Thanks for your comments. However, I disagree that Kyoto’s broader failures are due to US free-ridership. Emissions increases throughout the EU and elsewhere have much more to do with the challenges of emissions reductions that any conscious choice to defect from the regime in order to compete with the US. I think that many in he EU see emissions reductions as imperitive quite independent of what the US decides to do — and it is still proving difficult.

I’d be interested in any data that readers can provide on how EU emissions intensity has decreased.

I would hypothesize that given the EU’s relatively stable population that a good share of its aggregate performance on emissions can be explained by decreasing emissions intensity in the context of economic growth, in other words it is quite like the US despite Kyoto. The main diffences in emissions trends will be a result of (a) the starting baseline, (b) subsequent economic growth, and (b) the added factor of population growth in the US. Does anyone have such information they can point to?

background:

http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/prometheus/archives/climate_change/000633spinning_greenhouse_.html

http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/prometheus/archives/climate_change/000192population_greenhou.html

Thanks!

Thanks much for your comments. I wouldn’ disagree with you that some CDM projects may actually reduce (real) emissions. However, I would bet that these are pretty rare in the big picture. This if for the simple reason that CDM projects occur in developing countries and these countries are rapidly seeking to get more energy, so the vast majority of investment (and thus CDM opportunities) would be in new projects that will add to emissions.

A mandate that CDM be required to reduce actual emssions would, I bet, dramaticly limit the scope of possible investment opportunities. But I’d be interested in the views in someone more familiar with the CDM than I am.

Certainly, the reduction of emissions below what they otherwise would be makes sense, for a lot of reasons, but suggesting that these are “emissions reductions” as the FCCC has announced, or are in the direction of stabilizing concentrations of GHGs is misguided.

Thanks!

On the other hand, the CDM under Kyoto establishes a mechanism that achieves long-term reductions that would not have been achieved otherwise and by trading lowers the cost of achiving such reductions, and in this way differs significantly from the Administrations voluntary policies, which do not create financial interests that can be traded. The failure with respect to Kyoto has rather been a failure of the ratifying parties to agree to and then pursue significant GHG emission reductions, due to the free rider problems resulting from the decision of the US, S. Korea, Australia, China, India and others to accede to the treaty with undertakings of meaningful commitments. The lack of political will in the US to join Kyoto and to push others to do so in a meaningful way has itself directly produced the inefficacy of Kyoto to which you refer. Why should other ratifying parties perform their obligations when there are huge free riders?

Because the realization of meaningful AGW mitigation measures has been captive (i) to stalling in the US and (ii) to free rider and cheating problems abroad, aren’t the most productive questions not “what actions are worth doing and with what effects”, but what levers are available (carrots and sticks) (iii) to entice those who are blocking mitigation in the US to move, and (iv) to reduce free riding and cheating problems globally?

As I noted on another thread, there are definite winners in the US from our deliberately ineffectual voluntary approach. To get them to move, we can both put pressure on them by putting the spotlight on them and entice them to move by offering benefits for getting out of the way. The spotlight will become more effective as people generally better understand the looming consequences of failure to take action, resulting costs, the genesis of the problem in a market failure, and the nature of the solution in remedying the market failure through the creation of tradable GHG emissions rights and offsets (just like the Administration is finally understanding that the way to prevent over-fishing is create similar property rights).

As people can better understand the nature of the problem, they will begin to see more clearly that “fear of enviros” has simply been a smokescreen.

Regards,

Tom

I appreciate the analogies here very much.

“Nonetheless, CDM projects each represent an additive increase in total global GHG emissions.”

I think this is wrong. Some do–absolutely. But, and please correct me if I’m wrong, projects that reduce emissions by the thermal oxidation of HFC 23 , projects that partially substitute fossil fuels with alternative fuels, projects that optimize use of clinker in PPC manufacturing or increase the additive blend in cement manufacturing, demand-side conservation projects, fossil fuel switch/alternative fuel replacement projects, and catalytic N2O destruction projects — reduce net GHG emissions.

I know you’re right that the CDM allows projects to “directly or indirectly” lead to a net increase in GHG so long as reductions are made below the baseline established with an approved methodology.

But some projects reduce emissions below current levels. No? I think a more pressing problem with the CDM is that the projects that I’m saying result in net decreases in GHGs are more attractive to investors (because having that ‘baseline’ rule makes these projects register greater CERs than by setting the bar at current emissions) and these attractive projects generally also contribute the least to sustainable development. They’re low hanging fruit.

Maybe, it’s good that the current framework encourages picking this low-hanging fruit so in the second committment period perhaps investors and host countries will have developed the capability to gainfully participate in a more strict regime — where maybe baseline projections will be less generous.

There is a lot of gimmickry I’m sure, by project participants, to ensure the most profitable methodology is validated by the DOE. I don’t know that this means the CDM won’t work. We need to develop institutional capacities and iron-out percieved risks that prevent extensive participation in CDM/JI. A bottom-up approach is necessary: make market players comfortable and let them play before tightening regulations to strive for the final goal. A top-down approach that sets up the CDM so that all projects result in a net decrease in emissions, would remove all the flexibility from this nascent implementation of project-based flexibility mechanisms — because no one would flex it. That would be fine if Annex Bs didn’t need these mechanisms for Kyoto to be viable — we just pretty much lost Canada, take away flexibility and we’ll lose a lot more.

I’d love to hear your thoughts!