is a need
to educate public and media to that. Correct (true) information is always necessary.
The media are a critical constituency - they are the public's main source of
information. They like defined information and have trouble with uncertain information
which is what much of science produces. It is necessary to deal well with the
media for any emergency or act of bioterrorism - human, animal or plant.
Tell the truth and what you don't know, you don't know. CDC has communication
experts that package information in the way the media needs it - 10-second sound
bites. In crops (and animals? = agriculture) we have been too successful and,
therefore, people don't expect problems and don't worry about where their food
will come from. In reality we often do plant autopsies. Master Gardeners is
a way to contact the common citizen and spread an understanding and appreciate
of the impact of plant disease.
Have there been documented cases of crop bioterrorism? Major programs
existed in the past and we don't know if they were ever used. Al-quida documents
recovered indicated that they might have been working with crop bioweapons.
How do you handle the waste from large number of infectious human disease
cases? There is no waste incinerator in Colorado and we ship such waste
to Utah to be burned? CDC has looked at this in some of the planning exercises.
There is the capacity to cremate corpses and hospitals could work on this conjunction
with funeral homes. Much of the smaller amounts of waste can be autoclaved and
also a 10% bleach soak will work in many cases. Some biological agents like
anthrax spores require more treatment. This is the problem with cost of cleanup
at Hart building (over 6 million $U.S.).
For animal carcass destruction there are animal digesters being used. There
has been one added to CSU and other places - esp. for prion and spore destruction.
In plants (in planta) burning is really the only alternative. Small, lab samples
can be (and are) autoclaved.
Is it necessary to have truth triage? Where is the line? Who makes that
decision? If you don't say anything the media will invent something. Tell them
the information and then also tell them how and when to deliver it. Often information
is time sensitive - try to explain the situation to the media. How do you give
really bad news?
Cooperative extension has a disaster communication network - this network of
specialists needs to be engaged with our discussions. For example, Cooperative
Extension's response to the drought this year in the state of Colorado developed
a clear and frequent updating to the public. A special task force was put together
to deal with it in handling recommendations and communications.
If you give no information you get misinformation. For example, with
Rhizomania, a potentially devastating virus disease of sugar beet, a task force
was put into place before the disease was discovered in Colorado after it had
been found in Idaho and other western states. In this manner, the sugar beet
industry, along with federal and state researchers and regulatory, personnel
were able to handle the problem when it was found here with a minimum of hysteria,
despite extraordinarily poor (inaccurate) media coverage.
Drought builds over time, what about immediate information dissemination needs?
CDC answer - we use FEMA expertise to deal with emergencies. That is their job.
CDC does the job of the science and FEMA handles logistics and the rest. It
is hard to deal with fear and panic. If we are prepared enough in other ways,
perhaps the communication issue comes with that response? We often deal with
the confusion of bio-crime, bio-crime-detection with public health issues. Chain
of custody issues belongs to the FBI and other police agencies. If you are involved
with public health, focus your resources to quell public panic.
Are we comfortable with the civil liberties aspects of public health issues?
We probably haven't thought it through and this is definitely a public awareness
issue. We may have a very short time to discuss this, because if there is another
bioterrorism incident, the public view of civil liberties will change and, perhaps,
allow more restrictions, and backing out of this will be very difficult. There
may also be regional differences in comfort levels with what people will demand
or tolerate protection. Example, we know that if people carry guns there are
more deaths by guns and there is a big difference in whether or not states let
everyone carry guns.
Although people may not die, there can be huge economic impacts of crop destruction
- rural sociology, increased substance abuse, esp. in small farm communities
and market place embargoes of products originating in affected areas.
Again there is a difference between responding to an emergency and an "intentionally
caused" emergency. FBI has a different chain of custody, different culture
etc.
The available technology, policy and regulations in plant pathology lag behind
animal and human pathology. Is it legal to transport plant pathogens and/or
use them as an agent of bioterrorism? What are the laws about transporting pathogens?
There are definite laws controlling the possession and transportation of animal
and human pathogens. The select agent list and resulting regulations have been
strengthened for importation exclusion and defines how they can be brought into
the US. However, you must self report, it is almost impossible to locate pathogens
- there are no "detectors" - if you don't tell someone at the border
that you have them, it would be easy to bring them into this country.
The regulations for working with pathogens, especially select pathogens,
have been increased and will probably be further restricted. Is this impacting
your ability to do research? Does this affect the choice of research topics,
limiting research on those problems that most impact biosecurity?
Now laboratories must list pathogens on a government list and track receiving,
sending, inventory and disposal. The Patriot Act also prohibits hiring certain
people. All of these actions, even if they don't impact the research, make it
much more expensive and paperwork intensive.
Addendum to discussion submitted after the conference.
Also, I think there is scope for considering the idea of actual licensing of
researchers working with dangerous pathogens; doctors need to be licensed. So
do pilots and others. Why not those doing potentially dangerous research?? (Elisa
Harris - 10/22/2002)
Section 2-Recommendations
- How do you mange public reaction to Crises?
Determine what to communicate and when. There should be a system of information
that is a continuum during:
- Pre------------preparedness education and training
- During-------continual updating and direction
- Post-----------this is what we are doing to recover
- Back to Pre--what have we learned
Identify the best methods such as those used by Johnson and
Johnson during the Tylenol scare and anti-smoking campaigns, for example.
Use people like Mike Slater in Colorado State University's technical journalism
group. Good print media articles such as the recent article on small pox
that appeared in Newsweek.
Get to people not on the web. In a planned attack the web
might not be functional to begin with and in addition there are many that
do not have access. Many of the poor, the most vulnerable to a bioterrorism
attack, do not have computers. Use Cooperation Extension and similar groups
to package and distribute disaster information. CE has programs such as
EFNEP (Emergency Food and Nutrition Education Program) staff in all of the
Metro counties and elsewhere where there are significant minority and low-income
populations. Many EFNEP staff is bi-lingual and as such would be more effective
communicators in those target minority and low-income communities.
Empower local people (especially minorities and low income)
to participate in what needs to be done to educate, prepare and communicate
in a calm manner and avoid panic if a situation does arise.
Develop multiple media plans that insure communication even
in the lack of web access, electricity breakdown, etc. Radio, T.V., Internet
and even loudspeakers can run off auxiliary power sources. A network of
portable printers to produce and distribute hard copy information, posters
and flyers could be developed.
Training at many levels before the emergency will be critical
to insure that all of the above steps are in place and everyone at every
level knows what to do.
- How does university & technology community inform/work with media?
Build trust and understanding of media concern for independence
and ethics. Many reporters develop a long-term relationship with some technical
people because they learn that they can rely on them.
Prepare a short factual summary in print when contacted by
a reporter to make an appointment. Determine what the reporter needs to
learn to develop his/her story. In that way you insure that they have the
facts right in front of them and thus reduce the opportunity for being misquoted
or disseminating misinformation.
Use the institution's (university, institute, and agency) professional
public relations and publications staff that has established contacts
and relations with most media outlets in your area. Make sure the public
relations staff has a list of specialists/experts in various fields so they
know whom to contact. Have multiple persons in each subject matter area
to insure that a story does not go out without technical accuracy just because
the "expert" was out-of-town.
- Any documented incidents of biological/Ag bioterrorism?
Seth Carus (Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological
Agents in the 20th Century. Washington D.C.: Center for Counter proliferation
Research, National Defense University, 1999) mentions three instances of biowarfare
or threats of biowarfare against crops or animals. In 1981, an ecoterrorist
group, "Dark Harvest", threatened placing anthrax contaminated soil
in places throughout the UK to highlight the ecological dangers of chemical
and germ warfare. Tamil militants in Sri Lanka threatened to destroy the economy
by bringing in non-indigenous diseases to devastate rubber and tea plantations
during the early 1980s. The only documented evidence of Agroterrorism was
in 1952 when the Mau Mau used African Bush Milk (a plant toxin) to poison
steers of the Kikuyu tribe in Kenya. The potential consequences from an Agrobioterrorist
act on crops or animals in the country are, nonetheless staggering and include
economic destabilization and loss of confidence in the government, all with
a minimal risk of discovery.
Establish a CDC-like national center for animal and plant disease reporting,
tracking, research and response. While there are many local veterinarians,
county and state veterinarians and organizations responsible for detecting,
diagnosing and responding to animal diseases, there is no such organization
or staff responsible for plant diseases and pests. The USDA-APHIS plant and
pest programs concentrate on detection of exotic plant diseases, insects and
invasive plants. They do not address endemic plant pathogens that could potentially
be used as bio-weapons. Additionally the USDA-APHIS programs dealing with
non-animal pests and diseases are critically understaffed and under-funded.
Enlarge the network of regional diagnostic clinics. The Cooperative
Extension service staffs that are posted in the local communities have multiple
responsibilities and few are trained in plant disease detection, diagnosis
and management. There are diagnostic plant disease clinics in most states
that generally are operated by Cooperative Extension specialists and staff.
Presently these are being organized into a system (network) of 5 regions with
regional clinics at University of California Davis (West), Kansas State University
(Great Plains), Michigan State University (North Central Plains), Cornell
University (North East) and Florida State University (South). With the significant
widespread and diverse geo-ecological nature of the U.S., 5 regions are insufficient.
Additional clinics are needed, especially one to serve the Rocky Mountain
Region encompassing, Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming.
Along with the above develop a network of regional environmental monitoring
and reporting climate information such as the Colorado State University prototype
operational in eastern Colorado
- What do we do with biological waste in CO to ship to Utah?
Review and analyze the current system of generation, collection
and disposal of biological waste in Colorado. Determine if in-state bio-waste
sites are needed.
- Do we need truth triage? - invoke disaster extension services and FEMA.
Refer to # 1.
- Are we comfortable with civil liberties and public health issues?
NO. There is increasing tension and concern in the academic
community that our government will take a "preventive" approach
to security relying on secrecy, restriction of information exchange and censorship.
In contrast to this we believe that an approach that emphasizes our nation's
resilience as a major strength depending on preparedness, openness and effective
communication is best.
Initiate a national debate/dialogue on this issue. Use the
public health laws as a study case. Debates such as the current discussion
surrounding whooping cough should serve as a good example. Develop criteria
to determining how to manage potential epidemics.
Include all stakeholders in the debate. Especially those
that are most likely to be impacted the most seriously, minorities, the
poor, schools, farmers, etc.
- How do we discriminate between public health issues and Bio-crimes?
Establish criteria for crime in public health issues. There
presently are laws that identify some activities as criminal in public and
animal health. There are none or at best poorly define in crops. Such laws
should be reviewed and unified to reflect a continuum of policy and laws addressing
terrorist activity.
- Do we need policy to clarify whether spread of plant pathogens is a
crime?
YES we do, but only as a component of a total policy. There are
none but as noted above there should be a continuum on terrorist activity
and what is a crime. This should be based on intent not target.
- What are laws on spread of animal pathogens?
YES. But as noted above, only as a component of a total policy
based on intent not target.
Focus on malicious intent not on human, animal and crop.
Define any and all existing laws and write new laws as needed.
- Have the increased controls placed on research and on who can do research
(i.e., work on selective agents) caused interference with research or negatively
impacted research efforts?
YES. The impact on recruiting foreign graduate students is already
alarming to many in academia and other research institutes.
Initiate self-required peer review (where it does not already exist)
backed up by comprehensive professional peer review systems. There
is considerable concern about what researchers will be permitted to publish
in the future (cite the publication from APS and the other one given us
at the meeting). Good research is dependent upon open discussion of science
with and by peers. It is only through good research that good preparedness
can evolve.
Work with regulatory agencies that will develop rules and regulations.
The relevant professional societies, associations and other organizations
are the best qualified and the most impacted by the development of rules
addressing security. It is the responsibility of these organizations to
initiate and lead the debate on controls in association with the appropriate
governmental agencies involved.
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