Center Home Science Policy Photos University of Colorado spacer
University of Colorado University of Colorado CIRES
Location: > Prometheus: A Comment on IPCC Working Group II on the Importance of Development Archives

April 07, 2007

A Comment on IPCC Working Group II on the Importance of Development


Posted to Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Climate Change

Implicit in the work of the IPCC, and almost explicit in the report released yesterday, is the overriding importance of how the world choses to develop in the future. In the analysis in the IPCC lies the inescapable fact that how the world chooses to develop, independent of how the world responds to climate change, will modulate future global per capita GDP by a factor of up to 4.7 (the differences between the lowest and highest in the IPCC storylines for the future). By contrast, how the world chooses to respond to climate change, independent of how the world develops, will modulate future global per capita GDP by a factor of 1.05 to 1.20 (i.e., the conclusions presented in the IPCC WG II and the Stern Report).

To put this another way, from the standpoint of global GDP decisions that the world makes that make one storyline more likely to occur than another are between 19 and 74 times more important than decisions that are made about greenhouse gas emissions, under the assumptions provided by the IPCC!

So long as the IPCC, the Stern report, and others use GDP as a metric to advocate action on climate change, then this result is unavoidable. This is the main reason why some people have concluded that decisions about development, otherwise known as adaptation, must be front and center in any discussion of climate change. Yet the IPCC continuously tries to deemphasize the importance of adaptation as development, for instance writing that,

there are formidable environmental, economic, informational, social, attitudinal and behavioural barriers to implementation of adaptation.

Of course the exact same thing could be said about mitigation (but is not said), and by contrast the IPCC always frames mitigation in a positive light:

Many impacts can be avoided, reduced or delayed by mitigation.

It is well past time that the community openly and forthrightly discusses the importance of development pathways as the primary determinant of the future welfare of people and the environment. Carbon dioxide should be a part of that discussion, but not a substitute for it. The IPCC WG II is a small step in the right direction, but there remains a long way to go.

The background and calculations which provide the startling numbers above can be found below.

The IPCC effort is based on a range of plausible scenarios of the future:

Scenarios are images of the future, or alternative futures. They are neither predictions nor forecasts. Rather, each scenario is one alternative image of how the future might unfold. . . . They represent pertinent, plausible, alternative futures.

The IPCC uses four families of scenarios comprised of 40 different scenarios:

*The A1 storyline and scenario family describes a future world of very rapid economic growth, low population growth, and the rapid introduction of new and more efficient technologies. Major underlying themes are convergence among regions, capacity building and increased cultural and social interactions, with a substantial reduction in regional differences in per capita income. The A1 scenario family develops into four groups that describe alternative directions of technological change in the energy system.

* The A2 storyline and scenario family describes a very heterogeneous world. The underlying theme is self-reliance and preservation of local identities. Fertility patterns across regions converge very slowly, which results in high population growth. Economic development is primarily regionally oriented and per capita economic growth and technological change are more fragmented and slower than in other storylines.

* The B1 storyline and scenario family describes a convergent world with the same low population growth as in the A1 storyline, but with rapid changes in economic structures toward a service and information economy, with reductions in material intensity, and the introduction of clean and resource-efficient technologies. The emphasis is on global solutions to economic, social, and environmental sustainability, including improved equity, but without additional climate initiatives.

*The B2 storyline and scenario family describes a world in which the emphasis is on local solutions to economic, social, and environmental sustainability. It is a world with moderate population growth, intermediate levels of economic development, and less rapid and more diverse technological change than in the B1 and A1 storylines. While the scenario is also oriented toward environmental protection and social equity, it focuses on local and regional levels. (link)

The IPCC went to great efforts to suggest that any of the scenarios are possible future outcomes:

The broad consensus among the SRES writing team is that the current literature analysis suggests the future is inherently unpredictable and so views will differ as to which of the storylines and representative scenarios could be more or less likely.

And importantly, the scenarios do not consider any policies specific to human caused climate change:

The SRES storylines do not include explicit policies to limit GHG emissions or to adapt to the expected global climate change.

The IPCC concludes that:

All four SRES "futures" represented by the distinct storylines are treated as equally possible.

The role of policy making is to shape the future in preferred ways. The IPCC scenarios suggest different global outcomes based on decisions that societies around the world make, independently and jointly, starting today. Let’s consider such decisions with respect to one metric used by The Stern Report and the IPCC: wealth as measured by global per capita GDP. Let me acknowledge up front that GDP is not the only metric that matters, but it is one proposed by both Stern and IPCC, so I use it here.

The IPCC Working Group II report released yesterday (PDF) concluded that "global mean losses could be 1-5% Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 4 degrees C of warming." This conclusion is consistent with the conclusion of the Stern Report which concluded that business as usual could lead to economic losses of 5% to 20% of per capita GDP. In the analysis below we will therefore use both 5% and 20% as the possible impacts of climate change.

The IPCC finds global per capita GDP to be $4,000 in 1990. Under each of its four storylines it describes global per capita GDP for 2100 as follows (in constant 1990 dollars):

A1: $74,900
A2: $16,100
B1: $46,600
B2: $22,600

Under each storyline people around the world are significantly wealthier than they are today. The IPCC SRES report is careful to avoid a judgment of whether or not this is desirable. But because both Stern and IPCC WGII identify losses in GDP as being problematic, and a cause for action, we can safely conclude that both reports identify a higher GDP as being a better societal outcome than a lower GDP.

Now what happen when we factor in the effects climate change? For a 4 degree increase according to IPCC WGII these values would decrease by 5%:

A1: $71,200
A2: $15,300
B1: $44,300
B2: $21,500

And unmitigated BAU, according to Stern could reduce these values by as much as 20%:

A1: $59,900
A2: $12,900
B1: $37,300
B2: $18,100

So how the world chooses to respond to climate change, independent of how the world develops, will modulate future GDP by a factor of 1.05 to 1.20 (i.e., 5% to 20% found in IPCC WG II and Stern).

But implicit in the IPCC storylines, is how the world chooses to develop, independent of how the world responds to climate change, will modulate future GDP by a factor of up to 4.7 (i.e., the GDP in A1 divided by the GDP in A2). To put this another way, from the standpoint of global GDP decisions that the world makes that make one storyline more likely to occur than another are between 19 and 74 times more important than decisions that are made about greenhouse gas emissions, under the assumptions provided by the IPCC! [19 ~= 3.7/0.2 and 74 = 3.7/0.05]

This is the main reason why some people have concluded that decisions about development, otherwise known as adaptation, must be front and center in any discussion of climate change.

The IPCC WG II report acknowledges this point when it writes:

An important advance since the IPCC Third Assessment has been the completion of impacts studies for a range of different development pathways taking into account not only projected climate change but also projected social and economic changes. Most have been based on characterisations of population and income level drawn from the IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES). [2.4]

These studies show that the projected impacts of climate change can vary greatly due to the development pathway assumed. For example, there may be large differences in regional population, income and technological development under alternative scenarios, which are often a strong determinant of the level of vulnerability to climate change. [2.4]

To illustrate, in a number of recent studies of global impacts of climate change on food supply, risk of coastal flooding and water scarcity, the projected number of people affected is considerably greater under the A2-type scenario of development (characterised by relatively low per capita income and large population growth) than under other SRES futures. [T20.6] This difference is largely explained, not by differences in changes of climate, but by differences in vulnerability.

The unavoidable conclusion: we should be discussing development pathways, and not simply carbon dioxide.

Posted on April 7, 2007 09:24 AM

Comments

Roger:
Feedback first - I find this to be a very provocative and informative site and greatly appreciate your perspective and civility in hosting it
I do often, however, have reservations regarding views expressed and this is one instance,. While I would not disagree that both mitigation and adaptation are ultimately necessary (and I think that most of the IPCC would privately go along with that view), I believe that their stronger focus on mitigation stems from a few factors that you don’t really allude to, partially because you focus on the GDP aspects of the problem. One of these is that too often adaptation/ development perspectives take on purely anthropocentric values which largely discount ecosystem factors that may not heavily weigh in GDP calculations (at least not in a way that can be accurately calculated even within the limited time spans that we are discussing), yet they may have a value nevertheless that cannot be expressed in economic terms. The impact on biodiversity of climate change, for example, is a factor of indeterminate relevance to GDP, yet the extinction of large numbers of species as a potential consequence will not be abated by measures that constrain coastal development (which is not to say such measures should not be considered).

Another consideration is that both the ecological and economic impacts of GW are very likely to be not only unevenly distributed, but indeed to be maldistributed in the sense that early beneficiaries of carbon and GHG generating practices (who hold responsibility for getting the planet to the point where GHG accumulation is a global problem), will likely be less impacted than others who got to the game late. The extent to which ecosystem changes may lead to population displacement in less developed areas is a vulnerability that will inevitably receive less attention than in it will in wealthy (and significantly larger) states, and based on current attitudes (and general track records) on things like immigration policy and development aid, the prognosis for a focus on adaptation/development might seem to be at best to increase dependency and at worse to increase global instability and/or regional destitution. Again, this is not to say that adaptation is something to be ignored, but to suggest that there may well be valid reasons for focusing on mitigation.

Best,
MB

Posted by: mb at April 9, 2007 01:47 AM


I broadly agree with you that to tackle climate change only by looking at mitigation and more or less rule out adaptation is misguided.

Nevertheless, there are two points in this post that are a bit off, in my opinion.

First, the way you combine the Stern damage estimates with per capita GDP from the SRES scenarios is wrong. Stern uses the very strange concept of balanced growth equivalence (BGE) and express impacts in terms of changes of that. Here is how it roughly works: You calculate a consumption path for the future that has no impacts from climate change. In order to calculate the BGE for that you proceed as follows: You look for a consumption path that has a constant growth rate to which you are indifferent in terms of an ordering of a given social welfare function. That is, you come up with a scenario of economic growth that has constant economic growth that is equally desirable in terms of a social welfare function (note that you have two parameters that you can tweek to come up with such BGE scenario: The initial GDP and the constant growth rate). Next, you calculate a consumption path with climate impacts, and again calculate a BGE for that path, i.e. again a consumption path that is equally desirable from the point of view of your welfare function to this consumption path with climate impacts. Now you got two BGE: One for the scenario without and one for the scenario with climate impacts. The difference in those two BGE is what Stern calculated. But this does not at all tell you anything about the actual damages in a particular year calculated by Stern (like you assumed for the year 2100). Stern's numbers are a welfare measure in commodity units, not calculations of future impacts.

If you find that confusing, you are not alone ;) I am not sure why they did it that way. I guess the theoretical justification is that this way you can quantify a change in terms of percentage change even under an ordinal welfare ordering. On the other hand you will inevitably get people to misunderstand your numbers (and I guess this post is just one example).

Second point: They way you present the SRES scenarios, it almost appears as if they represent choices society can make, i.e. as if policy makers can choose whether they want to tweek some decision variable that effects which of the SRES scenarios will happen or they can tweek another set of variables that effect which climate scenario will happen. To some extend that might be true, but certainly the SRES authors have not presented their scenario families like that. They are not presented as a deck of policy choices, neither are they presented as a probabalistic forcast. All they are is possible futures, no more, no less. Whether societies can choose between them, or whether they represent scientific uncertainty about what will happen or some other kind of uncertainty is precisly not defined for them.

Alright, two pedantic points, I believe the general spirit of your post is spot on.

Posted by: David at April 9, 2007 04:43 AM


MB- Thanks for your comments. I pretty much agree with everything that you write.

The focus in this post on GDP is simply because that is the main quantified metric presented by both IPCC and Stern. This post is about following through the logic of these reports. IPCC and Stern could have (and maybe should have) decided, as you did, to emphasize equity, biodiversity, and past policy successes in development policy as the basis for arguing for action on climate change. But they did not, instead choosing to focus attention on the quantified impacts of climate change on GDP. This post shows where that thinking ultimately leads.

Thanks!

Posted by: Roger Pielke, Jr. [TypeKey Profile Page] at April 9, 2007 06:34 AM


David-

Thanks much for these specific comments. Your first point is a fair one.

The SRES projects world economic per capita growth rates of between 1.3% and 2.7. If these growth rates are reduced by 5% and 20% per year starting this year then the resulting impact on 2100 global per capita GDP is to reduce 2100 GDP by between 7% and 46% across the extremes of the SRES scenarios for the year 2100.

This way of calculating future growth would reduce importance of storylines from 19-74 times more important that greenhouse gas emissions to 8-53 times more important. (Which I suppose is why you agree that this point as pedantic!;-) if I write this up for broader discussion I will note this distinction.

On the second point, I agree with you that the IPCC presented the storylines as if they are exogenous to policymaking. The reality is that the storylines are the result of policymaking! The IPCC frames development as outside human control and carbon-reduction policy as being within human control. Is it no wonder that their focus is narrowly on greenhouse gases over adaptation? This post is meant to illustrate the consequences of this kind of wrongheaded thinking. A forthcoming paper of mine illustrates this in the specific case of future hurricane losses. I am waiting for the editor to give me the go-ahead on pre-pub posting . . .

Thanks much for your comments!

Posted by: Roger Pielke, Jr. [TypeKey Profile Page] at April 9, 2007 07:02 AM


Roger,
I don't understand. How is 1% to 5% consistent with 5% to 20%?

Posted by: D. F. Linton at April 9, 2007 09:54 AM


D. F. Linton- Thanks for your question, if I understand it correctly the 5% and 20% values that I chose are the high ends of the IPCC WGII and Stern Report respectively.

Choosing the lower ends of each (i.e., 1% for IPCC, 5% for Stern) would result in even more dramatic results!

Ask again if this doesn't get what you were after, Thanks.

Posted by: Roger Pielke, Jr. [TypeKey Profile Page] at April 9, 2007 10:00 AM


Roger,

Just a note on measures other than GDP to determine the impact of AGW.
A Times article
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article637004.ece
notes a study in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences on changes in forest density worldwide.

A quote from the article is interesting:

"Wealth is one of the clearest indicators of a country’s success in reversing deforestation. Of the countries surveyed, all of those with a GDP per capita greater than $4,600 (£2,400) — roughly equivalent to that of Chile — had increased their forest cover since 1990. "

This may suggest that increased wealth could have a positive impact on biodiversity. Therefore policies that increase global GDP may be better for the environemnt.
Obviously I am not saying from this one study we can fix all environmental problems by policies that increase global GDP, but I was intrigued by the correlation between GDP and forest density and it did seem to tie in with the comment by MB above.

Posted by: Rosco at April 9, 2007 07:53 PM


"The unavoidable conclusion: we should be discussing development pathways, and not simply carbon dioxide."

The IPCC is not allowed to do this. Its role is very narrowly defined as provoding scientific advice to political deciders and the public. They are not the ones who get to make political decisions, and they would be vilified even more in the science-averse parts of the political discourse if they tried to suggest otherwise.

Posted by: piglet at April 10, 2007 08:45 AM


Roger, piglet is right about the prescribed role of the IPCC, which is a creature of the parties to the UNCCC.

While I agree completely with your conclusion that we should be discussing development pathways and not simply carbon dioxide, since the US, EU and others set the IPCC's agenda it would be clearer if you targetted them and not the IPCC, as you also do here: "The IPCC frames development as outside human control and carbon-reduction policy as being within human control. Is it no wonder that their focus is narrowly on greenhouse gases over adaptation?"

The fact of the matter is that UNCCC and the Kyoto Protocol focus primarily on mitigation. I wholly agree that this is rather narrow and gives short shrift to the importance of adaptation, especially in the developing world. However, this is not the fault of the IPCC.

Issues of development are extremely difficult, so it is no surprise that countries declined to integrate them comprehensively into the ambit of the IPCC, the UNCCC and Kyoto. It is indeed unfortunate the the discussion of adaptation and development have been further ignored over the past six years while we debate further whether climate change is occurring and the contributing role of human activities, but of course discussions of development have continued on many tracks - even as they too have been put on the back burner due to wars in the Middle East, North Korea issues, etc.

I think you are focussed on the right issues, but perhaps are flogging the wrong horse.

Posted by: TokyoTom [TypeKey Profile Page] at April 10, 2007 10:22 PM


piglet and Tom- Thanks for your comments. I am not sure where you get your ideas on the scope of the IPCC mandate, but no where is it limited to mitigation or the FCCC. In fact, the IPCC goes to great length to explain that it is not wedded to a single policy approach.

It is of course the IPCC that raises the issues of development pathways as a starting point for everything that it does. The idea that the IPCC must focus on the FCCC or mitigation because governments demand that it does so is simply wrong.

Thanks!

Posted by: Roger Pielke, Jr. [TypeKey Profile Page] at April 11, 2007 06:58 AM


Thanks, Roger.

Clearly I need to do a bit more reading in the IPCC and its relationship to the UNFCCC.

Posted by: TokyoTom at April 11, 2007 07:18 AM


Thanks for the great article you wrote.It was very detailed and interesting information inside.I really liked "The A1 storyline and scenario". It is the most probable scenario I think will happen.Continue in the same way with your work.Have a nice day!

Posted by: Forex Advice [TypeKey Profile Page] at April 20, 2007 04:01 AM




Sitemap | Contact | Find us | Email webmaster