3. I think many would agree that Hansen’s words on fossil fuel CEOs may be bad policy advice and bad tactics – but presumably Hansen has a different view. In any case, I note that you no longer insist that his statement violated your formulation of what scientists should not do:

“scientists [should not] use formal (e.g., legal) mechanisms or even seek to create new formal mechanisms to limit what can be said on the issue of climate change” (viz., no seeking legal sanction!).

It looks like we have gotten close to some agreement on RS and Swindle as well.

2. Thanks for the reference to Chris Harrison’s paper. Not being overly lazy or disinclined to reading, I’ve tracked it down and, for the benefit of any other curious readers who might happen along, note that it is here, along with a host of other useful essays by you, Daniel Sarewitz, and Naomi Oreskes regarding the enganglements between science and policy: http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/publications/special/pielke_tse_debate.html

1. Deva vu all over again. I wouldn’t say that this thread has been unproductive, but I can say that it has been quite frustrating and disappointing to struggle to try to understand your views when you not only decline to describe them.

Regards,

Tom

1. You ask: “can you please spell out your view on when and why organizations like RS should avoid appeals using moral suasion to limit expression?”

Well here we are again. The answer is that the RS should take on the role of an “honest broker”. What do I mean by that? Please check out my book from your local library.

You write: “You can serve the debate better if you would clarify your views”

Well, I’ve tried in a short book. You’ve complained when I suggested that you read it. Here we are again.

2. On publishing pressure, see Chris Harrison’s paper, linked on our site (yes, another request to read;-)

3. Hansen. Bad policy advice, bad tactics. What more can I say?

Thanks.

I appreciate that you have agreed that there is a distinction between legal sanction and moral sanction and that in some instances an apparent infringement on freedom of expression may not actually violate the principles (tied to legal sanction) that you laid out (the PP) on what scientists should not do. However, you continue to criticize some of these activities by scientists, without clearly acknowledging that they do not violate the PP and without spelling out a general argument for why you disagree with such activities/find them unadvisable.

Allow me to point out these cases and to continue to ask you to clarify more precisely what your advice is and the basis for it.

2. Royal Society. While you precviously expressly argued that this was a case of an “effort to censor”, you now say it is “a separate issue from freedom of expression, and not really relevant here”, while continuing to criticize it, on the grounds that the RS was “seeking to use the authority of science to limit open debate” and that “some organizations [like RS, presumably] should avoid appeals using moral suasion to limit expression”.

While I would disagree with your first characterization (as I note in my next paragraph), my principal question is: Since legal and moral sanction are different (and I much prefer efforts ar moral suasion over legal sanction), can you please spell out your view on when and why organizations like RS should avoid appeals using moral suasion to limit expression? It does a disservice to the debate simply to lump legal and moral sanction together, which is why I thought you agreed to distinguish them. Further, in your immediately preceding post, you said that “the issue was whether the RS was to serve as an advocacy group for particular causes and against others. In my opinion, they should not take on this role.” Well, will the real RP criticism please stand up? Do you have any generalized advice you can draw from RS, or is it limited just to them? You can serve the debate better if you would clarify your views

As an aside, I disagree that RS was “seeking to use the authority of science to limit open debate”. The RS was simply trying to get Exxon to clarify when Exxon was actually talking, either directly or indirectly. Just as you have questioned the accountability of comments who post anonymously (like me), RS is right to note that when Exxon uses others to comment for it, Exxon is seeking to avoid accountability for its actions. This seems to me to be perfectly fair, and in fact a service to the debate. If you think that this is a role that RS should not be playing, or should be played with more balance, then we need to hear your reasons.

3. Swindle. I agree completely that scientists should not seeking to ask a regulator to require the correction of errors, for the reasons you offer – though suing privately seems to me perfectly fine.

However, more nuance is still helpful. Unfortunately, regulators often DO adjudicate truth claims, which is why people run to them when they see something they consider false on the telly. But what the complainants failed to notice was that Ofcom requires strict truth only on NEWS programs, and Swindle was not broadcast as news and so Ofcom’s review was much more limited. Thus while getting some vindication, the complainants also played into the PR hand of CH4 and the Swindlers. Obviously the complainants, in retrospect, might be considered unwise, and a positive lesson might be that scientists should be much more careful, since seeking to get a regulator to adjudicate truth might blow up in one’s face. But that’s entirely different from saying that seeking an adjudication is attempting to squelch free speech.

4. Lomborg. The Danish committee is an entirely different issue from whether Cambridge U Press publishes his book. I’d say the first is clearly a no-no under the PP, while the second is entirely fair (at least under PP). If you want to argue against the publishing pressure, you need to advance reasons other than PP.

5. Hansen. Again, can you distinguish between whether Hansen’s words violated the PP, or whether you simply have other arguments for why his statements were unwise/counterproductive?

Thanks again for your time.

Regards,

Tom

We are picking off a few of your issues, which is good, but running circles around others. A few replies:

1. You state, “Please note that sometimes political speech may be libelous and may be commercial speech” — granted. I still am not talking about situations of libel or commercial speech. I think that we both agree here that the subject matter I have raised is not what corporations say directly in regards to their business (despite Milloy’s efforts).

2. On the RS, you seem to have forgotten the very useful distinction between moral suasion and legal sanction that you introduced here earlier. On the RS I do indeed write:

“The Royal Society is seeking to use the authority of science to limit open debate. This is not, to put it delicately, the most effective use of scientific authority in political debates.”

There is no inconsistency between saying that some organizations should avoid appeals using moral suasion to limit expression, and all scientists should avoid appeals to legal sanction to limit expression. In your parsing of the latter I have pointed out that the RS example is not relevant.

3. You ask, “Should or should not scientists seeking to ask a regulator to require the correction of errors?”

Of course not, because this places the regulator in the position of arbitrating truth claims. My understanding is that OFCOM wisely did not accept such a role. Nor should they. Claims to truth cannot be regulated. Sorry.

4. Lomborg’s book was brought to a Danish Committee on Scientific Dishonesty. I have a paper and organized a special issue on this situation, should you want more, but yes, scientists sought formal sanctions via legal means, akin to Swindle. If you want links to papers and such just ask.

5. You write, “One can recognize that Hansen’s statement didn’t violate anyone’s rights to expression but still find it objectional on the grounds that it calls for formal sanction on activities that are not clearly illegal.”

Sure, I don’t think I ever said Hansen’s comments violated anyone’s rights. I think I said that the policies (i.e., trials for execs) he was calling for were plain old dumb;-)

6. You write, “I think your summarization of what scientists should not do in order to avoid violating free speech principles is fine. But the principles certainly allow nuance in reviewing different situations, which nuance may be important – as can be readily seen when we review various examples.”

Whew! Agreed;-)

1. I understand that you are referring to political speech, and that you exclude “libel, perjury, or even commercial speech (e.g., advertising) or specific product claims (e.g., health benefits of pharmaceuticals)”.

Please note that sometimes political speech may be libelous and may be commercial speech (indeed, ALL speech by corporations is commercial speech).

2. Roger, at any number of times in the discussion above you have lumped in the Royal Society’s letter to Exxon with the other examples we are now discussing. Now you say it is “a separate issue from freedom of expression, and not really relevant here”, and that “As I stated on that thread, the issue was whether the RS was to serve as an advocacy group for particular causes and against others.”

Well, I appreciate the clarification as to what your views are now, but in your initial post on the RS letter (September 21, 2006, titled “David Whitehouse on Royal Society Efforts to Censor”), didn’t you say the following?

- “Let me say in no uncertain terms that in my opinion the actions by the Royal Society are inconsistent with the open and free exchange of ideas, as well as the democratic notion of free speech. … The Royal Society is seeking to use the authority of science to limit open debate. This is not, to put it delicately, the most effective use of scientific authority in political debates. …. A strategy based on stifling debate is sure to backfire, not just on the climate issue, but for the scientific enterprise as a whole.”

and
- “I agree with the spirit of Dr. henson’s views, especially when he writes, “However the Royal Society sees its role in debates about science, is it appropriate that it should be using its authority to judge and censor in this way?” This question perfectly captures my concerns and is the message that I endorse 100% from the letter. Thanks for the chance to clarify.”

It seems to me that you have fairly consistently, indeed, up until your last post on this thread, confused the RS letter with “freedom of speech” issues. That’s one of the reasons why I have pushed the issue. I’m happy that you now apparently agree that the RS letter to Exxon is a separate issue from freedom of expression, and doesn’t violate the PP (which I continue to use because I think your summary is an apt one).

3. Swindle. You say that issues of libel are not your focus; that’s one clarification out of the way. But what about issues of misrepresentation? Do you disapprove of Prof. Wunsch or Sir King asking Ofcom to require Ch 4 to correct misrepresentations?

You have “no problems with scientists seeking to correct what they see are factual errors, and complaining loudly about this.” I’m happy you seem to agree that seeking a correction of errors is not the same as trying to limit what can be said. But what are you saying in the context of Swindle? Should or should not scientists seeking to ask a regulator to require the correction of errors?

Your offer another example: “when scientists lobbied Cambridge University Press to cease publication of The Skeptical Environmentalist, lest people’s minds be exposed to improper knowledge.” Can you clarify how your opposition to this is consistent with the PP (which I thought focussed on actions by governments)? What formal (legal) action was sought?

As I inquired in my previous comment, it may be appropriate to distinguish between (1) activities that actively seek to use the state to block or sanction expression (but not sanctions for false/libelous statements) and (2) other activities that merely create social pressure or private/non-governmental sanctions. If you are seeking to do (2), then it would be helpful if you noted that while such activities do not violate rights of expression, they may still be undesirable for scientists for certain reasons.

4. Hansen. “Splitting hairs” may be important Roger, particular if one wants to be clear and fair. One can recognize that Hansen’s statement didn’t violate anyone’s rights to expression but still find it objectional on the grounds that it calls for formal sanction on activities that are not clearly illegal.

BTW, my point was not that “it was the funding provided by corporations to pressure groups that might have been illegal”, but that we should be careful, when we discuss issues of “freedom of expression” to note that while corporations are full of individuals who have rights of free expression, corporations themselves are often not considered to have the same rights. All corporate speech is commercial speech, to refer to a distinction you acknowledged earlier.

5. Again, I think your summarization of what scientists should not do in order to avoid violating free speech principles is fine. But the principles certainly allow nuance in reviewing different situations, which nuance may be important – as can be readily seen when we review various examples.

Further, as I have suggested, I think that it may be acceptable to decide to criticize – or to counsel against as counterproductive – activities that do not strictly violate free speech principles but still come close to implicating them. While you might wish to lay out and explain a broader view – in order to help scientists to better advance political debate on science-related topics, but it doesn’t seem to me that you have done so yet (rather tending to sweep everything into broad criticisms of suppression of free expression).

Here, my goal has not been so much to lay out all of my views as to figure out more precisely what yours are, and why.

Regards,

Tom

Thanks for your comment and questions. Some replies follow:

1. Let me underscore my position, which is: “scientists should not use formal (e.g., legal) mechanisms or even seek to create new formal mechanisms to limit what can be said on the issue of climate change”

And as I mentioned far up in this thread, I am referring explicitly to political expression, not perjury, libel, commercial, etc.

2. The RS letter to Exxon is a separate issue from freedom of expression, and not really relevant here. As I stated on that thread, the issue was whether the RS was to serve as an advocacy group for particular causes and against others. In my opinion, they should not take on this role. Others may disagree.

3. Swindle. I have already said that issues of libel are not my focus. I have no problems with scientists seeking to correct what they see are factual errors, and complaining loudly about this. Perhaps the best parallel example to my concerns is when scientists lobbied Cambridge University Press to cease publication of The Skeptical Environmentalist, lest people’s minds be exposed to improper knowledge. Book or movie burning is not something I think scientists should engage in. See #1 above. Seems pretty clear to me.

4. I won’t split hairs with you on Hansen’s statement. The call for trials was absurd. I don’t know how to respond to your suggestion that it was the funding provided by corporations to pressure groups that might have been illegal. I can’t imagine how so. I have already (several times in fact) expressed on this thread that i am not talking about commercial speesh, but political expression.

5. While I appreciate the elevation of a principle of freedom of political expression to the lofty and impressive title of the “Pielke Principle”;-) Freedom of expression would seem to pre-date this thread by some time, and I am simply restating a view that is fundamental to American democracy, and more specifically modern academic inquiry. There is nothing tricky or fancy about my views, which again are a follows:

“scientists should not use formal (e.g., legal) mechanisms or even seek to create new formal mechanisms to limit what can be said on the issue of climate change”

You reject the notion that scientists SHOULD seek such mechanisms, so perhaps we ultimately agree, even if we may disagree on the justifications.

Thanks

1. Let me first, however, note that I lack sufficient humor (sorry) to enjoy your mischaracterization of my aim, which is NOT of course to “argue for prohibitions on certain expression in the climate debate”. Rather, I have been at pains to indicate ways in which YOUR position – now formulated as “scientists [should not] use formal (e.g., legal) mechanisms or even seek to create new formal mechanisms to limit what can be said on the issue of climate change” – is incoherent, inconsistent with actual precepts of “freedom of expression”, and consequently used to criticize scientists in ways that seem to me to be rather blunt and a bit unfair.

Your mileage may vary, of course, on my criticism but I am certainly not arguing for any new formal mechanisms to limit what can be said on the issue of climate change.

2. I note that, at the end of the day, you might decide that you still believe it is advisable for scientists not take actions that LOOK LIKE constraints on others’s freedom of expression – since criticisms by scientists may be easily misconstrue by others, etc. – but such a judgment would in principle be distinct from whether or not scientists are in fact infringing any rights of others or “limiting what can be said on the issue of climate change”.

3. So let’s take a look again at how the Pielke Principle in some of the cases that have been raised on this and related threads:

- the Royal Society’s letter to Exxon. In the letter, the Royal Society noted that Exxon had engaged in the practice of funding third parties to, on an unatributed basis, make science and policy arguments on behalf of Exxon, noted that Exxon had undertaken to end such practice and asked Exxon as to actual its progress in ending such practice. All that RS sought to do was to try to clarify when, precisely, Exxon was speaking, without at all criticising any message Exxon wishes to make. It seems that the RS may have leaked such letter, thereby putting public pressure on Exxon, but in any case the RS (i) did not seek to use any formal mechanisms or (ii) seek to limit what could be said by Exxon on the issue of climate change. So how doe the Pielke Principle apply?

- Martin Durkin’s Channel 4 “Swindle” polemic (his language): after Ch. 4 had run the Swindle documentary, a number of scientists criticized Swindle for misused and fabricated data, out-of-date research, misleading arguments, and misrepresenting the positions of Sir David King, Professor Carl Wunsch and the IPCC, and some scientists joined the many complaints that were filed with OFCOM (the UK broacast regulator) against Ch. 4 for airing Swindle, which was also released as a DVD (and not subject to OFCOM).

How does the PP apply here? As Swindle had already been broadcast (and released on DVD), did complaints about its accuracy (seeking a fine or a mandated correction) the same as seeking to limit what can be said on the issue of climate change?

What if instead of filing a complaint with a regulator, the scientists who thought they had been misrepresented (or libelled/slandered) had simply sued the producers and/or Ch 4 – would that violate the PP?

- Jim Hansen. You have said that Hansen “has famously called for trials of those who have provided support for the dissemination of skeptical perspectives on climate change, singling out executives in energy companies.” More narrowly, Hansen (i) said “In my opinion, these CEOs should be tried for high crimes against humanity and nature”, but (ii) not for what they or their firms said themselves about climate change but for funding sophisticated, disguised campaigns to spread doubt about global warming despite knowing full well the long-term consequences of continued business as usual.

I have criticized Hansen myself for invoking possible use of the state – see http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/archive/2008/06/26/jim-hansen-warns-of-slow-motion-disaster-and-welcomes-future-public-trials-of-fossil-ceos-for-buying-government-delay.aspx – but has Hansen actually sought to “use formal (e.g., legal) mechanisms or even seek to create new formal mechanisms to limit what can be said on the issue of climate change”? Are you stretching your Principles so they cover not actually seeking formal mechanisms, but simply expressing an opinion or hope that some else does? Hansen, of course, is not a not prosecutor, judge, jury or even a legislator.

Further, has Hansen sought to limit what can be said on the issue of climate change, or is he criticizing fossil fuel firms for paying OTHERS to say without attribution what the fossil fuel firms prefer not to say directly?

I take it that for purposes of your Principles, corporations should be treated the same as individuals? As I previously noted, the “freedom of speech” that societies give to corporations, which are creatures of the state, is not always the same as what they give to individuals. It was once considered that corporations had no free speech rights themselves, but even though corporations now seem to be “more equal” the regular citizens, we still closely regulate corporate (even religious) behavior affecting political/policy matters (from direct political endorsement and contributions to talking behind doors with officials and politicians), we prohibit corporations from talking too much with competitors, we hold corporations responsible for false and misleading statements, etc.

I would agree with you that what corporations have done so far regarding climate PR efforts probably doesn’t violate any statute or regulation, but I wouldn’t be sure of that. But I would say that there is no reason in our law and jurisprudence relating to free speech for a current protection given to rather obvious political meddling by corporations be etched in stone.

- Steven Milloy/FEAF. Milloy has asked the SEC to issue a statement to all publicy listed firms to the following effect:

1. False and/or misleading statements on material matters may violate the anti-fraud provision of the federal securities laws.

2. Statements by registrants on global warming and other environmental issues could be considered material.

3. There is considerable ongoing debate about the science of global warming and its impacts and;

4. Statements to the effect that “the science is conclusive,” “the debate is over,” and that “human activities are definitely causing harmful global warming” should be avoided.

It would seem to me that only item 4, by which the SEC would specifically discourage the use of particular language, would be a step too far.

Except for Steve Milloy, my questions above are largely restatements of questions I posed to you previously. Your further thoughts are appreciated – though I understand your time limits (nor do I wish to be too trollish or forward).

Regards,

TT

The issue is a much more concrete and focused question — should scientists use formal (e.g., legal) mechanisms or even seek to create new formal mechanisms to limit what can be said on the issue of climate change?

I think that the answer is no, for reasons I’ve explained.

Does the fact that there are other situations where expression is limited mean that those situations are analogous or relevant to the issue that I have raised? Perhaps, but so far I don’t see a useful analogy, and even the smoking-tobacco company analogy that was proposed does not fit well here. So if you want to argue for prohibitions on certain expression in the climate debate, you are free to do so (one advantage of free speech;-), but so far I don’t see a compelling case made based on particulars rather than sweeping generalities.

Thanks again.

It is of course somewhat ironic on a thread in which Roger stress the importance of freedom of expression to a productive political debate that Roger is rather quick to accuse his interlocutors of “classic trolling behavior”, of engaging in “the old blog-hijack trick of baiting the host via insults and accusations”, and of “hostile and rude comments”, as well as to imply that anonymous posters don’t deserve substantive replies.

While I don’t believe that Roger’s conclusions are justified, much less consistent with his concern for open debate, this is not my point. Rather, I want to note that this discussion illustrates that simply favoring “freedom of expression” tells us very little about how participants in the climate discussion – or any other political discussion – should behave.

Sometimes promoting and preserving open debate might even REQUIRE that blog administrators make hard decisions to silence disruptive and abusive commenters. Moreover, slander, libel and misstating the views of others (a la Swindle) may not only deserve sanction, but allowing it to go unchallenged may also put blog administrators at risk. Taking action to remove comments and ban or pre-screen certain comenters may adversely affect the “freedom of expresion” of those sanctioned, as well as causing others to self-censor. But beyond that, in my view at least (it’s not entitrely clear, as this is hosted by a government-funded university), this blog is Roger’s personal forum and not a government-owned “public space”, and he would be wholly entitled to ban whomever he wishes, simply because it pleases him to do so. He is also free to note when people comment anonymously, or to require all posters to register and comment in their own name; this has obvious parallels to the criticisms of Exxon by the Royal Society and Jim Hansen for contributing to the public debate not solely in its own name, but by paying for others to do so without attribution.

In short, limiting freedom of expression or imposing sanctions on abuses of it may justified or even necessary to enhancing a political discussion. One may be resolutely in favor of “freedom of expression”, while justifiably favoring, acknowledging or imposing restrictions on it oneself.

Roger, I do hope you’ll think that this comment is substantive and fair, and neither hostile nor abusive.

Regards,

Tom