« August 2004 »

Jay Kay on the Wisdom of Experts and other Things

A while back I wrote about The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies, and Nations, by James Surowiecki (Doubleday, 296 pp., $24.95).

In today’s Financial Times a regular columnist, John Kay, a British economist, discusses the wisdom of crowds, and of experts (subscription required but the essay is available free here). An excerpt:

“So the crowd is more likely to be right about things that do not matter, like guessing the weight of an ox or the number of jelly beans in a jar, and the expert is more likely to be right about things that do matter, like flying an aircraft or brain surgery. Where good judgments are important to us, we select people who are likely to be good at making these judgments and train them until they are very good at making these judgments. There are flight academies and medical schools, but no university offers a course on how to guess the weight of an ox or count the number of jelly beans in a jar… it is a mistake to place too much confidence in either great men or the market… Be sceptical: ask why you should buy what others want to sell. Discount the conventional wisdom. Be wise to conflicts of interest. There is wisdom in crowds, but more often wisdom in the wise. And you can beat the market, but not as often as the crowd would have you believe.”

Kay has a range of interesting articles on the site, including a very well-written one about uncertainty, uck, and gure.

Climate Models and Policy

The primary justification for public investments in climate models is that these tools will help to inform decision making related to climate. Of course, for many scientists, climate models are worth creating and studying regardless of their possible utility. But I think it is safe to say that the resources devoted to climate models would be much less if they were only of intrinsic merit.

In this light an article by Andy Revkin in today’s Science Times of The New York Times raises some difficult questions for the climate modeling community. The article carries with it the headline, “Computers Add Sophistication, but Don't Resolve Climate Debate.” The article observes, “…advances in research on climate change do not guarantee that a consensus will soon be reached on what to do about it. Computer models of climate, particularly, have become a lightning rod in the climate debate, and are likely to remain so for years to come.”

In fact, ASU’s Dan Sarewitz makes the provocative case in a recent paper that advances in science in fact may make environmental controversies worse. It is an article of faith among many that more climate science, and in particular, predictive (or projective, or scenario generation, etc.) results from computer models, will facilitate action on climate change. But what if this assumption is wrong?

One difficult question that might be asked is how we might evaluate the policy utility of climate models. [For some thoughts on this see this book.] By contrast the evaluation of climate models scientific progress according to scientific standards is fairly straightforward. A recent article in the UCAR Quarterly on the new version of the NCAR climate model describes some of these criteria:

Resolution: “The high-res CCSM3 features four times the number of data points as CCSM2 for its land and atmosphere components.”

Speed: “Benchmark tests using CCSM's atmosphere and ocean components showed Lightning to be 30% to 40% faster per processor than Blue Sky, the larger IBM cluster used since 2001 for much of NCAR's climate modeling.”

Expandability: “Much of the improvement in CCSM3 is in the model's foundation for follow-up work, such as in biogeochemistry and land-atmosphere interactions.”

But the article provides some reasons for thinking that the science of modeling can never be completed. Consider the following statements:

“The quest for resolution continues, especially in the realm of clouds and convection. Cloud particles form on scales of microns (0.00004 inches), while cloud formation is now simulated in global models on scales closer to 100 km (60 mi). "So there are 11 orders of magnitude separating us from the fundamental phenomena. What we're trying to do is start bridging that gap," says [NCAR scientist William] Collins.”

“Of course, each improvement in a component model makes it more challenging to produce full interactivity in the overall model. That task promises to keep Collins and his colleagues busy for model generations to come. "We're building a railroad from the east to west coast," he says, "and we haven't yet driven the golden spike."”

“Preliminary results indicate that the new version yields greater surface warming than the last version when carbon dioxide is increased to twice its present-day value. Several scenarios for emissions suggest that the atmospheric concentration of CO2 could double by 2100. Researchers have yet to pin down exactly what is making the CCSM3 more sensitive to CO2 …”

[Comment: Today’s climate models are so sophisticated that virtual worlds created in the models can be studied by climate modelers in as much detail as other climate scientists study the real earth.]

And according to NCAR’s Collins, "The model development never ends."

From the perspective of policy makers, never ending model development may not seem particularly attractive. This places climate modelers in a difficult position. If on the one hand, they make the case that models are currently good enough for the needs of policy makers, then they undercut their best justification for significant funding. But on the other hand, if they say that models are not good enough for the needs of policy makers, then they undercut justifications for action on climate change.

I am on who thinks that climate models are very important to both science and policy, just not in the way that has been conventionally assumed. For more on this see our book on Prediction.

Politicization of Social Science

Stephen A. Newman, a professor of law at New York Law School, has written a very interesting article titled “The Use and Abuse of Social Science in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate.” The full text is available at the Social Science Network Electronic Research Library.

The abstract describes the paper as follows: “There is no conclusive, scientific answer to the question of what children's development and well-being will be if society permits same-sex marriages… A look back at past societal controversies, over eugenic sterilization and over interracial marriage, highlights the danger of relying on scientific theories to resolve social issues. Science in these past debates too often reinforced societal biases. The four guidelines suggested here for considering the welfare of children in the context of same-sex marriage treat social science studies as one input among others that, when fairly considered, give substantial support to allowing such marriages as a means to promote the welfare of children raised by same-sex couples.”

Within the paper Newman writes:

“The experience with eugenic sterilization and with interracial marriage bans illustrate the dangerous power that prejudice and science, working together, can exert on the law. In our times, opponents of same-sex marriage have called upon scientific experts to testify that same-sex marriage will harm children. Whenever social science reinforces popular prejudice, the social science must be subject to the most searching scrutiny. Because the position that same-sex marriage would damage the well being of children is aligned with the long tradition of anti-gay bias in this country, it deserves careful examination. I will also scrutinize the shortcomings of expert testimony offered in support of same-sex marriage, to fully explore the role of social science in this controversy.”

A popular assumption is that social science research is more readily or directly relevant to policy making than other types of science (e.g., physical, biological, ecological, etc.). Often I have seen physical, biological, etc. scientists calling for collaboration with a social scientist to make their work more policy relevant. Presumably this sort of assumption results from the fact that decisions (i.e., policies) are made by people and social scientists happen to study people. My experiences suggest that this popular assumption is simply incorrect for several reasons.

One reason is that many social scientists strive not to be policy relevant by emulating their peers in the other sciences. For example, the discipline of economics has tried to emulate Newtonian physics, and sociology has tried to emulate biology. In some respects the social sciences are just as reductionist and narrow as their peer disciplines outside of the social sciences. One irony here is that the model of science emulated by many in the social sciences is pretty dated, and increasingly under challenge within the disciplines being emulated.

If this interpretation is close to the mark it helps to explain why traditional social science is open to politicization in exactly the same way as is other forms of science. Consequently, to make research relevant, useful, and avoid its misuse it is simply not enough to “add in” social science expertise, something else is needed …

Newman’s article is worth reading in full and comparing to the pieces prepared in the ESP special issue I mentioned recently.

A Perspective on Scotland’s S&T Policy

John Blundell, director general of the Institute of Economic Affairs in the United Kingdom, writes a perspective in The Scotsman criticizing government investment in science and technology.

The mission of the Institute for Economic Affairs “is to improve public understanding of the fundamental institutions of a free society, with particular reference to the role of markets in solving economic and social problems.” So it is not too surprising that its director is critical of government funding for science and technology. Even so, his arguments are worth a look.

Here is an excerpt:

“The official consensus, Right or Left, bright or dim, is that although the results of scientific applications can never be predicted, brainy people given leisure and resources must benefit the rest of us. The economic jargon is that science is a "public good"… The chemist Terence Kealey produced something of a jolt to all this when he published The Economic Laws of Scientific Research in 1996… One of the superstitions Dr Kealey has challenged is the amorphous assumption that state science will enhance or accelerate economic growth. It does not. Ask a few more questions and you wonder why such a mistaken view is so widespread.”

Here is a link to the opinion piece by John Blundell.

USGCRP and Policy Relevance

Some additional thoughts on the latest climate change flap resulting from an article in yesterday’s New York Times …

The USGCRP was developed in the late 1980s and formalized in legislation in 1990. (I have a lot of background information on this program because I wrote my Ph.D. dissertation in 1994 on its attempts to structure scientific research to inform policy.) The program’s legal mandate calls for it to provide “usable information” to policy makers in response to the challenges of global change, and in particular climate change.

The program’s administrators and participants has treated issues of policy a bit like the proverbial “third rail” – stay away at all costs! It has proven politically expedient to focus instead almost exclusively on scientific research on the global earth system, which has led to a great deal of very good science, but very little information that might be considered “usable” by policy makers. In fact, the research done by the USGCRP has fed endless debate about the science of climate change -- a debate that at least in the eyes of the public, has long been settled.

In an article in today’s Washington Post, following yesterday’s New York Times article, the president’s science advisor John Marburger says the USGCRP annual report has, "no implications for policy." (Thanks to Chris Mooney for the link.)

Marburger’s statement that the USGCRP’s annual report, which reflects approximately $30 billion in public investment in the USGCRP over more than a decade, has “no implications for policy” can be interpreted as nothing other than a massive science policy failure.

How is it possible that the USGCRP was created to inform policy and a leading government official is able to dismiss the program as having no implications for policy? (For answers see this paper, this paper, and this paper.) Can we expect members of the scientific community who have benefited from billions of dollars in public investment in research justified by its policy relevance to stand up and argue that the program does in fact have a mandate to inform policy? (For an answer see this paper.)

Last year, Dan Sarewitz and I wrote of the USGCRP and its umbrella program the Climate Change Science Program (CCSP):

“As a member of Congress asked more than a decade ago: “How much longer do you think it will take before [the USGCRP is] able to hone [its] conclusions down to some very simple recommendations, on tangible, specific action programs that are rational and sensible and cost effective for us to take . . . justified by what we already know?” The organization of the current CCSP offers the following answer: Forever.”

If people desiring action on climate change policies want action, then rather than trying to “box in” the Bush Administration with science, they should instead use the words in law (Public Law 101-606) to hold the government accountable for developing “usable information for policy.” As it currently stands the President, Congress, scientists, and environmental and industry interest groups are happy to argue about the science as if settling that debate will bring us closer to addressing issues of climate and energy policy. It won’t. But a lever for action exists in plain sight.

Striking shift? I don’t think so.

Yesterday we commented on a New York Times story that claimed to have identified a “striking shift” in the Bush Administration’s position on climate change. Today’s New York Time’s contains the President’s reaction to this claim:

“On environmental issues, Mr. Bush appeared unfamiliar with an administration report delivered to Congress on Wednesday that indicated that emissions of carbon dioxide and other heat-trapping gases were the only likely explanation for global warming over the last three decades. Previously, Mr. Bush and other officials had emphasized uncertainties in understanding the causes and consequences of global warming. The new report was signed by Mr. Bush's secretaries of energy and commerce and his science adviser. Asked why the administration had changed its position on what causes global warming, Mr. Bush replied, "Ah, we did? I don't think so." Scott McClellan, Mr. Bush's press secretary, said later that the administration was not changing its position on global warming and that Mr. Bush continued to be guided by continuing research at the National Academy of Sciences.”

I think that our interpretation of events on this issue holds up pretty well.

The New York Times and Our Changing Planet

Every year since 1989 the U.S. Global Change Research Program has released a report titled “Our Changing Planet” which provides a concise overview of research conducted under the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) as well as a summary of program activities and agency budgets. (The reports from 1995 are available online here.)

Yesterday the USGCRP released its 2005 “Our Changing Planet” report. Somewhat surprisingly the New York Times today, in an article by Andy Revkin, sought to portray this report as a “striking shift in the way the Bush administration has portrayed the science of climate change.”

This is a surprise because the 2003 edition of “Our Changing Planet”, while perhaps somewhat more staid in comparison to the 2005 report, nonetheless contains numerous references to human-caused climate change and predictions of its future, negative impacts. The USGCRP is after all a multi-billion research program motivated by evidence that humans are causing climate change and the desire to develop policy responses. It is hard to see what the news here is. The fact that the 2005 report echoes much of the language of earlier reports does not seem to me to be a striking change or motivated by any possible “shift in focus” of the Bush Administration.

More fundamentally, it appears that some are trying to “box in” the Bush Administration by getting it to admit the consensus view on climate change. Highlighting the scientific consensus as reflected in federal agency documents has been one such strategy (e.g., see this 2003 NPR interview with Andy Revkin on his earlier reporting about how the Administration excised some text on climate change from an EPA repot). The thinking may be that if the Administration is forced to admit the science then particular policies are necessarily compelled. This is a good example of the “linear” thinking that I described (and criticized) in a recent paper on science in politics and policy. The thinking behind such strategies may be that if agreement can be reached (or forced, in this case) on the science, then agreement among political opponents must follow on policy actions.

But what if scientific consensus doesn’t compel political consensus? Specifically, what if the Bush Administration decides to publicly accept the scientific consensus on climate change but then maintains its business-as-usual approach to climate policy justified in terms of jobs or economics, or international trade? This concern was raised by one representative of an environmental group in the Times article:

“At the same time, the report did not please environmental groups, which have repeatedly criticized Mr. Bush for opposing efforts to require restrictions on the gases linked to global warming, though he has gradually come around to the position that warming is at least partly caused by emissions. "The Bush administration on the one hand isn't doing anything about the problem, but on the other hand can't deny the growing science behind global warming," said Jeremy Symons of the National Wildlife Federation.”

The New York Times' apparent strategy of playing “gotcha” with agency documents on the science of climate change is sure to set off an (another) extended series of debates about the science of climate change and who believes or admits what. If so, then score another point for those who desire inaction on climate change because endless debate over the science is about as close a proxy to inaction as you can find. In the end, those pressing the Bush Administration to admit the science of climate change may very well achieve this goal, but they will likely find it to be an empty victory as the Bush Administration can very easily admit the science and then justify its actions on a range of legitimate, non-scientific factors.

Skewering Academia

In an op-ed in yesterday’s Washington Post, James E. McWilliams, an assistant professor of history at Texas State University at San Marcos, lays into the academic enterprise. He writes,

“The few history PhDs who manage to land full-time academic jobs quickly learn that the easiest way to become distinguished in the profession is through a lifetime of scholarly dedication to a single, defining and often very small idea -- one that usually has no bearing on contemporary events. That's precisely how to "make a contribution" -- the be-all and end-all for a serious academic. More often than not, though, that contribution is to our own job security and status within a small club rather than to a public debate badly in need of a broader historical perspective.”

Although I empathize with his frustrations, I don’t think that all of academia is as bleak an enterprise as McWilliams suggests. In particular, academia diverges from McWilliams' characterization with the growth of interdisciplinary, policy-focused graduate programs that are educating a new cadre of graduate students on how to be a specialist in the integration of knowledge as a contribution to real-world concerns. One such program is the University of Colorado’s now-3-year-old experiemnt in its interdisciplinary graduate Environmental Studies Program. But there many others as well.

Beyond Dominance

It is almost a matter of faith among U.S. policy makers and scientists that the United States should dominate the global scientific enterprise. Concerns are frequently expressed about the U.S. losing it dominance. In a commentary in yesterday’s Financial Times Caroline Wagner, of the Rand Corp and the University of Amsterdam, and Yee-Cheong Lee, president of the World Federation of Engineering Organisations, challenge this perspective. They write:

“…some still see the quest for scientific advancement and technological innovation as a race between nations. A recent report by the National Science Board of the US raised questions about whether America is at risk of losing its role as the world's centre of science and technology innovation.

This is the wrong question to ask in the 21st century. Today science has become a global phenomenon. Nations are part of an expanding knowledge network that has no borders. In the 21st century, security requires sharing rather than protecting knowledge. No country can work at the frontiers of all fields of science. The expanding knowledge frontier means that co-operation is the means of knowledge creation…

The US needs to break out of the "dominance" box of the last century and think beyond a national model of scientific or technological capacity… America stands to benefit more from knowledge and ideas flowing through a networked world than from a world in which countries are competing against each other.”

This op-ed will no doubt be warmly received by those who think that too often science and technology policy is portrayed as a competition – for more funding, for more publications, for more citations, for more prestige, etc., rather than as a means to organize the scientific enterprise to better achieve society’s goals. Wagner and Lee raise some important questions worth thinking about. Their commentary can be found here.

Science Education

We often hear calls for society to become more informed about science. A letter in Nature this week turns this around and calls for scientists to become more informed about society. An excerpt:

“Recent calls by the United Nations (Nature 430, 5; 2004) for stronger science input to support aid policy, in particular for feeding the hungry, are welcome. In the United Kingdom, organizations such as the Department for International Development (DFID) need to improve their use of the science base. But there is also scope for the scientific community to improve its understanding of development issues surrounding agricultural policy, if scientists are to be productively engaged in fighting world hunger and poverty.”

Thanks to SciDev.net for the link.

More on Science Literacy and Democracy

In today’s New York Times, Nicolas Kristof has a column on gene therapies and its effects on people and humankind.

He closes his essay with this comment:

“Perhaps the most important and complex decision in the history of our species is approaching: in what ways should we improve our genetic endowment? Yet we are neither focused on this question nor adequately schooled to resolve it.

So we desperately need greater scientific literacy, and it's past time for a post-Sputnik style revitalization of science education, especially genetics, to help us figure out if we want our descendants to belong to the same species as we do.”

If we have $1.00 to spend on “the most important and complex decision in the history of our species” I wonder what fraction it would make sense to devote to spend on a massive campaign of public education, versus other possible investments.

Kristof provides no data, but I’d guess his call for public education is grounded in his underlying assumptions of democracy (see my post earlier today) rather than any empirical evidence that such campaigns actually led to better societal outcomes. But I’d welcome any evidence to the contrary.

Democracy

The New Yorker online has an excellent article by Louis Menand on voting and democracy, or at least how these issues look through the lens of political scientists.

Menand writes:

“Skepticism about the competence of the masses to govern themselves is as old as mass self-government…”

Political scientists, at least, have given up on the notion that the public can come to well-informed judgments about political candidates, much less complicated issues of policy. The perspective of political scientists raises difficult questions about the viability of “public education” as a strategy for coming to grips with complicated issues like global climate change, genetic technologies, and international terrorism.

But if people aren’t the source of wisdom in a democracy, then where does it come from? Menad offers two alternatives in the form of three theories:

“All political systems make their claim to legitimacy by some theory, whether it’s the divine right of kings or the iron law of history. It’s not that people know nothing. It’s just that politics is not what they know. In the face of this evidence, three theories have arisen. The first is that electoral outcomes, as far as “the will of the people” is concerned, are essentially arbitrary… “

In other words, where the public is concerned, good luck.

Menand summarizes a second perspective in the form of two versions of a theoretical perspective I have called in my classes a “realist’s view of democracy,” using the concepts and ideas of political scientist E. E. Schattsschneider.

“A second theory is that although people may not be working with a full deck of information and beliefs, their preferences are dictated by something, and that something is élite opinion… The third theory of democratic politics is the theory that the cues to which most voters respond are, in fact, adequate bases on which to form political preferences. People use shortcuts—the social-scientific term is “heuristics”—to reach judgments about political candidates, and, on the whole, these shortcuts are as good as the long and winding road of reading party platforms, listening to candidate debates, and all the other elements of civic duty.”

From this perspective, the public can and does play a critical role in a democracy, but that role is mediated by experts, who comprise one part of the elite. How we think about democracy shapes how we think about the role of science, and information more generally, in policy making. All claims about science and its significance in decision making reflect a deeper set of assumptions about democracy, namely that either the public can address complex issues (which has been dismissed by most political scientists), that the public is just ignorant and cannot effectively participate in decision making (a pure elitist perspective), or a more realistic perspective, that experts play a mediating role that allows the public to participate meaningfully in the making of important decisions. Statements related to science and technology policy that invoke public education, literacy, communication, or participation ultimately are grounded (explicitly or implicitly) in one of these views, and I would suggest, are sometimes simply a result of these underlying assumptions about how a democracy ought to work.

The Menand article is well worth reading.

Job Opportunity

Project Specialist

The East-West Center is accepting applications for a two-year limited full-time position as Project Specialist in the Research Program for a project entitled “Managing Climate Risks in the Pacific: Pacific Islands Regional Integrated Science and Assessment (Pacific RISA) Program”. Major responsibilities include: collection, interpretation and analysis of data; technical support for meetings, workshops, project website, report preparation and other mechanisms associated with public outreach components of the project; and assist in project-related activities designed to improve understanding of the consequences of climate variability and change for Pacific Island communities, businesses and natural resources and to support climate risk management activities designed to enhance resilience in the face of climate-related extreme events such as droughts, floods and tropical cyclones.

REQUIRED QUALIFICATIONS: Master’s degree or equivalent in environmental or social sciences. Plus one year work experience with multi-disciplinary studies on the impact of climate variability and change for key sectors including (but not limited to) water resource management, disaster management, public health, coastal resource management, tourism, agriculture or fisheries. Knowledge of climate-related vulnerability in the Pacific Islands. Familiarity with scientific and public policy issues related to climate variability and change at regional, national or international levels. Strong verbal and written skills with demonstrated ability to organize ideas clearly and concisely and to communicate scientific information to a non-technical audience. Ability to work cooperatively with people of diverse cultural, professional, and social backgrounds.

PREFERRED QUALIFICATIONS: Familiarity with state-of-the-art capabilities in climate modeling, data analysis and integrated assessment techniques currently being used for regional climate studies. Familiarity with standard tools and methods for analysis of historic socio-economic data and/or model-based projections of climate variability and change, preferably in the Pacific region.

SALARY: $36,478.00 per year, plus a cost-of-living allowance (COLA) currently at 25% (subject to change) and an attractive benefits package.

Submit a cover letter including position title and a statement addressing how the qualifications are met, a resume, and names and addresses of three professional references. Screening and assessment will be based on the materials you submit. Send to Human Resources, East-West Center, 1601 East-West Road, Honolulu, Hawaii 96848-1601 or email to hrrecrut@eastwestcenter.org. Application must be postmarked or received no later than: September 10, 2004.

An Equal Opportunity Employer

Stem Cells and the Misuse of Science

In today’s Washington Post there is a very interesting op-ed on stem cell science and policy by Ruth R. Faden and John D. Gearhart, both professors at Johns Hopkins.

They write:

“The controversy about stem cells, and the choice between Kerry and Bush on stem cell policy, is not about science; it really is about values -- moral values. The science is clear. The only way to ensure that we realize the promise of stem cell research as quickly as possible is to permit federal funding to be used to create new embryonic stem cell lines and to support research with new lines. President Bush's values are also clear. He believes that the destruction of embryos can never be morally justified, no matter how much human suffering might be alleviated, even if the embryos are only still a clump of cells not visible to the human eye and even if the embryos will be destroyed in any event in fertility clinics where they are no longer needed. We believe that most Americans have different moral values from the president's.”

The latter assertion would seem highly questionable, at least according to recent polls. According to a July 2004 survey by the Gallup organization, when asked if John Kerry or George Bush “Shares your values” the public split 47% to 46% respectively. But it is also clear that public opinion on stem cells depends upon how the issue is framed. According to Matthew Nisbet of Ohio State:

“For [stem cell] funding advocates, the [recent poll] results clearly show that if they can make overwhelmingly salient in media coverage the connections between research and cures, the public is likely to be swayed… Still, in contrast, other commissioned polls indicate that opponents of funding will do best by linking stem-cell research to abortion and make it into a moral and religious issue. In the end, it comes down to a battle to frame media coverage and campaign messages.”

Hence the incentives for John Kerry are to make a clear connection between the research and possible cures and for George Bush it is to link the research to the abortion issue. It seems to me that on stem cells there is ample evidence that both sides have misused science for political gain.

For the Kerry folks there is a political benefit to exaggerate (or “mischaracterize” using our previously discussed misuse typology) the scientific benefits of stem cell research. For Bush folks there is a political benefit to exaggerate (or “mischaracterize”) the significance of his August 2001 decision, both in terms of the benefits (and numbers) of stem cells available for research as well as the benefits of alternative research techniques (e.g., with adult stem cells) that would make embryonic stem cells unnecessary.

As Faden and Gearhart observe, “Translating science into political symbols and slogans comes at a price.” While I agree with Faden and Gearhart that the stem cell issue is about moral values, once advocates from both sides use science to advance those moral values, the issue becomes a matter of science policy and, in the end, about science as well. As much as we may like to make a distinction, in practice separating science from values just doesn’t work.

PS. For an addition perspective on understanding science in the stem cell debate see this op-ed of mine published in the Rocky Mountain News last month.

Job Opportunity

Career Opportunity: Program Officer

Board on Atmospheric Sciences & Climate
The National Academies

The Board on Atmospheric Sciences & Climate is seeking an exceptional person with strong scientific expertise and an interest in applying science in the policy arena. A Program Officer (sometimes called Study Director) is responsible for all aspects of implementation of the Board’s work – designing studies, working with agencies and committees of experts, analyzing complex issues, and preparing reports. It’s a dynamic work environment – the National Academies’ staff of more than 1000 people address all the issues in today’s headlines and more, from stem cell research to alternative energy sources to climate change.

Qualifications: Ph.D. or equivalent knowledge is preferred, but Master’s degree or equivalent knowledge with 3 years of related experience will be considered. Requires ability to review and analyze scientific literature; good organization, interpersonal, and leadership skills; and ability to work productively in a team environment. Excellent oral and written communications skills are essential. Background in a variety of fields within the areas of atmospheric sciences, meteorology, and climate will be considered. The job is located in Washington, D.C. Some travel is required.

Responsibilities:
• Plan, develop, and direct technical and policy studies related to a diversity of scientific issues in the atmospheric sciences, meteorology, and climate.
• Manage the study process, including organizing meetings of scientific experts; gathering and analyzing information for projects; guiding committee selection process and evolution of committee reports; and keeping projects on time and within budgets.
• Effectively express complex technical and policy information in various written forms, including status reports, project summaries, and detailed committee reports.
• Guide reports through review, publication, and dissemination.
• Interact with agency personnel, policy makers, and senior scientists.
• Assist in preparation of prospectuses and proposals and work on special projects.
• Supervise the work of support staff.

For more information, visit . To apply, send a resume and cover letter explaining your interest in the position to Chris Elfring, Director, Board on Atmospheric Sciences & Climate at . Send a copy of your application to Rob Carlucci, Office of Human Resources, at . Please include the requisition number (040215-2) on your application and submit by September 30, 2004. No phone calls, please.

"Skeptical Environmentalist" Article Now Online

We've posted my contribution to the ESP specical issue.

Here it is:

Pielke, Jr., R.A., 2004. When scientists politicize science: making sense of controversy over The Skeptical Environmentalist, Environmental Science & Policy, Volume 7, pp. 405-417.

The Politics of Personal Virtue and Energy Policies

In April, 2001, Vice President Dick Cheney was criticized for downplaying the role of conservation as a tool of energy policy. He said,

“Now, conservation is an important part of the total effort. But to speak exclusively of conservation is to duck the tough issues. Conservation may be a sign of personal virtue, but it is not a sufficient basis all by itself for sound, comprehensive energy policy. We also have to produce more. The American people have worked very hard to get where they are, and the hardest working are the least likely to go around squandering energy or anything else that costs money. Our strategy will recognize that the present crisis does not represent a failing of the American people.”

This issue was sort of revisited by the New York Times last Sunday in an article about whether or not it is hypocritical for rich environmentalists to be jetting around on their private jets.

The article observes:

“Environmentalists in particular bear the imprint of their enemies. Most Americans think that so-called greens are "supposed to be dressing in wheat shoes and burlap and driving on donkeys," says Mr. [Bill] Blomquist [a political science professor at Indiana University-Purdue University]. As a result, he says, "any time they're not doing that, they're open to criticism." Environmental advocates privately admit that they'd prefer that their liberal donors fly commercial; some even call them outright hypocrites. But they also stress that policies matter more than purchases. "The Kerry energy plan has as its centerpiece an increase in fuel efficiency for automobiles, and they are a much larger environmental concern [than jets]," says John Coequyt, an energy policy specialist at Greenpeace. "Because there are more of them."”

It seems to me that the statement “[Conservation] is not a sufficient basis all by itself for sound, comprehensive energy policy” is pretty similar to “… policies matter more than purchases.”

The apparent bipartisan consensus that consumer choices about using energy matters less than the bigger picture decisions made by government may be exactly right. However, during an election year maintaining a focus on details of energy policy is difficult because of the importance of the symbols and stereotypes of personal virtue to the political contest. So we risk spending more time discussing who drives what or flies how, to the exclusion of discussing details of possible actions for effectively and beneficially providing the energy that modern society depends on.

Special Issue of Environmental Science and Policy

I co-guest edited (woth Steve Rayner) a special issue of the journal Environmental Science and Policy that is just out. The issue is titled "Science, Policy, and Politics: Learning from Controversy Over The Skeptical Environmentalist." Contributors are Chris Harrison (Cambridge University Press and Editor of The Skeptical Environmentalist), Naomi Oreskes (UCSD), Dan Sarewitz (ASU), Chuck Herrick (Stratus Consulting), and me.

You can find the journal online here and if you can't access online you can email me for a reprint (pielke@colorado.edu).

Comments welcomed.

Charley’s Damage in Context

In 1998 Chris Landsea and I published a paper that asked how much damage past hurricanes would cause under contemporary societal conditions (i.e., adjusting for changes in population and wealth.) The table below shows these data updated to 2003. The damage estimates for Charley are not yet in, but the storm will have to result in greater than $11.2 billion in damages to break into the top 15 all time and more than $22.9 billion to break into the top 5.

Top 30 Damaging Tropical Storms and Hurricanes in the continental U.S.

Normalized to 2003 dollars by inflation, personal property increases, and coastal county population changes (1900-2003).

The Insanity of the Climate Change Debate

One definition of insanity is repeating the same behavior and expecting different results. The climate debate is full of people who repeat the same behavior but expect different results.

On the one hand we have the self-described skeptics who seem to think that by highlighting uncertainties in science they can turn around the freight train that is public opinion, scientific consensus, and policy maker’s beliefs that human influences on the climate are worth addressing. In an essay published yesterday on TechCentralStation some familiar skeptics write, “The science is settled. The "skeptics" -- the strange name applied to those whose work shows the planet isn't coming to an end -- have won.”

I’d ask (or perhaps more accurately, request), does this victory mean that skeptics no longer feel a need to debate the science?

On the other hand are the technocrats who seem to think that solving the climate problem is simply a matter of “tuning” climate policies to the desired concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, presumably via some giant control panel with a big knob labeled (Global Atm. CO2 PPM) that policy makers can set like a thermostat. An example of this sort of view appears in an essay in today’s issue of Science where the authors write that “Humanity can solve the carbon and climate problem in the first half of this century simply by scaling up what we already know how to do.” Examples of such “simple” solutions include:

*Increase fuel economy for 2 billion cars from 30 to 60 mpg
*Add 700 GW (twice the current capacity) of nuclear power
*Decrease tropical deforestation to zero instead of 0.5 GtC/year, and establish 300 Mha of new tree plantations (twice the current rate)

What the technocrats fail to appreciate is that even as “solutions” such as increasing fuel economy, adding nuclear power, and eliminating tropical deforestation may be technologically feasible, seeing their actual implementation represents social and political challenges. Solving poverty, disease, and wars are also similarly “simple.” Overcoming these sorts of challenges are in reality not so simple, irrespective of the state of technology.

So if the climate debate were sane we’d stop arguing about issues of science and technology and instead start talking about society and politics, because we’d recognize that all the discussion of science and technology, no matter what side of the debate you are on is unlikely to lead to improvements in energy policies or a reduction in vulnerability to climate impacts. However, I have a sense that we will continue to debate the science and technology of the climate issue and expect different results than we’ve seen to date.

Blackouts Are Inevitable

An editorial in the Washington Post on Aug. 10, "Blackouts Are Inevitable", argues that it’s not possible to prevent future blackouts. Instead, they suggest we should focus on fulfilling the mission of the electricity system and making the kind of changes that successfully transformed the air traffic control system.

They write:

“While making obvious improvements in control and operation of the grid, we should focus the greater part of our effort on fulfilling the mission of the electricity system, not on trying to prevent blackouts. When hurricanes, tornadoes, ice storms or other problems black out the system, backup generators at hospitals, airports and other critical institutions prevent their missions from being interrupted.”

The editorial suggests a very different approach than that being articulated in Washington, such as using cost-effective and creative engineering approaches to accomplish critical missions. It ends with listing four tasks to accomplish their proposed objectives:

“The first task is to list the important missions that are accomplished by the electricity system. The second is to rank these missions in order of priority. Third, we must identify which missions are already protected. The fourth and final task is to find cost-effective ways of accomplishing the most important missions when the power fails.”

Designing the Electric Grid

Matthew Wald writes in today's Science Times that last August's blackout "spread so quickly that day largely because hundreds of components acted exactly as they had been programmed to do."

Meaning the nation's largest blackout was an unintended consequence, and a sobering reminder of the difficulties decision-makers face as science and technology become more powerful and complex. In this case, relays designed to protect electrical equiptment in the event of damaging currents tripped domino-like shutting down transmission and generation facilities. Not exactly a graceful failure, but not a catestrophic one either.

Anyone interested in more should check out the Kennedy School's Electricity Policy Group's site detailing information and analysis on the event.

Nanotech Authority

A recent report by Britain's Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering entitled ‘Nanoscience and nanotechnologies: opportunities and uncertainties’, calls for public debate regarding the development of nanotechnologies and research into their health and environmental effects.

The report has occasioned editorials such as one posted on SciDev.Net by David Dickson.

Dickson suggests the report points to two key challenges facing nanotechnology and nanoscience: adequately ensuring that nanotechnologies address the needs of the world’s poor and building social markets favorable to nanotechnologies.

To address the risk of a “nano-divide” between the world’s rich and poor nations, Dickson calls for the development of nanotech skills among poorer nations, dissemination channels for nano products, and informed public debate.

Characterizing the content of this debate, Dickson writes: “informed public debate…must include authoritative information about potential health and environmental consequences; there is no room for those who dismiss all such concerns as merely the unreasonable demands of whose who seek a risk-free society.”

It is not always clear on what basis information should be considered “authoritative” nor who should decide this. The approach outlined by Dickson would seem to include information and demands that might otherwise be disqualified on the grounds of being “unreasonable.” This type of approach may be encouraging to those who would make such demands, but it stops short of outlining what counts as “reasonable.”

While defining “reasonable demands” is risky business, without clear parameters, what gets debated could too easily be determined by the agendas of those who get to decide, rather than by a reasonable process.

Reader Challenge

In an editorial this week about science in the political process Nature makes the following assertion:

“In the current polarized political climate, it is hardly surprising that some scientists should swing behind Kerry in this way — the research community traditionally votes overwhelmingly Democratic.”

I am unaware of any data that might support this claim. I don’t disagree with the claim; I just have no basis on which to accept it or disagree with it. I am leery of conventional wisdom that lacks an empirical grounding.

So here is the challenge for you: Is anyone aware of a study or survey that would support or refute the Nature claim of the partisan tilt among researchers? Send us (pielke@colorado.edu) your thoughts and we’ll post the results.

Follow up On Fate of TRMM

NASA issued a press release today detailing a reprieve of sorts for the TRMM satellite. (For our earlier discussions of this topic see this post. The press release states that "NASA will extend operation of the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM) through the end of 2004, in light of a recent request from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)."

But the press release also states that "NASA and NOAA have asked the National Academy of Sciences to convene a workshop next month to advise NASA and NOAA on the best use of TRMM's remaining spacecraft life; the overall risks and benefits of the TRMM mission extension options; the advisability of transfer of operational responsibility for TRMM to NOAA; any requirement for a follow-on operational satellite to provide comparable TRMM data; and optimal use of GPM, a follow-on research spacecraft to TRMM, planned for launch in 2011."

This statement seems a bit odd to me because it appears that NASA has already decided when and how to deorbit TRMM. And it seems unnecessary to convene a workshop in September to provide advice on how to use TRMM for its last 2 months (through November) after 7 years of successful operations. NASA and the scientific community know very well how to use TRMM.

The press release includes this statement, which seems to contradict the above, from Dr. Ghassem Asrar, Deputy Associate Administrator of NASA's Science Mission Directorate, "It's important to note that we are able to extend TRMM for this brief period and are vigilant in maintaining our requirement for a safe, controlled re-entry and deorbit of the spacecraft." So what role exactly will the NRC Workshop play?

One concern is that the NRC Workshop will be used to provide a post-hoc rationalization for decisions already made about the future of TRMM. If so, then this would amount to a form of politicization of the NRC. By paying attention to who is invited to participate in this workshop (and who is not) we can get a sense of what perspectives are being advanced and which are not. As I have argued here in an earlier post the NRC would be better served by not recommending a single option, but a diversity of choices and their implications for decision makers to consider.

Several Minor Housekeeping Items

We've created a permanent link to my recent op-ed in the Rocky Mountain News on the role of science in the stem cell debate.

The interview I participated in last week on the show "Against the Grain" can be found here (scroll down), but it will only be online for a few weeks.

Space Shuttle Costs and NASA Dynamics

Today, the Washington Post reports, “NASA officials said yesterday that the costs of returning the grounded space shuttle to flight have risen as much as $900 million over original projections, raising the possibility that the agency may have to seek extra money from Congress next year or cut other space programs to fund the shortfall… NASA's announcement came 12 days after a key congressional committee passed a bill cutting the Bush administration's 2005 NASA budget proposal by more than $1 billion, dealing a sharp blow to the president's initiative to return humans to the moon and eventually send them to Mars.”

This situation raises a difficult situation for Congress. Should Congress provide more money for the Shuttle or accelerate its termination? And if Congress provides more money, where should it come from? Other NASA funding in human spaceflight (Mars?) or space science? From money going to Veterans or Housing? There are no easy answers.

In the Post article an unnamed source commented on these challenges, “One knowledgeable Republican source, who refused to be quoted by name because of office policy, acknowledged that Congress had heard about the shortfalls last month, and lawmakers "don't know what to think about it." While NASA is "acting responsibly" by voicing its fears early, the source said, the news "puts additional pressure on an already impossible budget -- and what are you going to take it from? And is this as high as [the shortfall] is going to get?"”

The escalating costs are just the latest example of the dynamics that have shaped U.S. space policy for two decades now. These dynamics have their origins in NASA’s commitment to a large, interdependent program focused on eventually going to Mars. When the whole mission to Mars was rejected decades ago NASA adopted an approach focused on “logical steps” – shuttle, station, and then Mars. But NASA’s ambitious plans lack resilience to perturbations, whether the perturbations are engineering-related or budget-related. When an unforeseen event occurs, like the loss of a shuttle or a budget overrun, its effects cascade through NASA disrupting plans and performance across the agency as it scrambles to adjust. NASA deals with the disruption and we start from scratch again. Meanwhile as NASA deals with these disruptions it makes inefficient progress towards its formal goals (e.g., lowering the costs of access to space) or even its decades-long desire to go to Mars. If this explanation is anywhere close to explaining NASA’s current situation, then simply adding more money in the absence of fundamental policy change may exacerbate rather than dampen these dynamics.

For more on these dynamics see the following two papers:

Pielke Jr., R. A., 1993: A Reappraisal of the Space Shuttle Program. Space Policy, May, 133-157.

Brunner, R., R. Byerly, Jr., and R.A. Pielke, Jr., 1992: The Future of the Space Station Program. Chapter in Space Policy Alternatives, edited by R. Byerly, Westview Press, Boulder, 199-222.

Radio Interview Q&A

A Prometheus reader posted a few questions after listening to a radio interview on climate change I participated in last week. Here are a few replies:

Comment: “Your points about separating climate and energy policy are interesting. You argue that the climate problem, for a variety of reasons, hasn't galvanized the necessary support for mandatory GHG reductions. You then posit energy independence could serve as the real impetus. You may be right, but do you have any data (public opinion or otherwise) to support this argument?”

Reply: I don’t have any data simply because the approach I am recommending has not been tried. There is some indirect evidence, however. Opinion polls routinely show that among the public, national security is considered more important than climate change. Here is a recent example of such a poll conducted in the U.K. from the BBC. What we do have is considerable evidence on how well the current approach is working. And the evidence shows, as discussed here on numerous occasions, that the current approach is not working very well. At some point it may be worth considering alternative strategies, even if they are untested (or perhaps because they are untested). This was the gist of our 2000 article in the Atlantic Monthly. It may be that the current approach to climate is the best one possible; however, it seems that such an argument is an increasingly hard case to make, particularly since there are many options yet untried.

Comment: “Also, with increasing mandatory action on GHG emissions at the state level (with climate change serving as the rationale) and growing support for legislation like McCain/Lieberman, might we be near a tipping point where the climate problem resonates with politicians enough to influence energy policy effectively ? Or do you still believe energy independence/efficiency arguments will make a more compelling, sensible case?”

Reply: The latter. The state actions and McCain/Lieberman are in my view watered down versions of the current, failing approach to climate policy. For many folks these policies are no doubt symbolically important and emotionally satisfying, but from the standpoint of addressing future climate impacts, these policies are, to say the least, substantively wanting. Ultimately, the proof of performance of any of these policies will lie in (a) the global level of greenhouse gas emissions, and (b) the vulnerability of people and ecosystems to climate.

Op-Ed on Stem Cell Science and Policy

I had an op-ed in Saturday’s Rocky Mountain News in which I try to make sense of the current debate over stem cells. It starts out like this:

“If you want to liven up conversation at a dinner party, ask the following question: How much money would you take for your pinkie toe?”

Read the whole thing here. Your comments are welcomed.