« July 2004 »

Ask Prometheus: OTA

We have something a bit different today, the first in hopefully a long series of Ask Prometheus posts. Ask Prometheus allows us to answer inquiries from our readers directly, or by pulling in other experts as we do today.

Kerry McEvilly writes to us, "Do you think that maybe it's time to re-establish the OTA [Office of Technology Assessment] to add some semblance of continuity in what our elected leaders are getting in the way of science policy advice?"

To answer we've asked Paul Komor, former OTA policy analyst and Project Director, and Rad Byerly, former chief of staff of the House Science Committee, for their responses.

The full responses follow, but first a couple excerpts.

Dr. Komor states, "OTA’s demise was not the result of careful deliberation, a thoughtful comparison of costs and benefits, or defeat by its political enemies. Rather, it was largely being in the wrong place at the wrong time."

And Dr. Byerly says, "In the main Congress is a reactive institution; it does not take up a subject until it is an issue needing attention, which often means that Members and interest group are already choosing sides."

The full-text follows and feel free to leave comments:

Kerry D. McEvilly writes:

I do not seek to submit an article so much as a question.

Much, far to much I sometimes fear, has been made of the Executive Branch skewing science policy for political or ideological purposes as of late.

One persistent critic in this chorus, among others on Capitol Hill, seems to be Rep. Waxman in the House, and in that chamber especially the differences between science and science policy is becoming increasingly blurred and politicized.

With each side of the aisle receiving partisan advice from such disparate advocacy organizations as AEI and UCS, it seems there isn't anything close to a common discourse on issues such as embryonic stem cell and climate change research.

Do you think that maybe it's time to re-establish the OTA to add some semblance of continuity in what our elected leaders are getting in the way of science policy advice?

I know that the legislation authorizing OTA has never been repealed and it seems that every session Rep. Holt and Rep. Boehlert introduce legislation to resurrect it, but obviously it would have to be a somewhat different entity to survive the Class of '94's hostility.

Presuming you even think it would be a good idea to reauthorize OTA, how would you reorganize or reform it to get it past the residual hostility it provoked in some members, garner the necessary votes in the House (a pilot proposal cleared the Senate in 2001) and into the next Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill?

Paul Komor responds:

Proposed legislation to reinstate the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) has become almost an annual tradition. In addition, there’s been a steady stream of articles from academics and think tanks calling for a reinstatement of OTA (For the latest, see here. ).

However the proposed legislation never seems to make it out of committee, and the many pro-OTA articles never get much attention. Why the apparent mismatch between intentions and reality?

First, arguments about whether OTA was politically biased or ineffective are largely off the point. OTA was the unfortunate sacrificial victim of the 1995 budget fight. The House of Representatives’ class of 1994, led by then-Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich (R-GA), had ambitious plans to drastically shrink government. To demonstrate their commitment, they cut the Legislative branch budget as well – which included eliminating OTA. OTA’s demise was not the result of careful deliberation, a thoughtful comparison of costs and benefits, or defeat by its political enemies. Rather, it was largely being in the wrong place at the wrong time.

Second, OTA’s demise, and the repeated failure of attempts to reinstate it, reflect the public-good-like nature of its work. OTA was a Congressional support agency, with a mission of informing Congressional members and staff about science and technology issues. OTA’s ultimate goal of “better policy” is a worthy one, but one without direct constituents (other than the small group of academics and intellectuals who write articles calling for OTA’s reinstatement).

Congress is typically (and unfortunately) driven by need, rather than by foresight. There’s no short-term perceived need for a new OTA, no influential constituent or Member of Congress with a concentrated interest in a new OTA, and no groundswell of popular support for a new OTA. As a result, although few will argue against a new OTA, even fewer will invest political capital in an idea that benefits everyone a little but no one a lot.

Finally, this is not to say that OTA was perfect. Our reports were, almost without exception, well written, objective, and thoughtful. (I spent 6 years at OTA, as a policy analyst and Project Director). But we could have done better at meeting Congress’ needs. Our reports were sometimes late, usually much too long, and often inconclusive. The more fundamental problem was that we hired too many people like me – academics, motivated by intellectual curiosity and a need to get all the data in before drawing any conclusions. We needed more of a private sector consultant culture: where schedules and deadlines are seen as imperatives rather than suggestions, clients’ needs come first, and findings are more important than research methods.

Rad Byerly responds:

McEvilly’s letter contains its own answer to his question about resurrecting OTA: Resurrection will be difficult due to “residual hostility” to advice on issues such as stem cell research and climate change research, and of course teaching evolution vs. creation. To a much greater degree and extent than anytime in recent history, the three branches of the Federal government are driven by religious faith in a truth higher than science, so that to this degree and extent no science advice is needed or wanted. Reform of OTA is thus irrelevant.

Eventually this will change, the government will be more balanced, and perhaps OTA can then be resurrected. Let’s consider one important difficulty OTA faced.

In the main Congress is a reactive institution; it does not take up a subject until it is an issue needing attention, which often means that Members and interest group are already choosing sides. OTA got its “assignments” from the Congress, and so typically could not initiate a study until it was on Congress’ agenda. OTA’s study process was slow relative to the speed with which issues became polarized and Members took positions. Not always, but often, OTA’s studies arrived in a Congress that had mostly made up its mind, usually agreeing to disagree, and technical arguments typically were not strong enough to change votes.

What might be done differently? Could we develop a process to get ahead of issues? Perhaps. We did foresee the existence of ethical, legal, and social issues in the Human Genome Project, at least enough to fund some research on them. OTA could have established a parallel effort. Assuming the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository moves ahead, in several decades we will face a decision on whether to “close” it, essentially to abandon it to passive management. When and if we come to that decision the waste will have been emplaced and the repository will have been activity monitored for a period. The issue will be whether to change to a lower, i.e., cheaper, level of management; a passive management. The fear is that, de facto, it will be forgotten. OTA could begin soon (i.e., when/if lawsuits conclude and progress begins again) to prepare for the decision, perhaps for years mainly only putting information about the repository and related matters into a secure database. Another area: OTA might develop long-term projects to evaluate activities, e.g., in elementary education, whose ultimate success cannot be measured in less than a decade or two. The point here is that Members might support such efforts that would bear fruit for a future Congress.

Establishing this new kind of OTA would be difficult, but not impossible. It would not be necessary to change the nature of Congress, only to get several farsighted Members committed to some vision like this. The whole Congress would not have to act, to take a vote, on the issues themselves, only to fund relatively cheap preparations for the time in the distant future when the issues ripen.

UPI Story on Science Funding

Yesterday the UPI ran a very good story on science funding prospects. Here are a few excerpts:

“Though is it widely agreed the U.S. economy is based on discoveries from such research, there is little chance that more money will be found for science this year ... or next year ... or the year after that. The more distant future looks even worse.”

“Part of the reason for the cuts is election-year competition. Funding for NSF falls within a larger bill that also covers the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development. Under the same fiscal roof are EPA and NASA, the only federal agency -- other than the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security -- to receive a budget increase request for FY 2005. The needs of these agencies are real and they are better-connected politically. "This is described by both the majority and minority as a no-winners bill," a senior congressional staffer told United Press International. "The two places that actually got big increases (the VA's Veteran's Health Administration and HUD's Section 8 housing) ... neither of those groups is happy," the staffer said, adding, "both of them would say it is not enough even to maintain current services."”

“The point, said the staffer, is not the specific numbers but the trend. The numbers will change every year but the trend reflects the priority and plans of the administration. Would a Democratic White House or Congress make a difference? "If you look at the macro policy generated by the tax and discretionary and mandatory spending numbers," the staffer said, "it is very hard to see this getting a whole lot better, no matter who is president or who is in control of the House or Senate. The staffer continued, "If there is a change in political control, then there probably will be some change in amounts for discretionary spending -- and science will be one of those areas that I think will compete for that -- but I think that there is a general view that tough times are ahead."”

Here is the link to the whole story.

Radio Interview

Today at 12:30 PM Pacific I’ll be appearing on a radio show called Against the Grain which is carried on KPFA 94.1 FM & KFCF 88.1 FM in Northern and Central California. The topic will be global warming. The program has a nice web archive, so we’ll post a link when available. You can also listen to it live online from this link.

NRC Report on Genetically Engineered Foods

The NRC is releasing a report today on risks posed by genetically engineered foods. Media coverage suggests different interpretations of what the report says.

A New York Times story today suggests some confusion about whether or not the report says that GE crops are more risky than foods modified using other techniques:

“Genetically engineered crops do not pose health risks that cannot also arise from crops created by other techniques, including conventional breeding … the report said that genetic engineering and other techniques used to create novel crops could result in unintended, harmful changes to the composition of food … The report said that genetic engineering was more likely to cause unintended effects than the other techniques used to develop plants except for the mutation-inducing technique.”

An A.P. story in the Washington Post characterizes the study as follows:

“Federal regulators should look more closely at the potential health effects of some genetically modified plants before they can be grown as commercial crops, a scientific advisory panel said yesterday. It also said regulators should check for potential food safety problems after people eat the products. The report by a committee of the National Research Council and Institute of Medicine said regulators should target tighter scrutiny at genetically engineered varieties that have greater levels of biological differences from current plants.”

The report release will be carried via a webcast today at 11AM Eastern.

Legislative Assistant Position (Science)

Congressman Ehlers is seeking candidates for a Legislative Assistant to handle Science Committee issues in his personal office. The person would be responsible for advising the Congressman and developing policy on all scientific issues that are before Congress. In addition, the person would be responsible for staying abreast of developments in the different fields of science and briefing the Congressman on new issues or discoveries relevant to federal policy, working with the various scientific organizations on policy and scientific issues, and representing the Congressman's views to the scientific community. The qualifications for the position include:

A PhD is required;
background in science policy;
strong writing, communication, and networking skills;
ability to keep abreast of research in different fields of science;
knowledge of PowerPoint;
and experience in the federal legislative process.

Please e-mail resume and CV (as appropriate) to
Cameron.wilson@mail.house.gov, with the subject "Ehlers Science Position". No phone calls or faxes please.

Distinguishing Climate Policy and Energy Policy: Follow Up

In a post of mine earlier this week I observed that the climate mitigation community has largely ignored the geopolitical rationale for reducing dependence on fossil fuels. In a comment a reader asks for links to a bit more detail on this assertion. Here are a few articles of mine on this topic.

See this 1998 paper and also a related analysis now under review that updates and extends the 1998 argument:

Pielke, Jr., R. A., 1998: Rethinking the Role of Adaptation in Climate Policy. Global Environmental Change, 8(2), 159-170.

Pielke, Jr., R. A. (submitted). Misdefining Climate Change: Consequences for Science and Action, Environmental Science and Policy.

For a somewhat less wonky discussion see this 2000 article in The Atlantic Monthly I co-authored with Dan Sarewitz:

Sarewitz, D., R. A. Pielke, Jr., 2000: Breaking the Global-Warming Gridlock. The Atlantic Monthly, 286(1), 55-64.

Comments welcomed!

Two Views of Science in Society

Today’s New York Times contains two almost diametrically opposed views of science in society.

The first view is presented in a profile of Dr. Gerald D. Fischbach, who has an idealistic view of science unfettered by politics:

“He speaks of "a fundamentalist streak" in the administration's stem cell policy, and] feels passionately that science should not be ruled by politics. "It drives me nuts," he said on a recent morning in his large, airy office on West 168th Street. "When you begin arguments based on convictions and not open to scientific discourse, the whole process starts to crumble, and that worries me, not only with stem cells but in the whole sphere of scientific inquiry," he says. "It gets to a very complex issue of regulation of science. Scientists have to be able to do unfettered research, as long as it is in the boundaries of societal mores. And right now, and I think Ron Reagan is concerned about it, there are more and more regulations of science for political reasons. I think it is very threatening. I think it is as threatening as any time in my lifetime, including the McCarthy era," he says.”

But he fails to acknowledge that setting the “boundaries of social mores” is fundamentally a political act. There is a lot of science that is not conducted (e.g., contemporary versions of the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment or areas of WMD development) because such research in some way exceeds socially acceptable boundaries. Thanks to its connections with the abortion issue, in the U.S. stem cell research just happens to be an issue currently close to the boundary of acceptability and politics is the means that our society uses to define where those boundaries lie.

A second Times article by Abigail Zuger, M.D presents a more realpolitik (and more sobering) perspective on science and society:

“Experts hope that, in time, a policy of "transparency," in which all such conflicting interests are exposed to public view, will help to untangle them as well. But these calls for transparency have yet to penetrate to the individual doctor's office, still a black box where conflicts of interest go virtually unchallenged. Studies have shown that gifts from pharmaceutical companies, which can include lavish trips and meals, often sway doctors' prescribing habits. Some professional organizations gently suggest that their members limit their acceptance of this largesse to inexpensive trinkets, like pens, but more draconian edicts have yet to be enacted. Someday, though, perhaps transparency will be the rule in the office too, and every doctor will greet new patients with a mandatory set of suitable disclosures:

"I'm happy to meet you and must inform you that I hold lots of stock in Pfizer and just bought some Bristol-Myers Squibb. You should know that I am a registered Democrat and attend no place of worship. My father had an idiosyncratic near-fatal reaction to a common antibiotic and I've never felt quite the same about that perfectly good drug ever since. I have an aunt I adore who looks a bit like you, and a cousin I never liked who favors the style of jeans you are wearing today. A big payment on my son's college tuition is coming due this Friday. I had an excellent lunch today with a representative from Merck, am getting a headache which your perfume is making much worse, and am desperate to get out of here on time for a change. Now, have a seat, and tell me what brings you in today."”

Dr. Zuger’s hypothetical disclosure, while no doubt tongue-in-cheek, portends a world where science is lost almost completely in the complexities of multitude interests that every person, scientist or not, grapples with in everyday life. While separating science from politics may be fantasy, replacing science with politics would no doubt lead to bad outcomes.

There are no easy answers (which makes science and technology policy an interesting subject!) But you can gain some insight on these issues from this excellent book:

Alan Lightman, Daniel Sarewitz , Christina Desser , 2004. Living with the Genie: Essays on Technology and the Quest for Human Mastery, Island Press, Washington, DC.

Health Research Priorities

In an article in the Lancet, David H Molyneux, of the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, challenges current priorities for spending on health issues. He argues that considerable societal benefits can be achieved by focusing attention on diseases that are currently less politically popular, but nonetheless tractable from the standpoint of improving human health outcomes. Here is an extended excerpt:

“The Millennium Development Goals and a plethora of initiatives have focused on the control of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. However, a large group of diseases has been confined to the “other diseases” category by health policy makers and politicians. These so-called neglected diseases are the viral, bacterial, and parasitic infections of the tropics (often vector borne), together with acute respiratory infections and diarrhoeal diseases of children. Despite the availability of cost-effective, stable, and successful control or elimination interventions, large numbers of the world’s poorest people remain afflicted or are at risk from this group of diseases. The focus of health policy makers on HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, as well as emerging or reemerging diseases causes funding for neglected diseases to be overlooked, with deleterious effects on the social and economic wellbeing of the poorest quintile of populations in the least developed and low-to-middle income countries…

If we are to ensure the efficient use of the substantial resources needed to reduce morbidity and mortality associated with HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, then a small investment in proven, cost-effective interventions against “other diseases”—preferably from the Global Fund resources—will bring sustainable public-health benefits, integrate well with and strengthen the health system, reduce disabling conditions, and bring collateral benefits to the health of the poorest nations. Policy makers are ignoring scientific and operational evidence that interventions against “other diseases” are effective. By concentrating on so few agents, current policies could perpetuate inequity, disrupt health financing policies, divert human resources from achievable goals, and deny opportunities for impoverished health systems to improve. Current policy also raises ethical issues. Resources are being transferred to interventions against the big three that, realistically, have only a limited chance of success as they are reactive and do not adequately control transmission—a pre-requisite for any public health impact. The proactive pro-poor interventions against neglected diseases succeeded by aiming to reduce transmission. Allocation of a small fraction of the Global Fund resources to “neglected” diseases would be likely to achieve broader public health goals.”

The whole article can be found here.

Distinguishing Climate Policy and Energy Policy

Yesterday’s New York Times included interesting story on the expected costs of climate change regulations to the auto industry. This excerpt is worth highlighting:

“"As a U.S. auto analyst, I'm very concerned about the risk side of the equation,'' said [John A. Casesa, an analyst at Merrill Lynch]. "For the domestic auto companies, we've had an accommodating energy policy, but there are new issues like climate change, and there are new geopolitical issues, defense issues, that relate to our energy policy.

"There's the potential for a confluence of events to occur,'' he added. "Americans could be more concerned about climate change, while at the same time we try to reduce our dependence on the Middle East for oil, for national security or political reasons. If these two strands come together, that would put a lot of pressure on policy makers, which would invariably lead back to higher fuel-economy standards.''”

For the most part, advocates of climate mitigation policies have ignored one of these strands.

On Not Regulating the Regulators

An article in the New York Times this weekend describes the Bush administration's opposition to consumer lawsuits regarding products approved by the FDA ("In a Shift, Bush Moves to Block Medical Suits").

There are serious considerations involved in allowing a potential onslaught of such lawsuits, including their possible effect on health costs, the availability of medical products on the market, and the possibility that states would reach different conclusions regarding the safety of a medical device.

According to the article, the administration states that different conclusions would lead to "chaos for the regulated industry and F.D.A." That may be so, and yet this possibility raises grave questions about the goal of having clear and straightforward regulatory policy if it comes at the expense of credibility in the eyes of the public.

The administration is banking on the credibility of the FDA: "if" (according to the article) "a local judge or jury finds that a drug or device is unsafe, it is in direct conflict with the conclusion reached by the F.D.A. after years of rigorous testing and evaluation."

Surely, expensive and rigorous testing must count for something. But for how much? Unassailability on the part of the product once it has been approved? That argument may work when the buyer is held responsible for his or her decision to purchase and use a product. But making the FDA responsible arguably takes the responsibility away from the consumer and undercuts the "buyer beware" argument.

The case is complicated (alas, not simplified) by the role of expertise, namely scientific expertise. The government position is based on the belief that consumer lawsuits would "interfere with federal regulation of drugs and devices, by encouraging "lay judges and juries to second-guess" experts at the F.D.A." (ibid).

Deciding that "tested" science is unassailable is not quite the same as deciding that "proven" science is unassailable. Few today would endorse dragging Galileo or his contributions to trail. Furthermore, no one wants to see competent science and engineering innovations senselessly punished. Yet, circularly making medical drugs and devices immune from lawsuits on the grounds of the scientific expertise that underlies them amounts to technocratic tyranny.

Should attending to the need for clear regulation come at the cost of the need for such regulation in the first place?

Bipartisan Call to Save TRMM

Congressman Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY), Chairman of the House Science Committee, has sent a letter to the President's Science Advisor, John Marburger, asking for his intervention to help prolong the TRMM satellite mission. The appeal to save TRMM is bipartisan. We'll link to Representative Boehlert's letter and press release when we find it on the House Science Committee site.

An Appeal to the President to Save TRMM

A press release from the minority of the House Science Committee announces:

“Rep. Nick Lampson (D-TX), Ranking Member of the House Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee, sent a letter today asking President Bush to reverse NASA’s decision to terminate the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM) later this year.”

The letter can be found here.

Rep. Lampson writes, “In the United States, both the National Hurricane Center and the U.S. Navy’s Joint Typhoon Warning Center use TRMM to reduce risk to lives and property from hurricanes and typhoons… I hope that you will intervene to help protect our citizens from the increased risk that would result from a termination of TRMM’s operations this year.”

Of course, if the President asks for hard evidence of increased risk, in response he will only get a suggestive anecdote or two. Three years ago we advised the TRMM community to conduct rigorous research on TRMM’s benefits to society specifically for situation such as this. You can lead a horse to water ...

Irony Abounds, Futility Reigns

Take a look at the composition of the National Research Council committee currently studying the presidential appointment process. You’ll find some interesting arithmetic. Of the 11 panel members, 9 have been appointed by past presidents to positions where they oversee or provide scientific advice, and one held office as a congressman (and the eleventh person has not been appointed to any position by a president). As chance has it, of these 10 people there are 5 people who have been appointed by Democratic presidents and 4 who have been appointed by Republican presidents, plus one former congressman (Republican). 5 Democrats, 5 Republicans. How convenient! What luck!

Does anyone out there think that this balance occurred for any reason other than explicit consideration of ensuring political balance on this very visible NRC committee?

How would you feel if all members of the NRC committee had served only Republican presidents? Only Democratic presidents? People would no doubt find a problem with such compositions, because political balance fosters the legitimacy of the Committee’s work.

The composition of the panel looking at Presidential appoints reflects in microcosm the impossibility of separating science and politics. To think otherwise is simply unrealistic.

Panel members appointed by former presidents (plus one former member of congress):

John Porter – former Congressman (Republican)

E. Edward David- -- Science advisor under President Nixon, a Republican

John P. McTague, Science advisor under President Reagan, a Republican

Louis W. Sullivan, secretary of health and human services, appointed by President Bush, Sr., a Republican

Christine Todd Whitman, former Governor (Republican) and EPA Director appointed by President George W. Bush

Frank Press – Science advisor under President Carter, a Democrat

Richard A. Meserve, Chairman of Nuclear Regulatory Commission, appointed by President Clinton, a Democrat

Ernest J. Moniz, Under Secretary of the Department of Energy, appointed by President Clinton, a Democrat

John H. Moxley III, Assistant Secretary of Defense, appointed by President Carter, a Democrat

Maxine L. Savitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Conservation at the Department of Energy, appointed by President Carter, a Democrat

More on Presidential Appointments to Science Advisory Committees

We discussed presidential appointments to science advisory committees a little while ago. Yesterday, the Washington Post reported on a meeting of a committee of the National Research Council, chaired by former congressman John Edward Porter (R-Il), on “the murky world of whether -- or how much -- politics and point of view should be considered in the appointment of scientists to federal advisory committees.” The Post characterized the meeting as follows:

“In a day-long session yesterday, the NAS committee heard from representatives of numerous special interest or activist science groups and two congressmen. Most bewailed what they considered the unwarranted intrusion of politics into discussions of scientific evidence. But there was very little discussion about how a person's point of view and experience can color the interpretation or use of scientific facts.”

The comments of two congressman at the committee suggest a partisan split on whether or not political considerations should be formally considered in the empanelment of advisory committees:

“Rep. Vernon Ehlers (R-Mich.), who has a doctorate in physics, said that in appointing members to advisory committees "a single, guiding principle should be applied -- select the most qualified person for the job." In the case of presidential appointments, however, he said "it is important that the scientist be in tune with the philosophy of the appointing president."

Asked by Porter whether he thought it was acceptable to ask about party affiliation or recent presidential voting when considering a candidate for a science advisory committee, Ehlers answered: "I think it's an appropriate question. I don't think scientists should consider themselves a privileged class -- that politics is for everyone else and not for them." He also said that a question about the morality of abortion "is a question that is very pertinent to some committees' work."

Rep. Henry A. Waxman (D-Calif.), who appeared with Ehlers, said interviewers of candidates for advisory panels "ought not to ask what party you're in, what your views on abortion are, whether you voted for the president. . . . I think this committee should spell that out."”

Several Democratic members of the House Science Committee responded with a press release late yesterday taking issue with the remarks of Congressman Ehlers as reported in the Washington Post. Here is an excerpt:

“Representatives Eddie Bernice Johnson (D-TX), ranking Member on the Basic Research Subcommittee, and Brian Baird (D-WA) today released statements endorsing the work of the National Academy of Sciences relating to appointments to Scientific Advisory Panels…

Mr. Baird commented, "When the government seeks scientific advice, we have to follow appointment policies that attract the best scientists available. The key questions in putting such a panel together revolve around the research expertise of potential members and relevant conflicts of interest, not their political preferences or which candidates they may have given money to in the past. Once you begin letting politics get in the way of choosing scientists to offer expert advice, you corrupt the very process designed to get you good advice."

Ms. Johnson said, "I was very disappointed to learn of Mr. Ehlers’ statements regarding advisory panels. He is widely viewed among Republicans in the House as a leader on science issues. If he is saying it is okay to politicize scientific advisory panel appointments, then it is little wonder that such behavior was actually pursued by Administration officials. I strongly disagree with his views. I don’t think that such questions are appropriate and I don’t think the public is well served by a process built on political calculations. My position is that we should get the best scientific advice available, and then let policy makers and politicians deal with that advice in the context of policy, ethical and political considerations."”

I don’t think a policy of “don’t ask-don’t tell” makes any sense whatsoever, and would not remove political considerations from advisory panel empanelment, but simply drive it into backrooms and out of sight. Of course, asking about political affiliations is not a good option either, as it risks turning scientific advisory panels into yet another arena for purely partisan political debate. This is why I "http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/prometheus/archives/science_policy_general/index.html#000129">recommended a focus not on the empanelment process, but the process of providing advice to policy makers. Political biases cannot be avoided, but they can be managed -- we do it all of the time in pretty much every other setting other than science.

Follow Up on HHS as Gatekeeper

Last month we commented on a new policy by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that would require the approval of HHS officials for scientists to be allowed to speak with the World Health Organization. Yesterday’s Washington Post carried an article with some new information on the HHS policy. The Post writes,

“The Department of Health and Human Services and the World Health Organization have reached a compromise on the controversial issue of who gets to name U.S. government scientists to serve as advisers to the Geneva-based organization. The trouble is that the two sides have nearly opposite views of what the compromise means. WHO has agreed to send invitations to specific scientists through the U.S. government, rather than to contact the experts directly. This arrangement, largely a matter of protocol, is one the organization has with China, Russia and a few other of its 192 member countries. HHS officials, however, believe WHO has acceded to its request that the U.S. government be allowed to "identify an appropriate expert who can best serve both of our organizations" after WHO provides a general description of the expertise it is seeking.”

There appears to be an intractable different in roles for U.S. government scientists according to the directives of both HHS and WHO. Here is how the Post characterizes the situation:

“William R. Steiger, HHS Secretary Tommy G. Thompson's special assistant for international affairs … noted that federal employees "do not and cannot" participate as individuals but "serve as representatives of the U.S. government at all times and advocate U.S. government policies." In a response written earlier this month, [Denis G. Aitken, an assistant director general of WHO] noted that a WHO regulation requires that members of advisory panels "shall act as international experts . . . they may not request or receive instructions from any government." (WHO staff, and people lent long-term to the organization by governments, must swear a similar oath of independence.)”

So the U.S. says that government scientists cannot participate as individuals but as government representatives, while the WHO says that its advisors must participate as individuals and not as government representatives. No middle ground there.

Of course selection of scientists to participate in WHO activities could just as easily be motivated by political considerations within WHO as in HHS. This issue will likely boil down to support for WHO to select HHS scientists from those who support the WHO’s political perspectives and support for HHS to choose scientists from those who support the Administration’s politics. In either case, this situation would seem to delegitimize the role of science in health discussions, because it creates a perception (if not reality) that scientists will be selected by WHO or HHS according to their political perspectives.

It seems to me that the compromise I proposed last month makes even more sense today:

“I am sure that many reactions to the HHS policy will focus on trying to “let scientists talk about science” or somehow cleanly separate out science from politics. Of course, such clean separation is not possible. It seems to me that if the Administration wishes to place government scientists on a tighter leash (and it is not clear to me why this would be necessary), then a policy that would be more legitimate would allow WHO to choose HHS experts, but require these government scientists to acknowledge the official U.S., government policy on a particular topic whenever they discuss specific policy issues related to their expertise.”

Understanding Science Budgeting: Veterans/Housing vs. R&D

If you want to understand the budget process for NASA, NSF, and R&D in EPA, then you have to understand the scope and composition of the VA-HUD Appropriations subcommittees in both the House and the Senate. More money for research means less money for veterans and housing, and vice versa. So when an advocate for more money for NASA or NSF goes to a member of Congress and asks for greater support, the member hears such a request as the equivalent of asking for less money for veterans and people who benefit from low-income housing.

Consider an article in today’s Washington Post, which doesn’t explain these dynamics but describes their consequences in the context of action yesterday by the House VA-HUD Appropriations subcommittee:

“A key congressional subcommittee slashed President Bush's NASA budget request by more than $1 billion yesterday, dealing a sharp early blow to the administration's efforts to set in motion an ambitious plan to send humans to the moon and Mars… Congressional sources attributed the panel's decision to cut $12.4 million from a mission to explore the moons of Jupiter as a casualty of budget austerity. This was felt by other agencies in the bill. Even though the panel boosted spending on the Department of Veterans Affairs by $4.3 billion over 2004, [Rep. Alan B.] Mollohan [ranking member on VA-HUD and D-WV] said the department needed $1.3 billion more for VA housing. Also short, he said, was federal assistance for low-income renters of apartments and houses, despite a proposed funding level of $14.7 billion, $491 million more than in 2004. The bill proposed paring the budget of the National Science Foundation to $5.5 billion, $111 million below 2004 and $278 million below the president's request. The Environmental Protection Agency's spending was set at $7.8 billion, $613 million below its 2004 level.”

Worth noting is that the current budget dynamics we are seeing in the FY2005 budget would, according to current plans at least, not be much different under a second term Bush administration or a Kerry administration. Both have promised to hold the line on discretionary spending, though of course that could change after the election.

There will be more to say on this next week (most likely) when the Senate acts on VA-HUD appropriations and the two chambers reconcile. Also expected are hoots and howls from the scientific community after experiencing cuts (if they hold, and even if relatively small) in appropriations for NSF and NASA for the first time in a while.

Science Inputs and Outputs

In this week’s Nature magazine David King discusses the relationship between research funding (inputs) and publications and citations (outputs). The study contains a wealth of data comparing publication and citation rates across a range of countries.

David Dickson has written a very thoughtful analysis of King’s paper and its significance. Here are a few excerpts:

“In recent years, however, it has become increasingly clear that measuring scientific strength in terms of spending alone is not only relatively crude, but also misleading. For merely adding up the amount of money allocated to research provides no indication of the effectiveness with which it is being spent. The focus has therefore shifted to looking at the results — or outputs — of scientific research.”

“Pumping money into science is not enough, as many of such countries have discovered to their cost. Indeed, a single-minded pursuit of increased expenditure on research and development as a proportion of GNP is not the Holy Grail that many pretend (if it was, France and Germany would be way ahead of Britain in the research race).

What counts is the level of transparency and accountability with which the money is spent, and measures that are introduced to ensure that money is used to promote and reward scientific creativity (even if on relatively small projects), rather then institution building and career politics. The more this lesson can be built into the science policies of the developing world, the more rapidly they are likely to bridge the 'output gap' that, at present, continues to fuel the knowledge divide between rich and poor nations.”

Read both King’s paper and Dickson’s critique.

More on TRMM Reentry

A follow up …

In 2001 NASA asked me to organize a workshop to evaluate the decision alternatives it faced on TRMM. Our workshop report concluded:

“[W]e recommend that NASA should not base its decision to extend the TRMM mission primarily on quantitative comparisons between "lives potentially saved" through operational exploitation of TRMM data and "potential hazard" associated with uncontrolled reentry.”

We made this recommendation because estimates of reentry risk are simply arithmetic exercises with little connection to reality. As it turns out, so too are estimates of the benefits of the TRMM satellite to hurricane warnings. Comparing two meaningless estimates didn’t make much sense to us.

It turns out that NASA (probably inadvertently) followed our advice, according to this excerpt in the Washington Post article Shep cited earlier:

“In 2002, Asrar asked Bryan O'Connor, NASA associate administrator for safety and mission assurance, to conduct a "disposal risk review." Did the benefits of using all the fuel to keep TRMM in orbit an additional five years outweigh the hazards of allowing the spacecraft to fall back to Earth without guidance?

In his reply on Sept. 4, 2002, O'Connor said the probability of a TRMM debris casualty would be one in every 5,000 reentries, twice as dangerous as NASA's standard of one in 10,000. NASA allows about six uncontrolled reentries a year. Despite the heightened danger, O'Connor concluded that "these risks appear to be reasonable when subjectively weighed against the potential public safety benefits of improved storm analysis and forecasting capabilities that appear to be realized by extending the TRMM mission."

But uncontrolled reentry was never seriously considered, Asrar said, and the O'Connor analysis was used to reaffirm what Asrar described as NASA's original view: "What if the one in 5,000 becomes a reality?" Asrar said. "Can anybody stand up and say it was worthwhile?" He said he asked for the O'Connor report simply to show that "we had done due diligence" in evaluating TRMM's potential hazard.”

Our workshop concluded:

“[D]ecision makers lack knowledge necessary to prioritize observational program decision alternatives on the basis of quantitative risk assessment according to the actual and potential contributions to science and society. Absent such information, it is likely that decisions on issues such as TRMM deorbiting will continue to be made on an ad hoc basis. It would be relatively simple to construct a “back-of-the-envelope” calculation of potential lives saved related to TRMM data availability based on a set of simplifying assumptions. However, participants agreed that because of the unverified nature of the cascade of assumptions on which such a calculation would be based, it would have little connection with reality. One reason for the lack of unanimity in the Workshop participants' estimation of relative risk is the lack of analysis and data on the direct and indirect roles of TRMM data in weather forecast operations. Anecdotes, back-of-the-envelope calculations, and incomple!
te case studies are not a substitute for reasoned conclusions based on rigorous, scientific analyses.”

Finally, while I do agree with Shep that the money saved on TRMM has nothing to do with the President’s Mars mission, it all but certainly has something to do with paying for the next generation of remote sensing satellites.

NASA Nixes TRMM Extension

Back in May, Roger noted some similarities between the situations of Hubble and the Tropical Rainfall Measurement Mission (TRMM) in determining how risk, cost, and scientific value balance out. Today, Guy Gugliotta, in the Washington Post reports a NASA decision to perform a controlled de-orbit of TRMM, thus dashing hopes of significantly extending the satellite's mission. And the similarities are growing as, like Hubble's case, the scientific community has vociferously attacked the decision.

Among the charges lies a suggestion that the cancellation of Hubble and TRMM serve as cost saving measures to support President Bush's space initiative to the moon and Mars. That arguement has never rung true to me. To begin, in the TRMM case, Mr. Gugliotta reports:

"[Ghassem] Asrar [NASA's associate administrator for earth science] said it was "absolutely incorrect" that NASA decided to begin the de-orbit now to save money for the Bush initiative, noting that "we started looking at this issue two years ago," long before the moon-Mars plan arose."

In the case of Hubble, Administrator O'Keefe has stated several times that he personally made the decision to cancel SM4 on the grounds of risk alone.

And more to the point, a savings of up to $37 million for TRMM doesn't make much of a dent in the $12 billion over the next five years President Bush has proposed. Hubble does, however, have a larger footprint, with operating costs running at $250 million per year, and the cost of the servicing mission itself running at about $140 million (SM3A). But even this larger amount occurs early in the Initiative before any serious moon or Mars missions begin and at the end of construction of ISS.

This arguement just doesn't do enough work to wholly explain these cancellations. However, the cost savings critique is just one of manyand both decisions remain open to a number of different and probably more convincing arguements.

Seeds of Confusion

Over the last several weeks I have criticized Senator John Kerry for making several mistaken assertions about trends in federal funding for science and technology. Well, it may very well be that Senator Kerry is receiving incorrect information from his advisors who in turn get incorrect evidence from leaders in the scientific community.

As evidence, see this speech made Thursday by Shirley Ann Jackson, President, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute who happens also to be the President of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). In her speech she states:

“The Federal investment in research, measured as a share of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), has declined by almost two-thirds since the 1980s.”

And then AAAS quotes her speech extensively in a news release, leading with the following:

“AAAS President Shirley Ann Jackson warned Thursday that U.S. economic growth and homeland security are being threatened by declining federal investment in scientific research and by declining student interest in science and technology.”

Contrary to President Jackson's assertions, the fact is, according to the AAAS (see this graph) R&D funding as a percentage of GDP is about 33% less than it was in its peak during the 1980s, but it has been increasing dramatically as a percentage of GDP since 2000. And as posted here last week, according to the NSF, “Graduate student enrollment in science and engineering (S&E) programs across the United States reached a record high in the fall of 2002.”

The scientific community clearly shares responsibility for some of the confusion in current discussion of trends in science budgets. If any group values the importance of getting the facts straight you’d surely think that it would be the science community and its leaders.

Clear Thinking on U.S. and Kyoto

Debra Saunders at the San Francisco Chronicle has this very perceptive essay on U.S. climate policy and politics in yesterday’s edition. An excerpt:

“WHEN SEN. JOHN Edwards addressed The Chronicle editorial board in February before the Democratic primaries, I asked him if he would ask the Senate to ratify the Kyoto global warming treaty. "Yes," the presidential candidate answered. Then, he added, he believed Sen. John Kerry shared his position. Wrong. The next day, when presidential candidate Kerry talked to The Chronicle editorial board, he said that he would not ask the Senate to ratify Kyoto. Now the Democratic Party has dropped support for Kyoto (a plank in the 2000 party platform) from the initial draft of the national platform for 2004… While Europeans generally see President Clinton as supporting Kyoto -- after all, his administration signed the pact -- Clinton never sent the treaty to the Senate for ratification, hence it was never official U.S. policy. More important, when Clinton left office in 2001, emissions were 14 percent higher than 1990 levels. Clearly Clinton was never serious about meeting the Kyoto goals. Clinton, no fool, knew how compliance with Kyoto would damage the U.S. economy. Emissions have fallen during the Bush years to 11.5 percent higher than 1990 levels…”

Read the whole essay.

Thanks to David Appell for the link.

Update on European GHG Emissions

The European Environment Agency (EEA) released a report on Wednesday titled Annual European Community greenhouse gas inventory 1990-2002 and inventory report 2004 which contains some interesting data on GHG emissions in Europe. The EEA provided an overview of its findings in its press release announcing the report:

“The fall in 2002 took total EU15 emissions to 2.9% below their level in the base year used for calculations - 1990 in most cases. This represents an improvement on 2001, when emissions were only 2.1% lower than in the base year. But it still leaves the EU with a long way to go to meet its commitment, under the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, to bring emissions in the period 2008-2012 to 8% below their base year level. Assuming the 8% reduction between the base year and 2008-2012 were to follow a linear path, emissions should have fallen 4.8% by 2002. On this basis, only four countries are on track to comply with the national targets that all pre-2004 member states have accepted under an agreement to ensure that the EU as a whole fulfils its Kyoto commitment. The four are France, Germany, Sweden and the UK (see annex for details). On the same basis, the other 11 pre-2004 member states are heading towards overshooting their emission targets, some by a substantial margin. This is the case particularly for Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Austria, Italy, Denmark and Greece. Spain faces a greater challenge to meet its target than any other member state. Its emissions in 2002 were 39.4% above their base year level – well over double the 15% increase it is allowed between the base year and 2008-2012 under the EU agreement.”

If you’d like to do some comparing, here are the U.S. estimates, and the U.S. Energy Information Agency press release is here.

It is data like this that led me earlier this year to write:

“Much has been made about the apparent differences between the United States and Europe on the issue of climate change. A close look reveals that from a practical standpoint these differences, while real and significant, may be more symbolic than substantive… The point here is not simply that Europe is struggling to meet its Kyoto commitments or that the United States is a profligate emitter of greenhouse gases, but that under the current approach to climate policy the stated intentions of policy makers and the general populace do not appear to make a large difference in policy outcomes with respect to in actual greenhouse gas emissions. In short, with very few exceptions industrialized countries that have signed on to Kyoto have seen their emissions increase and so too have countries that have turned down Kyoto.”

Reference: Pielke, Jr., R.A., 2004: L'Apocalisse Prossima Ventura (Italian Version). Darwin, May, 52-59. (Also available in English.)

House Hearing on Prizes as Space Policy

Here on Prometheus we discussed prizes as space policy a while back (here and here).

Yesterday the House Science Committee held a hearing on the topic. Read the press release here and the witness testimony can be found here Particularly thoughtful testimony was provided by Molly Macauley of Resources for the Future. And a cautionary note was provided by Douglas Holtz-Eakin of the Congressional Budget Office. Even so, my guess is that we’ll see prizes as space policy in the not-too-distant future. If so, it'll be a policy experiment worth watching.

Confusion about Science and Policy

A story on Yucca Mountain in today’s New York Times by Matthew Wald contains this interesting, and I think very misplaced, observation:

“Congress has made other decisions that substitute policy for science.”

What decisions are being referred to?

“In 1982, [Congress] decided that waste should be buried, and in 1987, it said waste should be buried at Yucca, one of three sites the Energy Department was then considering. There was no presumption that Yucca was best, only that it was a site on which everybody outside Nevada could agree, and was better than leaving the waste at reactor sites around the country.”

... and ...

“[Congress] alone decides what high-level waste is. It is considering a bill that would redefine some waste as not being high level, so the waste could stay where it is, in old steel tanks in South Carolina, rather than being solidified for burial at Yucca.”

"Science” alone cannot answer questions about whether or not to bury nuclear waste, where to bury that waste, what waste is risky, and how to bury or store that waste. The fact is that there is not a single technical answer to such questions because the answers involve considerations of different individuals’ and groups’ values and preferences, which differ widely. “Risk” is a subjective term. Politics is the process that we use to reconcile differences in values in preferences when we need to act together.

To suggest in this instance that Congress has made “decisions that substitute policy for science” is to fundamentally mischaracterize the role of science in decision making, and the differences between policy and politics.

On such confusion see:

Pielke, Jr., R. A. 2004. Abortion, Tornadoes, and Forests: Thinking about Science, Politics and Policy, Chapter 9, pp. 153-142 in J. Bowersox and K. Arabas (eds.) Forest Futures: Science, Policy and Politics for the Next Century (Rowman and Littlefield).

NRC Report on Hubble, “Outside Experts,” and Policy Advocacy

Yesterday the NRC released a letter report on NASA’s options on the Hubble Space Telescope. Today, here is how the New York Times characterized the report,

“An expert panel from the National Academy of Sciences said Tuesday that the Hubble Space Telescope was too valuable to be allowed to die in orbit and that NASA should commit itself to a servicing mission to extend its life, perhaps with astronauts in a space shuttle… The committee of outside experts urged the space agency to commit itself to replacing two major instruments on the telescope, as well as upgrading its batteries and gyroscopes to extend its life.”

NASA’s decision on Hubble is interesting enough (and Shep is our local expert), and I don’t weigh in on it here, but what I’d like to focus on is the characterization of the NRC panel as “outside experts” and the role of NRC in making recommendations to government agencies.

First lets consider the issue of “outside experts.” Presumably, a fair interpretation of the phrase “outside expert” means in this context that the members of the NRC panel are outside of NASA or not subject to benefiting from the decision NASA makes on Hubble. But despite their significant influence on policy, the media (or anyone else for that matter) rarely looks at NRC panels for any actual or perceived conflicts of interest. Of course, the NRC has an internal process that looks at personal financial conflicts of interest (such as owning stock in a company that benefits from a NRC recommendation), but often members of a NRC panel are recipients of government funding for research in areas that they are making recommendations.

Lets take a look at the composition of the NRC Committee on the Assessment of Options for Extending the Life of the Hubble Space Telescope.

The very distinguished panel includes:

- A former director of the Space Telescope Science Institute which manages Hubble.
- A space scientist who has criticized how human spaceflight programs took money from programs such as Hubble
- A scientist who serves on a council that helps to manage Hubble
- An astronaut who helped deploy Hubble from the space shuttle
- Several former NASA employees (e.g., here and here)
- A scientist whose work depends upon Hubble (e.g., here and here)
- A scientist who advocates for space telescope missions.

My point is not that these people are unqualified (they are an impressive bunch), but that they can hardly be characterized as “outside experts.” Almost all have very close ties to NASA or Hubble, including creating, using, or supporting Hubble.

One way to deal with actual or perceived conflicts would be to have the NRC panel take on the task of clarifying alternatives rather than advocating a single option over others.

Given that many of the members of the panel have at least the appearance of predispositions to preserve Hubble, it would seem that the NRC would be better served by having its panel present and evaluate the full suite of options open to NASA, rather than taking an advocacy position on a single option. At the very least it is time that the media takes a more critical eye on the composition of NRC panels who, with very little scrutiny, provide guidance that influences policy making.

Risk Communication: SNL Scoops GAO

The General Accounting Office released a report today titled, “Homeland Security: Communication Protocols and Risk Communication Principles Can Assist in Refining the Advisory System.”

“In this report, we make specific recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security regarding documentation of communication protocols to assist DHS in better managing federal agencies’ and states’ expectations regarding the methods, timing, and content of threat information and guidance provided to these entities and to ensure that DHS follows clear and consistent policies and procedures when interacting with these entities through the Homeland Security Advisory System.”

In this instance Saturday Night Live scooped the GAO:

“Good evening. I'm Tom Ridge. Nearly six months ago, President Bush asked me to organize and lead a new federal agency, the Office of Homeland Security. Since that time, many of you have probably wondered just what this agency has been up to and what, if anything, we are doing to prevent terrorist attacks within our borders.

Tonight, I'm proud to unveil my agency's new weapon in the War on Terror: the Homeland Security advisory system. It's a simple five level system, which uses color codes to indicate varying levels of terrorist threat. The lowest level of threat is condition OFF-WHITE, followed by CREAM, PUTTY, BONE and finally NATURAL. It is essential that every American learns to recognize and distinguish these colors. Failure to do so could cost you your life. For those who may have questions, an excellent guide will be found on page 74 of the spring J. Crew catalogue.

Now, what precisely do these threat levels indicate? Condition OFF-WHITE, the lowest level, indicates a huge risk of terrorist attack. Next highest, condition CREAM: an immense risk of terrorist attack. Condition PUTTY: an enormous risk of terrorist attack. Condition BONE: a gigantic risk of terrorist attack. And finally, the most serious, condition NATURAL: an enormous risk of terrorist attack.

Many of you probably noticed that in the preceding chart, we used the term "Enormous risk of terrorist attack" twice. This was a mistake we didn't catch in time and we're trying to fix it... Live, from New York, it's Saturday Night!”

AAAS Leadership Seminar in Science and Technology Policy

The AAAS Leadership Seminar in Science and Technology Policy is a “crash course” in science and technology (S&T) policy, designed for those who need to know how S&T policy works. It is modeled after the highly acclaimed orientation program that AAAS provides for its new S&T Policy Fellows each fall, but distills the key material into 4 days instead of two weeks. Space is limited to only 25 participants—the small group setting provides an ideal opportunity to learn about the challenges and solutions of S&T policy from the experts.

Learn more about this program here.

Yucca Mountain, Politics, Science, and the NRC

A fascinating dissertation is waiting to be written on the role of the National Research Council (NRC) in the policy and politics of the proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository. NRC reports often (but not always) eschew explicit discussion of policy, and focus only on "the science." In practice, it is just about impossible to focus only on "the science" in cases where science is related to decisions. The case of Yucca Mountain makes this abundantly clear. Here is the short story:

An editorial in yesterday's Washington Post provided a nice summary of the situation:

"Last week, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit complicated matters further, handing down a unanimous decision dismissing most of the objections that figured in multiple lawsuits against Yucca Mountain, save one -- but it's a big one. The court concluded that the Environmental Protection Agency acted wrongly when its regulations governing construction of the site demanded only that it guarantee its safety for 10,000 years. In fact, the National Academy of Sciences -- whose views Congress has said the EPA must comply with in these matters -- has declared that geological concerns should be considered for a much longer period, even up to a million years. If Yucca Mountain is to comply with the law, the entire project must be rethought or redesigned with that in mind. Alternatively, the law has to be changed."

For its part, the 1995 NRC report on the Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards observes that there is no scientific basis for limiting predictions of risks to 10,000 years, and in principle such predictions could be made for 1,000,000 years. So in other words, there is no purely scientific basis for evaluating the risks of the facility, such decision must be made on factors other than science. Thus the NRC report observes,

"Although we have taken a broad view of the scientific basis for the standard, we have not addressed the social, political, and economic issues that might have more of an effect on the repository program than the health [risk] standard. In particular, we have not recommended what levels of risk are acceptable; we have not considered whether the development of a permanent repository should proceed at this time; nor have we made a judgment about the potential for Yucca Mountain to comply with the standard eventually applied."

But in fact, based on the decision rendered last week by the D.C. Circuit court, the NRC report did in fact determine what levels of risk are acceptable (i.e., 10,000 years is not enough) and it did stop the repository (i.e., as the Washington Post observes, "the entire project must be rethought or redesigned"). This is both ironic and dangerous because the NRC Committee that wrote the report on standards had no expertise or authority to determine acceptable risk, but this is exactly what it did. This is a scary thought because either (a) the NRC really did not consider extra-scientific factors and thus the D.C. Court's decision was based on an arbitrary scientific discussion, or (b) the NRC did consider extra-scientific factors but out of the public eye and behind the scenes. Either way, the process is not a shining example of how to connect science with politics.

Consequently, the D.C. District court has turned a discussion putatively about science into a question of politics. In other words, asking how many years into the future should Yucca Mountain be designed to be safe cannot be answered with science alone. An answer of 10,000 years, i.e., the standard that its development has proceeded under to date, is consistent with continuing the project's implementation. An answer of 1,000,000 years, i.e., the standard that the NRC report said could be done, is consistent with terminating the project's current implementation. There is not a scientific way to resolve this question. Appeals to "science" to make either case will clearly be a misuse of science via "arguing politics/morals through science." With John Kerry against Yucca Mountain and George Bush for it, there will be ample opportunities for both to misuse science in this case. We'll be watching.

One final note. The ultimate irony of this situation is that a prediction of 10,000 years and a prediction of 1,000,000 years are both nonsense (see our book Prediction for further discussion of predictions and Yucca Mountain). The idea that we can accurately predict risks to a nuclear waste storage site over thousands over years gives a new meaning to the notion of scientific hubris. So the D.C. Circuit Court's decision basically suggests substituting one set of nonsense for another, and opens the door to wages a political battle through supposedly objective science. There is cause for optimism. The National Research Council, in a 2003 report that deals explicitly with policy, recommends an approach to storing high-level radioactive waste called "adaptive staging" which instead of focusing on fictional predictions far into the future, focuses instead on the sort of decision processes on needs to keep waste safe in perpetuity, given that we can't accurately anticipate the future. Perhaps the D.C. Court decision will provide a chance for Congress to adopt this more sensible and practical approach.

The 2003 NRC report is titled