Just from the section quoted it seems that in the definition of the political model Mazur includes everything from a certain degree of cherry picking” to lying without distinction. Does Mazur consider a pathological and non-pathological version of the political model? Or is the knowledge model the sole non-pathological option?

During my stint in government my job was to ensure that White House decision makers had the best available policy-neutral information available to them, if they wanted it. It was not my job to make decisions; rather, it was to inform decisions that were made.

Using science to inform decisions had a number of possible outcomes. First is the case where informing decision makers caused them to make decisions that were consistent with my values. Obviously this is the most satisfying outcome; it’s the one that hundreds (thousands?) of global climate change scientists hope for. But as scientists we tend to be blind to the values we bring to our research and analysis. So when decision makers choose what we want them to choose, it ratifies both our competence as scientists and the worth of our values.

The second scenario arose when decision makers, once as fully informed as I could make them, made decisions that conflicted with my values.
When this happens, it assaults one’s sense of scientific competence and questions the legitimacy of one’s values. Because we are incapable of sustaining challenges on both our scientific and moral integrity, we quickly project our anger and disgust upon the decision maker. It is HE (not me) who is scientifically inept, lazy or foolish. It is SHE (not me) whose values are corrupt, venal and damnable. The mere possibility, never mind high likelihood, that the decision makers values are equally legitimate as our own — and quite possibly more so for having stood for election and won — simply does not occur.

However difficult it is to adapt to life in this second scenario, it is nevertheless something we must do when we interact in the policy world. For if we do not we end up with the third scenario.

Sometimes decision makers have no interest in being informed, and spend sometimes considerable effort to become misinformed, and work overtime to misinform others. This is the “politics” model in its ugliest glory. Lies become useful tools for prevailing in political battle.

It is remarkably easy for scientists to succumb to the temptation to engage in the “politics” model at this base level. It satisfies a deep need for the vindication of values that decision makers have disrespected. But the price of values vindication is the sacrifice of scientific integrity.

If decision makers want to make what we consider foolish or improper choices, but they have the legitimate authority to decide, it is our duty to provide accurate scientific information and correct scientific error but then back away. To maintain our credibility as scientists we must resist the temptation to color science with our policy preferences. In this way we can attenuate the worst features of the “politics” model.

If we want to be decision makers we need to endure what decision makers must: stand for election, or seek Executive appointments that confer the authority to decide. But let’s be clear: that is not a scientific job; it’s a political one.