Summary Remarks by Eugene Skolnikoff

Some thoughts on the Science, Technology and Security Symposium

Eugene B. Skolnikoff
MIT
Oct. 14, 2002

The symposium was a great success from my point of view, and I believe from the perspective of most of those who attended. I judge such an event by whether or not I learned from it, and on that criterion the session far more than fulfilled my hopes.

I will not attempt to summarize all that I heard, but would prefer, as in my closing remarks at the symposium, to offer some comments and mention a few issues I think deserve recognition. These can most easily be presented as a series of bullets.

• The group assembled for the symposium, drawn from a wide range of professions and positions in Colorado and a few outsiders was most impressive both in depth of knowledge and breadth of experience. I gather many, perhaps most, did not know each other before the meeting. Given the multidisciplinary nature of the terrorism challenge, bringing together such a disparate group successfully is particularly encouraging for their essential ability to work together. I was also struck by how much discussion, analysis and research is going on in Colorado related to the issues, considerably more than I was aware of. It is not clear if the glass is half full or half empty, given the difficulty of the whole subject, but Colorado appears to be well along in appreciating the nature of what has to be done.
• Given that, it seems to me to be quite appropriate for the university to seek to obtain one of the Federal centers on counter-terrorism likely to be set up in the new Federal Department of Homeland Security when (if?) it is finally established.
• The extensive discussion in the symposium of threats and vulnerabilities, a necessary part of mobilizing to deal with them, raised some serious concerns in my mind. The sense of being "at war," encountered so clearly in the government in Washington, strikes me as carrying significant dangers. In particular, it leads to what I feel is excessive attention to the nation's vulnerabilities. That can, perhaps already has, resulted in a panic atmosphere that we are facing immediate and grave risks that must be corrected at once. Our vulnerabilities are in an important sense endless, can be reduced but not eliminated, and can only be tackled over a long period of time. Moreover, the sense of panic can easily lead, as I believe it already has, to attempts at control and at restrictions of various kinds on civil liberties and on knowledge that are both unwise and counterproductive. We are not at war in any kind of traditional sense; there will be no decisive "end" and if we are to have reasonably stable policies and allocation of resources over time, the sense of crisis is distinctly unhelpful.
• Several issues or concerns came up repeatedly. Perhaps the most common of these was the identification of a critical need for improved communication in many different settings: between technology and human systems, between science and those seeking to use the results of research, between government and the public, between and among official agencies, and so on. This subject is clearly important in this relatively new era of international terrorism for which a quite new set of actors is often involved. In many of the areas of identified need, the question is how knowledge can be effectively transferred from the laboratory to the field, from the government agency to the public, or from one agency used to working in one environment to another with a different environmental background and experience. It is often not realized, especially when the demands pose seemingly different challenges from the past, how much experience there is on techniques for effective transfer of knowledge and how much excellent literature is often available. It will be important to avoid re-inventing the wheel in the process of tackling the obviously serious challenges the need for effective communications poses.
• Another repeated comment was the importance of creating resilience in the structure of American society as a way of reducing our vulnerabilities. Resilience was never quite defined, but constituents that were identified that contributed to resilience included, in particular, redundancy and standardization. This concept of resilience deserves to be fleshed out both in the abstract and in concrete applications.
• A third comment often cited in the symposium was the significance of the fact that such a large proportion of the nation's infrastructure is in the private domain. This creates a clear requirement for improving and expanding government/industry relations and for designing incentives and policies that will make possible effective industrial participation in the counter-terrorism effort.
• Finally, there were concerns raised that particularly affected science, research and civil liberties. It was pointed out, for example, that onerous or excessive restrictions on biological agents or on foreign students and scientists, or on publication of research results could well discourage competent scientists from working in critical areas.
• Similarly, regulations imposed on "sensitive but unclassified information" could easily be counterproductive if not designed carefully and implemented with understanding of the scientific research process and of the value systems of universities. Some traditional scientific and university procedures may require modification, for example, recognizing that there are areas of information that were previously readily available that may now have to be protected in some way. But, the important questions are Who decides? With what attitudes and backgrounds? And who implements the new rules? The history of the effect on science of government-imposed regulations implemented by national security agencies is often not good, in the process damaging rather than supporting national security. It is critical that the community-science, technology, universities-be out in front on this issue, suggesting appropriate rules and implementation procedures that are reflective of the values essential to the vitality of the scientific enterprise, which in turn is essential to the counter-terrorism effort. If the community does not respond adequately, rules and procedures will be imposed rather than designed in a collaborative process.
• Lastly, the many examples of civil-liberty concerns that arise in policies to provide public health protection against terrorism were frequently raised. These range across many dimensions from personal privacy to forced immunization. The concerns are serious and deserve intense study and understanding to avoid sacrificing the very values we are trying to protect.
• Good show.