« May 2005 »

University Polices on Academic Earmarks

Princeton’s Alan B. Krueger had an interesting commentary on academic earmarks in last week’s New York Times. Krueger writes,

“Increasingly, universities are being financed like farmers and military contractors, with legislative earmarks. According to The Chronicle of Higher Education, there were 1,964 earmarks to 716 academic institutions costing a total of $2 billion in the 2003 fiscal year, or just over 10 percent of the federal money spent on academic research. From 1996 to 2003, the amount spent on academic earmarks grew at an astounding rate of 31 percent a year, after adjusting for inflation. Earmarks contrast with the way the government finances most university projects, which is through open competitions for grants. In these competitions, agencies like the National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health review grant applications, often consulting with outside experts, and base awards on the applications' perceived merit. Earmarks are decided by a political process, without external peer review. As academic earmarks have grown, so have universities' lobbying expenditures. Spending on lobbying jumped to $62 million in 2003 from $23 million in 1998, according to The Chronicle of Higher Education.”

Krueger cites several studies of earmarking. One study looked at the period 1997-1999 and found, not surprisingly, that the presence of a member of congress on a House or Senate appropriations subcommittee is a critical variable in explaining earmarking awards. The study also found that lobbying efforts have a significant monetary return to universities, which explains the growth in university lobbying efforts. Krueger cites another interesting study,

“A. Abigail Payne, an economist at McMaster University in Canada, has studied how earmarks affect the quantity and quality of academic research, inferring quality from the number of times research studies are cited by subsequent studies. She concludes that ‘earmarked funding may increase the quantity of publications but decrease the quality of the publications and the performance of earmarked funding is lower than that from using peer-reviewed funding.’”

Krueger concludes, “Indications are that academic earmarks crowd out spending on competitive peer-reviewed grants, at least in the short run. The competitive merit-based system that has financed most academic research since World War II is probably one reason the United States has been pre-eminent in science and higher education. If academic earmarks continue to grow at an exponential rate, this system could be in jeopardy. Slowing the growth of academic earmarks would require a concerted effort by American universities to shun the practice, or a new consensus in Congress to finance academic research only through the competitive merit-based process. The Association of American Universities, a group of 62 elite research universities, is currently re-examining its position on earmarks, and could send a strong signal by unequivocally rejecting the practice.”

Here at the University of Colorado-Boulder I serve on the chancellor’s advisory committee on federal relations, which includes lobbying and earmarking. I have proposed that Colorado adopt and publicize a general policy of not accepting academic earmarks, with an ability to make exceptions on a case by case basis. I have proposed that we take a close look at such a policy in place at the University of Michigan as a possible model. It’ll be interesting to see how my colleagues respond to such a proposal. The lure of earmarking is strong. But the consequences are significant.

John Marburger on Science Policy Research

In last week's Science, John Marburger, science advisor to President Bush, calls (PDF, subscription required) for greater attention to science policy research:

"How much should a nation spend on science? What kind of science? How much from private versus public sectors? Does demand for funding by potential science performers imply a shortage of funding or a surfeit of performers? These and related science policy questions tend to be asked and answered today in a highly visible advocacy context that makes assumptions that are deserving of closer scrutiny. A new "science of science policy" is emerging, and it may offer more compelling guidance for policy decisions and for more credible advocacy."

In my view, the "science of science policy" is being practiced most explicitly at Arizona State University's Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes and our own Center for Science and Technology Policy Research at the University of Colorado. Dr. Marburger's Science editorial follows up on his recent AAAS speech on the same subject.

Needless to say, we agree about the need for more systematic study of science policy - that is, decisions made about science and decision made with science. Our mission (PDF) here at the University of Colorado is based on the assumption/hypothesis that science policy decision making can be improved by expanding the scope of choice available to science policy decision makers. Perhaps we'll prove ourselves wrong, but we'll sure have fun along the way.

Hiding Behind the Science of Stem Cells

David Shaywitz has a nice op-ed in Tuesday’s Wall Street Journal on the stem cell issue. The article is not available online. Shaywitz makes the case that the very same conservatives who decry “junk science” are hiding their moral objections to stem cell research behind scientific claims that adult stem cells are a good substitute for embryonic stem cells. Shaywitz writes:

“For true believers, of course, these scientific facts should be beside the point; if human embryonic stem cell research is morally, fundamentally, wrong, then it should be wrong, period, regardless of the consequences to medical research. If conservatives believe their own rhetoric, they should vigorously critique embryonic stem cell research on its own grounds, and not rely on an appeal to utilitarian principles. Instead, there has been a concerted effort to establish adult stem cells as a palatable alternative to embryonic stem cells. In the process, conservatives seem to have left their usual concern for junk science at the laboratory door, citing in their defense preliminary studies and questionable data that they would surely – and appropriately – have ridiculed were it not supporting their current point of view.”

I think that Shaywitz is right on here with the exception of one important point. I don’t think that conservatives (on the stem cell issue or generally) are alone in their concern over “junk science” or unique in their desire to hide behind science. People and interest groups from across the political spectrum have shown considerable willingness to engage in political battles through science. In fact, turning political debates into scientific debates is arguably one of the most robust areas of partisan agreement.

Presentation on Climate Change and Reinsurance

Today I am giving a presentation at a forum on climate change sponsored by the Reinsurance Association of America. For those who are visiting this weblog as a result of my invitation during my talk, welcome! I am serving on a panel with several distinguished scientists from the reinsurance industry:

Dr. Eberhard Faust Head of Climate Risks, Department of Geo Risks Research Environmental Management, Munich Reinsurance Company AG

Gerry Lemcke, Ph.D. Head, Catastrophe Perils Team, Swiss Re America Corporation

My talk focuses on current scientific understandings related to the attribution of trends in the growth of economic damages related to weather and climate extremes. My basic conclusion is that, despite various claims to the contrary in the media and by advocacy groups, looking back in time, the evidence from climate impacts scientists provides very little support for claims that any significant part of the trend of increasing economic losses is the result of changes in the frequency or intensity of weather or climate extremes. (We discussed this in some detail last year here and here). Below you can find a long list of relevant studies.

This conclusion is for two reasons. First, although extreme events have varied at all time scales in their occurrence and magnitude (and such variations can be seen in the impacts records), and one can present historical records of various lengths that show trends, there has been no secular increase in extreme events around the world over recent decades. This conclusion is well supported by the most recent assessment of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. A second reason is why the influence of extreme events is hard to detect is that the single most important factor responsible for the trend is increasing population and wealth in exposed locations. Any climate signal in the historical record will be difficult to detect, even after adjusting for societal factors, simply because the size of the climate signal is less than the errors in the societal data.

Looking to the future it is important to consider both possible changes in climate and society. All of the analyses that I am aware of all suggest that societal factors will continue to dominate climate factors, probably overwhelmingly so. We should therefore expect weather and climate-related damage to increase dramatically in future years and decades. This increase will be insensitive to the amount of emissions reductions that might be achieved (either realistically or unrealistically) over coming years and decades. It does not make sense to attempt to modulate future extreme events, and by extension their impacts, with energy policies (although there are other good reasons for thinking about energy policy and CO2 emissions.) Reduction of the economic and other human impacts of weather and climate will be most effective when focused on the societal conditions that lead to ever growing vulnerability.

It is of course important to recognize that science is always a work in progress and new experience or studies might give good reasons for a change in expectations.

For further reading:

Downton, M., J. Z. B. Miller and R. A. Pielke, Jr., 2005. Reanalysis of U.S. National Weather Service Flood Loss Database, Natural Hazards Review, 6:13-22. (PDF)

Pielke, Jr., R. A. and D. Sarewitz, 2005. Bringing Society back into the Climate Debate, Population and Environment, Volume 26, Number 3, pp. 255-268. (PDF)

Sarewitz, D., and R.A. Pielke, Jr., 2005. Rising Tide, The New Republic, January 6. (PDF)

Pielke, Jr., R. A., J. Rubiera, C. Landsea, M. Fernandez, and R.A. Klein, 2003: Hurricane Vulnerability in Latin America and the Caribbean, Natural Hazards Review, 4:101-114. (PDF)

Downton, M. and R.A. Pielke, Jr., 2001: Discretion Without Accountability: Politics, Flood Damage, and Climate, Natural Hazards Review, 2(4):157-166. (PDF)

Changnon, S., R. A. Pielke, Jr., D. Changnon, D., R. T. Sylves, and R. Pulwarty, 2000: Human Factors Explain the Increased Losses from Weather and Climate Extremes. Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 81(3), 437-442. (PDF)

Pielke, Jr., R.A., and M.W. Downton, 2000: Precipitation and Damaging Floods: Trends in the United States, 1932-97. Journal of Climate, 13(20), 3625-3637. (PDF)

Pielke, Jr., R. A., R.A. Klein, and D. Sarewitz, 2000: Turning the Big Knob: Energy Policy as a Means to Reduce Weather Impacts. Energy and Environment, Vol. 11, No. 3, 255-276. (PDF)

Landsea, C. L., R. A. Pielke, Jr., A. Mestas-Nuez, and J. Knaff, 1999: Atlantic Basin Hurricanes: Indicies of Climate Changes. Climate Change, 42, 89-129. (PDF)

Pielke, Jr., R. A., and M. Downton, 1999: U.S. Trends in Streamflow and Precipitation: Using Societal Impact Data to Address an Apparent Paradox. Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 80(7), 1435-1436. (PDF)

Pielke, Jr., R.A., and C.W. Landsea, 1999: La Nia, El Nio, and Atlantic Hurricane Damages in the United States. Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 80, 10, 2027-2033. (PDF)

Pielke, Jr., R. A., and C. W. Landsea, 1998: Normalized Hurricane Damages in the United States: 1925-95. Weather and Forecasting, American Meteorological Society, Vol. 13, 621-631. (PDF)

Job Opportuntity

CAREER OPPORTUNITY: PROGRAM OFFICER

The Board on Atmospheric Sciences and Climate is seeking an exceptional person with strong scientific expertise and an interest in applying science in the policy arena. A Program Officer (sometimes called Study Director) is responsible for all aspects of implementation of the Board’s work--designing studies, working with agencies and committees of experts, analyzing complex issues, and preparing reports. The National Academies is a dynamic work environment with a staff of more than 1000 people who address all the issues in today’s headlines and more, from stem cell research to alternative energy sources to climate change.

Qualifications: Ph.D. or equivalent knowledge is preferred, but Master’s degree or equivalent knowledge with 3 years of related experience will be considered. Requires ability to review and analyze scientific literature; good organization, interpersonal, and leadership skills; and ability to work productively in a team environment. Excellent oral and written communications skills are essential. Background in a variety of fields within the areas of atmospheric sciences, meteorology, and climate will be considered. The job is located in Washington, D.C. Some travel is required.

Responsibilities:
• Plan, develop, and direct technical and policy studies related to a diversity of scientific issues in the atmospheric sciences, meteorology, and climate.
• Manage the study process, including organizing meetings of scientific experts; gathering and analyzing information for projects; guiding committee selection process and evolution of committee reports; and keeping projects on time and within budgets.
• Effectively express complex technical and policy information in various written forms, including status reports, project summaries, and detailed committee reports.
• Guide reports through review, publication, and dissemination.
• Interact with agency personnel, policy makers, and senior scientists.
• Assist in preparation of prospectuses and proposals and work on special projects.
• Supervise the work of support staff.

For more information, visit . To apply, send a resume and cover letter explaining your interest in the position to Chris Elfring, Director, Board on Atmospheric Sciences and Climate at . Send a copy of your application to Rob Carlucci, Office of Human Resources, at . Please include the job number (050058-5) on your application. No phone calls, please. Applications desired by June 30, 2005. The National Academies is an affirmative action/equal opportunity employer.

The Linear Model of Science in Climate Policy

Over at openDemocracy.net they have an interesting series of articles on climate change. Jon Miller has an article published yesterday titled "Selling Climate Change" that contains some smart advice (do read the whole thing). Here we focus on his first suggestion; one that Prometheus readers know will find a lot of sympathy here: "Don't debate the science." He continues,

"Everybody knows that greens love getting into a good debate. It's not surprising - there's a powerful scientific, moral and commonsense case to be made for taking action. Unfortunately, those with a vested interest in doing nothing are too shrewd. In the United States especially, they have successfully entangled environmental change campaigners in detailed debates about the validity of the science. It's a simple strategy: the likes of Exxon throw money at some financially compliant scientists, who produce a report with the appearance of credibility and objectivity. The greens, of course, leap to an enthusiastic defense of their case - and the trap is sprung: the public tunes out (too boring), the media downgrade the story (too complex) and the politicians have the greatest excuse for doing nothing (let's wait until the science is clear). It's entirely right to set out the case, of course - but the time has come to have confidence in the scientific consensus around climate change, and to stop debating the science. We urgently need to move the conversation from "is it really happening?" to "what do we do about it?""

Miller's call, like our own, to stop debating science is contrary to how many scientists describe their role in the political process. For example, a group of scientists writing last week in the openDemocracy forum make the claim that wise policy making requires accurate scientific judgments:

"In order to choose policy options wisely, decision-makers require the most accurate assessment of the relevant scientific information without having followed every discussion in the technical literature. To that end, scientists have a public role in placing new results in context, distilling the current state of knowledge, and pointing out where continuing uncertainties and problems lie."

This is an excellent example of an invocation of the "linear model" of science and decision making which I discussed in a recent paper (PDF). The linear model is "based on first getting the science "right" as a necessary, if not sufficient, basis for decision making... ". The linear model places science at the center of political debates:

"If the linear model is indeed an accurate reflection of how the world works then battles over science and how people interpret the significance of science are necessarily of critical importance because certain political outcomes can be made more or less likely through shaping public or policy maker perspectives on the science that putatively supports one agenda or another. However, the linear model has long been understood to be an inaccurate characterization of and even an undesirable approach to the relation of science and decision making because of the ample evidence showing that policy does not simply emerge from scientific understandings (see Oreskes, 2004 in this volume; Sarewitz, 2004 in this volume; Jasanoff, 1987; Wynne, 1991). Consequently, when scientists reinforce the linear model it has potential to create pathologies in decision making. From the perspective of the linear model science not only plays a (if not the) central role in political battle; but because scientific understandings are supposed to motivate political action, winning a scientific debate leads to a privileged position in political battle. Consequently, scientific debates are in effect political debates because resolving scientific debates will resolve political conflicts. Science thus becomes a convenient and necessary means for removing certain options from a debate without explicitly dealing with disputes over values. But because the linear model in fact fails to accurately describe the relationship between science and political outcomes, it may simply mask normative disputes in the language of science, to the possible detriment of both science and policy."

After the scientists writing on openDemocracy assert that wise policy requires accurate scientific assessments, they then assert exactly the opposite, "We comment here on scientific content in the submission by Benny Peiser in openDemocracy's climate change debate. Any criticism of his scientific points is however independent of our opinions concerning his preferred policy options." This raises some obvious confusion: If wise decision making requires accurate assessments, and Benny Peiser's assessment of science is inaccurate, then surely it stands to reason that the policies that he would recommend (whatever they are) based on science are then unwise policies. If the scientists' critique of Peiser's assessment of science is "independent" of judgments of policy, then wise decision making does not depend upon science. It can't be both ways -- judgments about policy cannot simultaneously both "require" and be "independent" of scientific debates.

One reason why scientists invoke the linear model is that it provides plausible deniability for scientists. It allows them to act is an overt political manner while simultaneously claiming to be disengaged from politics. Scholars who study science in society have long seen through this faade, but most scientists remain either unaware of or unburdened by it or its implications.

Miller's (and our own) call to move beyond debating the science of climate change and onto explicit discussion of policy would certainly be facilitated if leading climate scientists, who for many good reasons are the authoritative voices in the climate debate, themselves decide that wise policy does not depend upon debating the science, and, as Miller recommends, stop debating the science. But ironically enough my own call for scientists to recognize and act on the consensus of knowledge of scholarship in science and society is probably just another hopeless invocation of the linear model. Perhaps instead of invoking the scientific consensus of science scholars as the basis for action, climate scientists could instead benefit from open discussion of a range of choices for how they engage with society.

Making Sense of the Stem Cell Policy Debate

It looks like we are seeing another flare up in the debate over stem cell research. Here is an excerpt from what I wrote on this last year in and op-ed in the Rocky Mountain News:

“If you want to liven up conversation at a dinner party, ask the following question: How much money would you take for your pinkie toe?”

Read the whole op-ed here (PDF).

More Cart and Horse

The actions of municipalities in the U.S. and several major companies to respond to human caused climate change by reducing their green house emissions has caused some to suggest that these decision makers have been persuaded by science to change their behaviors. But what if this interpretation of their actions is incorrect?

Surely some people do undergo “data induced transformations” of their policy commitments when presented with new information. But it is probably just as if not more likely that, as Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay have observed, "people generally come to their beliefs about how the world works long before they encounter facts." Such distinctions matter because they shape how people think about science in the politics of climate change. For many people the challenge of climate change is to convince “skeptics” or the uniformed of the scientific consensus on climate change under an expectation that such convincing will invariably lead to certain actions. But what if support for action on climate change has origins in factors other than knowledge of science? (Or alternatively, what if battling over science actually hinders effective policy?)

Consider the following two vignettes:

1. From The Economist last week is this interesting quote from Jeffrey Immelt, CEO of GE: “We are investing in environmentally cleaner technology because we believe it will increase our revenue, our value and our profits... Not because it is trendy or moral, but because it will accelerate our growth and make us more competitive.”

2. Michele Betsill at Colorado State University has studied cities and climate change. She writes in a 2001 paper,

“The experience of CCP [Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) campaign sponsored by the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives] communities indicates that global climate change is most likely to be reframed as a local issue when city officials recognise that actions to control GHG emissions also address other local concerns already on their agendas. Localisation requires the prior existence of a local hook on which to hang the issue of global climate change. Localising global climate change is an important first step in developing a municipal response to global warming; it helps generate political support for reducing local GHG emissions. However, not all communities are able to move from reframing to policy action. There are several institutional barriers that make it difficult for cities to develop and implement policies and programmes for mitigating climate change: the issue does not fit the way most city governments organise themselves; many city governments lack the administrative capacity to monitor their GHG emissions; and there are often budgetary constraints that make it difficult to invest in emissions reduction activities. Ultimately, motivating local action to mitigate global climate change calls for an indirect strategy, focused on the ways in which emissions-producing activities are embedded in broader community concerns (Rayner & Malone, 1997). The primary benefit of an indirect approach is that it avoids many of the political debates about climate change science that have plagued international efforts to address this issue (Sarewitz & Pielke, 2000). Several officials noted that it really does not matter whether global climate change science is credible. Since the emphasis is on how reducing GHG emissions can help the city address other (more pressing) problems, questions of the scientific basis for climate change rarely come up. When and if they do, city officials can easily reply that these are actions they should take anyway.”

Cart or horse matters a great deal for how we think about, use and prioritize science and advocacy on climate change. Framing has practical implications, and climate change, and the dominant framing of climate change may not be particularly effective from the standpoints of science or action. We have something to learn from the case of policy responses to ozone depletion. The lessons of policy responses to ozone depletion are often characterized as the cart leading the horse, but in reality, the horse did in fact lead the cart. See this paper (PDF) by Pielke and Betsill, which presents a perspective on the lessons of the ozone case.

Cart or Horse?

The energy policy debate over climate change has largely been framed as an issue of managing the global climate for long-term benefits with the extra benefits of reducing dependence on foreign oil, increased efficiency and decreased particulate pollution. For example, A New York Times editorial today restates this logic:

“there is some talk that Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberman may offer a bill imposing industrywide caps as an amendment on the Senate floor. But a properly drawn energy bill has the potential to do much good, especially if it avoids rewarding the old polluting industries, as the House version does, and focuses instead on putting serious money behind cleaner fuels, cleaner power plants and cleaner cars. That these measures would also ease the country's dependency on overseas oil is, of course, a persuasive side benefit.”

But what if energy policy were to be characterized in terms of a primary need to reduce dependence on foreign oil, increased efficiency and decreased particulate pollution, and with the resulting side benefit of reducing the impacts of humans on the climate system?

The difference in framing is of critical importance for practical action, e.g., it shapes arguments made in advocacy, and influences the role of science in political debates. As progress on reducing emissions has yet to show any signs of success with respect to policy goals (e.g., such as those of the Climate Convention). A large body of experience -- including the adoption of Kyoto, Europe’s policy actions, the possibility of McCain/Lieberman, corporate and state endorsements of emissions limitations, etc. – might suggest that the current framing is not particularly effective. In this circumstance will there come a time when advocates for changes in energy policies consider how things might be done differently? Or are we, for better or worse, on the path that we are on for the long term? Thinking about degree to which changes to energy policy ought to be advocated in terms of their short term versus long term benefits might be a good place to start thinking about new options. Without a doubt, the current debate emphasizes the long term issues over the short term, which, and the Times states, are all but dismissed as merely a side benefit.

Is the “Hockey Stick” Debate Relevant to Policy?

On several occasions I have alluded to the fact that I think that the debate over the so-called “hockey stick” temperature reconstruction is a distraction from the development and promulgation of climate policy. And the debate goes on (and on). We have written frequently about the core dynamic of the climate debate in which political opponents pick a scientific sandbox to fight in, with little connection to policy, and fight things out in a public manner under a pretense that the debate has significance beyond science. Over time this skeptic vs. hawk debate has taken place over a supposed CO2 sink in North American, surface vs. satellite temperature trends, hurricanes and climate change and also the “hockey stick” (among other areas). Within science (including my own area of expertise) subject matter experts engage in vocal and at times nasty debates over knowledge. Such dust-ups are characteristic of the academic enterprise. But I’d assert that the battles over climate science go far beyond typical academic wrangling, are really proxy wars over something else. But what is that something else?

It might be political power, i.e., who gets to have a public voice on issues of climate change? Science is widely viewed as authoritative and legitimate, so everyone wants the imprimatur of science on their side. From this perspective the battle over climate science is a battle for standing, with little connection to the substantive connections of the scientific debates and practical decision making. In other words, the battle is over who gets to decide what action we take on climate change and not what actions we should take. This battle for political supremacy is most visible on the rival WWW sites that have sprung up to join the battle over the hockey stick (see RealClimate and ClimateAudit.)

But there is also evidence to suggest that some people believe that the hockey stick is relevant to decision making. For example, in its most recent assessment the IPCC clearly considered the “hockey stick” to be relevant to policy, as it included it prominently it is 2001 “Summary for Policy Makers.” The mission of the IPCC is to be “policy relevant” so presumably it is safe to say that any science that it presents (and particularly in its summary for policymakers) it considers it to be relevant for policy. But because the IPCC does not explicitly discuss policy, there is no way to glean from its reports why it thinks that the hockey stick is policy relevant. Further, the IPCC clearly does not need the hockey stick to assert its scientific authority and legitimacy, so there must be a very real presumption of policy relevance.

[There is also the possibility that the battle over the hockey stick has more to do with personalities and egos than politics or policy. However, while I am sure that personalities and egos play an important role in the evolution of this and the other proxy wars on climate, I do not think that they overshadow the politics and policy issues above.]

So here is my question to Prometheus readers: Is the debate over the “hockey stick” of any policy relevance whatsoever, other than as a battleground for political standing? That is to say, is the future resolution of the “hockey stick” debate at all relevant to understanding (a) our available scope of options on climate change, or (b) how we might evaluate those options? The views of those actually engaged in the “hockey stick” debate are solicited as well – why are you involved in this debate?

Science and Policy Guidelines in the UK

The U.K. Office of Science and Technology has recently issued a “consultation (PDF)” requesting guidance on an update to its guidelines on the interface of science and policy. Specifically, “The Guidelines on Scientific Analysis in Policy Making is a high-level document addressing the way in which Government departments obtain and use analysis and advice in policy-making.” It seems to me the that community of scholars who study science and decision making might have some useful input to this consultation.

The draft update observes, “The environment in which Ministers must make decisions is continually changing. In recent years we have seen the level of public interest in evidence based issues increase, and in some cases the level of public confidence in the government’s ability to make sound decisions based on that evidence has decreased. It is therefore essential that an effective advisory process exists which allows decision-makers access to a high-quality and wide-ranging evidence base. This will enable them to make informed decisions, to deal effectively with crises and to ensure that all opportunities are explored to their full potential. In short, we must ensure that:
• key decision makers can be confident that evidence is robust and stands up to challenges of credibility, reliability and objectivity
• key decision makers can be confident that the advice derived from the analysis of the evidence also stands up to these challenges
• the public are aware, and are in turn confident, that such steps are being taken

The principles laid out within these guidelines are consistent with the current better policy making guidelines to which policy makers adhere. They aim to further highlight the importance of the role of evidence in policy making, and to increase the awareness of policy makers on how best to seek good quality evidence from the most credible sources at the most appropriate time.”

Here are the specific questions that input is being requested on.

“In this consultation document the Government invites responses to the following questions:
Consultation Question 1
Peer review and publication can be important factors in the robustness of the evidence used by government departments in policy making decisions, so:
• What should the CSA guidelines say about this? Should we say that best practice is for each department being responsible for ensuring all research/evidence is peer reviewed unless there are very exceptional circumstances? What might those circumstances be?
• How should we deal with ‘breaking news’ where the new evidence might be radically different?
• How should policy makers mitigate the impact of radical evidential change on existing bodies of evidence?
• Should we suggest they attempt a fast track peer review in parallel and share with key experts who can seek to replicate?

Consultation Question 2
Departmental use of the guidelines will be difficult to measure. The guidelines are principle based and in most cases will be woven into departmental guidance on better policy making. It is also important to recognise that departments are subject to a considerable amount of evaluation already, so:
• How should we evaluate? Do we simply say here that OST will work with senior policy makers in each department to ensure that the principles of the guidelines are fully embedded in departmental policy procedures?
• Do we say this will be followed up in greater detail under Science and Innovation Strategy Assessments?
• Should we suggest we will sample significant policy documents/publications to see what they tell us?”

The full “consultation (PDF)” document has instructions for submission of input.

Letter in Science

I've got a letter in Science this week on Oreskes/consensus. Naomi has a response. I've reproduced both in full below:

Consensus About Climate Change?

In her essay "The scientific consensus on climate change" (3 Dec. 2004, p. 1686), N. Oreskes asserts that the consensus reflected in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) appears to reflect, well, a consensus. Although Oreskes found unanimity in the 928 articles with key words "global climate change," we should not be surprised if a broader review were to find conclusions at odds with the IPCC consensus, as "consensus" does not mean uniformity of perspective. In the discussion motivated by Oreskes' Essay, I have seen one claim made that there are more than 11,000 articles on "climate change" in the ISI database and suggestions that about 10% somehow contradict the IPCC consensus position.

But so what? If that number is 1% or 40%, it does not make any difference whatsoever from the standpoint of policy action. Of course, one has to be careful, because people tend to read into the phrase "policy action" a particular course of action that they themselves advocate. But in the IPCC, one can find statements to use in arguing for or against support of the Kyoto Protocol. The same is true for any other specific course of policy action on climate change. The IPCC maintains that its assessments do not advocate any single course of action.

So in addition to arguing about the science of climate change as a proxy for political debate on climate policy, we now can add arguments about the notion of consensus itself. These proxy debates are both a distraction from progress on climate change and a reflection of the tendency of all involved to politicize climate science. The actions that we take on climate change should be robust to (i) the diversity of scientific perspectives, and thus also to (ii) the diversity of perspectives of the nature of the consensus. A consensus is a measure of a central tendency and, as such, it necessarily has a distribution of perspectives around that central measure (1). On climate change, almost all of this distribution is well within the bounds of legitimate scientific debate and reflected within the full text of the IPCC reports. Our policies should not be optimized to reflect a single measure of the central tendency or, worse yet, caricatures of that measure, but instead they should be robust enough to accommodate the distribution of perspectives around that central measure, thus providing a buffer against the possibility that we might learn more in the future (2).

Roger A. Pielke Jr.
Center for Science and Technology Policy Research
University of Colorado
UCB 488
Boulder, CO 80309-0488, USA

References

1. D. Bray, H. von Storch, Bull. Am. Meteorol. Soc. 80, 439 (1999).
2. R. Lempert, M. Schlesinger, Clim. Change 45, 387 (2000).

Response
Pielke suggests that I claimed that there are no papers in the climate literature that disagree with the consensus. Not so. I simply presented the research result that a sample based on the keywords "global climate change" did not reveal any, suggesting that the existing scientific dissent has been greatly exaggerated and confirming that the statements and reports of leading scientific organizations--including the U.S. National Academy of Sciences--accurately reflect the evidence presented in the scientific literature.

Pielke is quite right that understanding the results of scientific research does not implicate us in any particular course of action, and the purpose of my Essay was not to advocate either for or against the Kyoto accords or any other particular policy response. A full debate on the moral, social, political, ethical, and economic ramifications of possible responses to climate change--as well as the ramifications of inaction--would be a very good thing. But such a debate is impeded by climate-change deniers. In this respect, I am in complete agreement with Pielke's conclusion, which was precisely the point of my Essay: Proxy debates about scientific uncertainty are a distraction from the real issue, which is how best to respond to the range of likely outcomes of global warming and how to maximize our ability to learn about the world we live in so as to be able to respond efficaciously. Denying science advances neither of those goals.

Naomi Oreskes
Department of History and Science Studies Program
University of California at San Diego
La Jolla, CA 92093, USA

Wake-up Calls

There was an interesting wake up call in the Letters section of Science this week.

It was along a familiar theme: federal science funding is being axed in an alarming way, and the United States risks a slew of (undefined in this short letter) future maladies if we forget that strong support for basic science and tech research is a key ingredient in our economic health. It’s a point that was also made in the masthead editorial by Lazowska and Patterson.

The difference between the featured editorial and the short letter is that the author of the latter is Bart Gordon, the ranking member of the Committee on Science in the U.S. House of Representatives. Rep. Gordon repeats a familiar (of late) theme: “[misguided budget priorities] puts our nation’s strong global standing in science and technology at risk now and in the future.” But he is doing so from an unfamiliar podium to most readers of Science, a podium perhaps much more relevant than that from which most scientists usually hear the same message.

The fact that this letter was even written signals to me a new urgency in Congress over science funding. This is a member of Congress practically begging the community of federally-funded researchers to speak up, to slough off their hesitation and embarrassment, and to place a call to their elected representatives. It is a member of Congress saying, “Hey, despite what you’ve heard about how things work around here, individuals calling on their representatives actually does have a large impact.” In other words, this is an ironic role reversal: an elected representative lobbying the U.S. science and tech community to lobby other members of Congress on federal funding priorities.

The science and technology community hears this message from time to time, but how often do they hear it from a member of Congress directly? That should be both a neat insight into how Congress works and how people can influence the system, and a strong wake-up call. According to one of the best-placed members in science policy and politics, the science and tech community has a large role to play in shaping federal research priorities but is abrogating that role.

Any researcher in the U.S. should meditate on Rep. Gordon’s closing words:

“Researchers, students, faculty, this affects you. Write, call, e-mail, and speak on the importance of what you do for this nation’s economy. Help us help you by being your own unrelenting advocates.”

It is easy to dismiss this message as self-serving when from another science-based commentator, but when the message comes directly from the horse’s mouth (conflicts of interest in protecting committee turf aside), it is something all federally-funded researchers should take note of.

Water Vapor and Technology Assessment

A study just out in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) provides some reinforcement for the idea of a technology assessment of the environmental effects of fuel cell cars.

Last year a few of us (myself, Bobbie Klein, Genevieve Maricle, Tom Chase) here at the Center for Science and Technology Policy Research wrote a letter (PDF) to Science suggesting that water vapor emissions from fuel cell vehicles ought to be considered from the standpoint of a technology assessment, because water vapor can have effects upon the environment. We speculated:

"As fuel cell cars are suggested as a solution to global climate change caused by rising levels of greenhouse gas emissions, they are frequently misidentified as "zero-emissions vehicles." Fuel cell vehicles emit water vapor. A global fleet could have the potential to emit amounts large enough to affect local or regional distribution of water vapor. Variation in water vapor affects local, regional, and global climates (1). Data on such effects are sparse because of complexities in the water vapor life cycle. However, our preliminary calculations indicate that a complete shift to fuel cell vehicles would do little to slow water vapor emissions, which presumably have increased perceptibly in some metropolitan locations through the growth in use of internal combustion engines. In some locations, changes in relative humidity related to human activity have arguably affected local and regional climate (2, 3). Depending on the fuel cell technologies actually employed, relative humidity in some locales might conceivably increase by an amount greater than with internal combustion engines. This increase could lead to shifts in local or regional precipitation or temperature patterns, with discernible effects on people and ecosystems The broad environmental effects of fuel cell vehicles are an issue worth addressing via a technology assessment before implementing a solution (4). Not all problems can be anticipated in this manner, but if some can, then the effort will have been well spent (5). In the case of hydrogen cars, the cure may indeed be better than the disease, but we should make sure before taking our medicine."

Our point was not that the environmental effects of water vapor emissions would necessarily be significant (we haven't done that research), but instead that research should be conducted to explore whether or not (and to what degree) such effects would be significant, even if such research leads to a dismissal of concerns. We received a number of dismissive replies to our letter suggesting that human emissions of water vapor were necessarily irrelevant in the climate system, because of its small contribution to he global water vapor cycle, and as a consequence, this aspect of a technology assessment would be unnecessary. (And ExxonMobil incorrectly states that fuel cells provide "zero vehicle emissions.") While scientific claims of the irrelevance of water vapor emissions may prove correct, it would not preclude the importance of doing a comprehensive technology assessment. After all, CFCs were long thought to be a perfect industrial chemical because they had "no effect" on the environment. And a negative finding from a technology assessment can be just as important as a finding of harm.

A study just out in the PNAS (I don't have a direct link yet) would seem to support our calls for a technology assessment, and was described by SciDev.net as follows:

"Line Gordon, of the University of Stockholm, Sweden, and her colleagues, looked at how much water vapour is being produced around the planet and compared this to estimates of what would have been produced if human activities hadn't modified land-use and vegetation. Their study is the first to look at water vapour flows on a global scale. The researchers found that, worldwide, deforestation has decreased the evaporation of water by four per cent. Overall, this is almost exactly offset by the increase in the release of water vapour from irrigation. But the authors warn that the balance at the global level hides strong regional differences... The combined effect, say that authors, is a substantial difference in the distribution of vapour at a global scale compared to what the distribution would have been without human deforestation and irrigation. Studies in China have shown the changes to vapour flows within a region can affect the monsoon rains across the region. No one has yet studied the interaction between vapour flows and the climate on a global scale. The authors suggest the interaction could be large, and the implications for food security could be severe... [Gordon] underlines the need to start analysing the role of water vapour flows in the global climate. "We need to see how big an effect this can have on a global scale," she says."

Ultimately, water vapor emissions from a global fleet of fuel cell powered autos may indeed prove to be benign or irrelevant. It would certainly be wonderful to find a important energy technology with little downside. But given the low cost of exploring this topic, it would seem to make good sense to perform a comprehensive technology assessment (argued in the peer-reviewed literature) of fuel cell technologies, before committing to a particular technological or policy path. And any such assessment ought to consider water vapor as well.

Immigration and Climate Change

The New York Times today has an op-ed on climate change and immigration by Sujatha Byravan, president of the Council for Responsible Genetics, and Sudhir Chella Rajan, head of the Global Politics and Institutions Program at the Tellus Institute. The op-ed revisits an argument made by the authors recently in Nature.

Byravan and Rajan argue that one of the consequences of human-caused climate change "will be rising seas, which in turn will generate a surge of "climate exiles" who have been flooded out of their homes in poor countries. How should those of us in rich countries deal with this wave of immigrants? The fairest solution: allowing the phased immigration of people living in vulnerable regions according to a formula that is tied to the host country's cumulative contributions to global warming."

This op-ed is worth commenting on because it actually talks about policy, and does not take us into the cul-de-sac of "global warming: yes or no?". So let's discuss their recommended policy option. To summarize my critique, Byravan and Rajan take a complicated issue of great importance, displaced peoples, and argue as if a human-caused climate change aspect of this issue can be considered in isolation of that larger problem. This, in a nutshell, represents the core pathology of current discussion of climate policies.

Byravan and Rajan proposal is as follows: "So no matter what we do, a wave of climate change exiles is inevitable. One option for dealing with this is to tighten our borders and inure ourselves to the exiles' cries for help. A more sensible, and just, approach is for the top greenhouse gas emitters - including China and India - to grant entry to the up to 200 million people who could lose their homes to rising seas by 2080. How many should go where? Under our formula, the top cumulative emitter, the United States, would absorb 21 percent of the climate-change exiles a year; the smallest of the 20 major emitters, Venezuela, would absorb less than 1 percent. If such a program were to start in 2010, the United States, for example, would have to be prepared to accept 150,000 to a half-million immigrants a year for the next 70 years or so (to put that in context, the United States now has one million legal immigrants annually)."

My critique of their proposal has two parts. First, Byravan and Rajan's numbers are based on some highly dubious assumptions. They suggest that based on its proportion of historical greenhouse gas emissions the US might be responsible for accepting 21% of climate change immigrants, which they calculate as 150,000 to 500,000 per year. The Times op-ed doesn't say where these numbers come from but we can see their origin from what Byravan and Rajan said in Nature:

"Estimates suggest that roughly 50 million to 200 million people will be displaced by the 2080s, owing to the direct impacts of climate change under a plausible range of emissions scenarios (R. J. Nicholls Glob. Environ. Change14, 69-86; 2004). Assuming that all these climate-change exiles are absorbed by the top ten 'emitter' countries, new annual immigrants would range from a few thousand for the Czech Republic to about three-quarters of a million for the United States."

So 150,000 immigrants refer to the 50 million-over-70-year scenario and the half million immigrants refers to the 200-million-over-70-year scenario. Setting aside uncertainties in projecting future sea-level rise and its impacts on coastal inhabitants, the dodgiest assumption here is that all people projected to be displaced by human caused climate change will seek to relocate in rich countries.

The Indian Ocean tsunami does provide some experience that might be useful in exploring how many displaced coastal residents from developing countries actually seek to migrate to rich countries. According to the Red Cross more than 1.6 million people were displaced by the tsunami. Have all of these people sought to migrate to rich countries? It seems highly unlikely. According to a just-released US AID study in the aftermath of the tsunami, "despite the devastation, the desire for self-sufficiency and a return to normality has led some people to return home already without help from the government or aid agencies. Most people said that if they could not return home, they would like to be relocated as close as possible to their original homes and jobs if the government could guarantee them legal ownership of the land on which their new homes would be built."

A second issue with the numbers is that Byravan and Rajan seek to anchor attention to the current level of United States immigration of ~1 million per year. Under their proposal this would result in a 15% to 50% increase over present day levels, numbers surely designed to capture attention. But a more appropriate base rate is the number of displaced people worldwide. The U.N. High Commission for Refugees estimates in recent years that there are ~17-20 million people who are in some way displaced. Even assuming the worst case assumptions of Nicholls study, it would seem that migration of people associated with climate change is a subset of a much larger challenge of displaced peoples, rather than vice versa.

And this leads to my second criticism of the Byravan and Rajan op-ed, it seeks to redefine a serious humanitarian issue as an issue of human caused climate change. This is (yet) another example of attempts to gerrymander the climate change issue as if it can be addressed in isolation from issues of disease, disasters, poverty, water resources, energy use and now migration. Under Byravan and Rajan's proposal that climate change refugees be allocated to rich countries I wonder how they might identify a "climate change refugee" from the much larger population of displaced peoples. So as to distinguish them from the tens of millions of other displaced people, presumably these future immigrants to the rich world need some proof that their dislocation resulted from the historical emissions of greenhouse gases and not poverty, war, poor governance, bad luck or any this else.

Less charitably, invoking concerns about future migrations of developing world peoples to the north comes close to exploiting existing fears and passions about immigration as a rhetorical political strategy to garner support for action climate change. Issues of displaced peoples and immigration are tremendously important. Climate change is also important. But conflating the two is unlikely to lead to effective policy development in response to immigration or climate impacts.

New Publication

Bobbie Klein and I have a new paper out. The paper suggests that the impacts of hurricanes/tropical storms is somewhat greater than conventionally accounted for, when inland flooding is considered in addition to coastal damages.

Here is the abstract:

"Abstract: A problem exists in that the classifications used by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for weather-related disasters do not always allow analysts to clearly link declared disasters to their ultimate meteorological cause. This research focuses on those disasters related to flooding resulting from tropical cyclones. Neither FEMA nor the states that request federal disaster aid distinguish flood disasters by their meteorological origin, making it difficult to assess the contributions of various meteorological phenomena to the incidence and severity of Presidential Disaster Declarations. The data presented in this initial analysis indicate that the flood-related impacts of tropical systems are considerably broader and undoubtedly larger in economic magnitude than documented in the official records kept by FEMA."

The whole paper is here.

Another Recipe for Politicization of Science

Nature reports this week that the U.S. National Science Foundation is moving toward limiting the number of proposals that a particular university can submit,

“In the past few years, the NSF has placed limits on the number of applications that a single institution can submit. Those limits will now become increasingly common, according to Arden Bement, the agency's director. He says the measures are needed to control the number of proposals flooding in to his staff, and to boost the success rate of applications. He stresses that the new policy will affect only large facilities and collaborative grants. "This would not be for individual applications," he says. But universities are starting to speak out about the proposals, warning that the changes are forcing them to become unwilling peer reviewers. Earlier this year, administrators at Princeton University, New Jersey, had to choose one of several proposals for a programme that funded international collaborations, according to Diane Jones, director of the university's office of government affairs. The proposals came from several disciplines and departments, making the choice far from straightforward. "Universities are not set up to do this kind of internal peer review," she says.”

In my experience universities are highly politicized places -- and I don’t mean here the Republican-Democrat sort of politicization, but the sort of politicization associated with turf, disciplinary status, personal feuds, professorial fiefdoms and horse trading and logrolling. Going further down the path of outsourcing peer review to universities is in my view another step towards a continued diminishment of peer review as an effective tool of decision making about science.

Fun With Cherry Picking

Two blog posts from recent days highlight the cherry picking of information to put a favorable spin on information.

Chris Mooney does a nice job showing differences between a press release on a recent paper by Hansen et al. issued by Columbia University and a version of the same press release issued by NASA. Mooney argues that the differences show that, “The tenor of these edits is all in one direction: Make the findings seem less alarming--i.e., less demanding of political action, and also less newsworthy.” Of course, the authors of the Columbia press release also had decisions to make about how to portray the Hansen paper.

At Climate Audit, a recent post makes the case that the IPCC selectively ignored inconvenient data when creating a graphed showing paleoclimate temperature reconstructions. Climate Audit then presents its recreation of the graph in question with the previously not-included data added and suggests that the IPCC did not include the data because it complicated its conclusions.

Both of these instances are great examples of the “cherry pick -- the careful selection of information to buttress a particular predetermined perspective while ignoring other information that does not. In other words, take the best and leave the rest.” NASA is allegedly trying to present the Hansen paper in a way that puts the current Administration’s climate policies in the best light, and the IPCC is allegedly trying to present data that best support its conclusions. If we get a bit reflexive about this, in a similar manner, Chris Mooney is selectively focusing on data and anecdotes that make the Bush Administration look bad (e.g., he has not vetted every agency press release), and Climate Audit is focused on holding the paleo-climate science community accountable (and similarly has not audited every IPCC graph). Here at Prometheus we selectively focus on examples and cases at the messy interface of climate politics and science (and we tend to focus on problematic aspects of that interface). But of course we should not expect to receive information that is not selective; it would be of little use. Weblogs are useful because they are selective in their presentation of information.

All of this is to say – to quote Dan Sarewitz -- all uses of facts and information are selective. Every single one. There is no alternative. Every time anyone makes an argument and invokes facts or information they have some agenda for doing so (except Michael Crichton, that is). That NASA or the IPCC (or Chris Mooney or Climate Audit or Prometheus) have agendas in not surprising. In neither case do Chris Mooney or Climate Audit allege (I think this is correct) that either NASA or the IPCC has engaged in scientific misconduct. What they are saying is that each organization has acted in ways to present information in a manner that further its own interest , perhaps revealing an underlying agenda, probably political.

Good for Chris Mooney and good for Climate Audit. Such close attention can help both the IPCC and NASA realize that people are paying attention to their use of information and facts. Knowing that people are paying attention will mean that NASA and IPCC may be less likely to go beyond cherry picking to providing information that is mistaken or mischaracterized. NASA and IPCC (and bloggers as well) should care because if people come to learn that their information providers are playing fast and loose with facts and information, then with some audiences their institutional legitimacy and authority may be placed at risk.

Anytime someone uses facts or information to make an argument, that use is selective. Cherry picking is inevitable. But it is important to recognize that how one uses information can either foster or damage legitimacy and authority (on this, see recent reports on use of intelligence leading to the war in Iraq).

What Kind of Politicization Do You Want?

In Sunday’s Sacramento Bee Mark B. Brown and Ramshin, both of California State University, Sacramento, observe (free registration required) that while it is impossible to separate science and politics on the stem cell issue, we do have choices about how stem cell science is politicized. They write,

“The controversy over implementation of Proposition 71 is not about whether stem cell research will be politicized but how it will be politicized Prop. 71 was designed to counteract the politicization of science associated with federal science policy. The Bush administration had reportedly slanted the membership and distorted the recommendations of several of its scientific advisory boards. And the president's 2001 restrictions on publicly funded stem cell research have been widely criticized for sacrificing science to ideology. Seeking to avoid such political meddling, Prop. 71 made the institute's advisory committees largely exempt from conflict-of-interest and open meetings laws. It stipulated that the initiative's provisions could not be changed by the Legislature for three years, and then only by a 70 percent vote in both houses. And Prop. 71 declared, "There is hereby established a right to conduct stem cell research." Just as the Bill of Rights protects civil and religious freedoms, Prop. 71 sought to protect science from political interference. So far, none of these efforts to insulate science from politics has worked. But why would they?”

Brown and Ramshin make the case that the issue is not whether or not stem cell science politics will be politicized, it will no matter what. The issue is how it is politicized and Brown and Ramshin make the case that we have choices in this regard.

“Two lawsuits now challenge Prop. 71, and many former supporters have publicly attacked the secretiveness and cronyism at the institute. But even if it is impossible to get the politics out of stem cell research, there are ways to avoid the sort of politicization undertaken by the Bush administration. A constitutional amendment recently introduced by state Sens. Deborah Ortiz, D-Sacramento, and George Runner, R-Lancaster, and now in committee, offers one option. The amendment, which if passed by the Legislature would require approval by California voters, would make the bodies created by Prop. 71 subject to open meetings and public records laws, as well as conflict-of-interest and financial disclosure requirements. These are worthy goals. They would introduce a more accountable and transparent, and hence more democratic, form of politics into stem cell research.”

Read the whole article here to see Brown and Rashmin’s recommendations for how stem cell science might be politicized consistent with democratic common interests.

Leadership in Space

Technological and political leadership has been an important goal for NASA over the last fifty years. Particularly during the early days of space exploration, international competition between the Soviet and U.S. space programs spurred manned and unmanned missions, with each country achieving important milestones in space exploration. Now, the Bush Administration’s call on NASA to pursue novel and unique capabilities to send manned missions to the Moon and Mars reflects a dedication to space leadership as a tool of international politics.

NASA explicitly defends the inclusion of manned missions to the Moon and Mars in terms of leadership saying in a recent budget document, [PDF] “[Humans] will also serve as a potent symbol of American democracy, a reminder of what the human spirit can achieve in a free society.” The Administration’s rhetoric of exploration supports a view of space as ground for proving new capabilities and enhancing the perceived power of the U.S. at home and abroad.

The U.S. faces growing anti-Americanism in some parts of the world, and as the NASA quote above shows, some believe that manned exploration accomplishments can contribute to bolstering the image of the U.S. abroad. Much as Apollo purported to demonstrate U.S. military superiority over the U.S.S.R. in the cold war, some suggest a new lunar program would demonstrate the cultural superiority of the U.S.

But, will a manned mission to the Moon or Mars really convince rival nations to accept U.S. policy positions?

The U.S. no longer faces competition from a peer rival and the other nations with space capabilities remain allies. In fact, NASA has recently pursued a variety of cooperative missions with international partners, ranging from data sharing on U.S. built craft to cooperative development of mission plans and hardware. The International Space Station now includes major partners from 16 countries, including Japan, Russia, and the E.U. Cooperation with Russia on the ISS program has proved critical to keeping the station supplied and in orbit after the loss of the space shuttle Columbia. And cost sharing has reduced the cost of the ISS to the U.S. significantly, as partner nations have provided over a quarter of the station components.

The U.S. now has an opportunity to learn from these successes while framing a new Moon/Mars initiative. Using the successful cooperative models of ISS and science missions such as SOHO and Cassini-Huygens, NASA could direct a combined international effort to explore space. A cooperative program would yield greater benefits than a unilateral attempt by demonstrating a U.S. commitment to the concerns of international partners and lesson perceptions of an American hegemony.

Internationalizing NASA's "Vision for Space Exploration" also has the potential to engage the Chinese space program which has also announced a manned mission to the Moon, avoiding a costly and unnecessary repeat of a lunar space race.

An international effort also makes sense from a cost and data sharing perspective. Cooperation has allowed nations to pursue projects that they could not afford individually, increased access to space assets and data, and contributed to international diplomacy. Increasing international involvement in the Vision could benefit the policy as a whole, and should be considered now during initial development. For leadership in space to have tangible benefits back home, the U.S. must strive for more than building the biggest rockets.