« International »

New Data on the Global Economy
   in Author: Pielke Jr., R. | International December 18, 2007

Shellenberger on Bali
   in Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Climate Change | Energy Policy | International December 17, 2007

Reality Check
   in Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Climate Change | Energy Policy | International December 13, 2007

Why Action on Energy Policy is Not Enough
   in Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Climate Change | International December 06, 2007

Science and the Developing World
   in Author: Pielke Jr., R. | International | R&D Funding February 26, 2007

Richard Benedick on Climate Policy
   in Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Climate Change | International January 26, 2007

Class Copenhagen Consensus Exercise: Feedback Requested
   in Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Education | International November 24, 2006

Willful Ignorance
   in Author: Pielke Jr., R. | International June 13, 2006

An Outsourcing Urban Myth
   in Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Gathering Storm | International April 19, 2006

Uranium Enrichment and Stem Cells
   in Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Biotechnology | International | Science Policy: General March 09, 2006

Scientific Protectionism or Globalization?
   in Author: Pielke Jr., R. | International November 07, 2005

Dust Up Over MDGs
   in Author: Pielke Jr., R. | International September 20, 2005

Science and Policy Guidelines in the UK
   in Author: Pielke Jr., R. | International May 17, 2005

Dangerous Ideas
   in Author: Pielke Jr., R. | International | Science Policy: General September 13, 2004

Population, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and US-Europe Negotiations
   in Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Climate Change | International September 03, 2004

A Perspective on Scotland’s S&T Policy
   in Author: Pielke Jr., R. | International August 30, 2004

Beyond Dominance
   in Author: Pielke Jr., R. | International | Science Policy: General August 26, 2004

Follow Up on Politics and the Kyoto Protocol
   in Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Climate Change | International July 12, 2004

China’s Technology Policies
   in Author: Pielke Jr., R. | International | R&D Funding July 08, 2004

Chinese Science and Technology Policy
   in Author: Pielke Jr., R. | International | Science Policy: General June 04, 2004

A Lesson in International Politics
   in Author: Pielke Jr., R. | Climate Change | International June 02, 2004

International Competition
   in Author: Ryen, T.S. | International | Science Policy: General May 03, 2004

New Data on the Global Economy

The World Bank has released a valuable new dataset with data on the global economy calculated as PPP and MER. In 2005 the global economy was about $44 trillion (MER) and $55 trillion (PPP). The slide below is taken from the press briefing presentation (ppt).

Shellenberger on Bali

Over at the Breakthrough blog, Michael Shellenberger offers some straight talk on the outcome of the Bali meeting.

Reality Check

From Alan Zarembo writing in the LA Times today, this dose of reality:

Here's a recipe to head off the worst effects of global warming:

1. Start with 30 new nuclear power plants around the world.

2. Add 17,0000 wind turbines, 400 biomass power plants, two hydroelectric dams the size of China's Three Gorges Dam, and 42 coal or natural gas power plants equipped with still-experimental systems to sequester their carbon dioxide emissions underground.

3. Build everything in 2013. Repeat every year until 2030.

It's an intentionally implausible plan presented this week by the International Energy Agency to make a point: For all the talk about emissions reductions, the actual work is way beyond what the world can achieve.

As delegates from 190 countries gather here on the Indonesian island of Bali to negotiate a "road map" for the successor to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on global warming, some experts are wondering whether the meeting has lost touch with the reality of tackling climate change.

So far, the thousands of delegates have been consumed by a debate over caps on emissions of greenhouse gases that are the primary cause of global warming.

The United States and China -- the two biggest carbon polluters, each accounting for about 20% of worldwide emissions -- have opposed any hard caps.

But while the debate continues, the most fundamental question of what it will take to achieve meaningful reductions has gone largely forgotten.

Why Action on Energy Policy is Not Enough

When in the comments on Tom's post about the recent scientists petition for action on climate change I complained that 200 scientists calling for action on climate change had ignored adaptation, Todd Neff, a local reporter from here in Boulder, helpfully explained to me why climate change is only about energy policy and not human development, and how a focus on the latter implies "pooh-poohing" the former:

Lots of things kill human beings and make them miserable. Poverty and income inequality is real, and 50-1 ratios and 7.3s versus 0.15s should be addressed with real vigor. But that's not what's being talked about in Bali. Pooh-poohing efforts to transform the energy system because poverty remains a problem despite Lyndon Johnson's best efforts strikes me as diverting from the point. These climate scientists are completely ignoring Tay-Sachs disease, too, not to mention tooth decay and this nefarious hiphop prisoner jeans-at-the-knees look that clearly risks widespread tripping among America's male teens.

The view that adaptation is not a part of climate change does seem to be widely shared among environmentalists who would like the climate issue to be narrowly looked at as only an energy issue. Not everyone agrees, particularly folks who work in developing countries. OXFAM for example (PDF) has a different perspective, reflected in this call for action in Bali:

To enable poor countries to adapt successfully, change needs to occur at many levels. Communities must be at the heart of efforts to build resilience, whether through improving economic choices, diversifying livelihoods, protecting eco-systems, or strengthening food and water security. Ministries must be able to integrate climate risk management into their overall planning and budgeting, and must also integrate adaptation into development-planning processes, restructure and strengthen institutions, and provide early-warning systems. In addition, they must ensure that climate risks are integrated into national and local disaster-risk reduction plans, so that they can tackle the underlying vulnerabilities that put communities at risk in the face of the increasing number of climate-related disasters.

Given rich countries' historic role in causing climate change, they now have two clear obligations: to stop harming, by cutting their greenhouse gas emissions hardest and fastest; and to start helping, by providing compensatory finance so that poor countries can adapt before they suffer the full impacts of climate change. . .

In 2005, the G8 countries promised to increase annual aid levels by $50bn by the year 2010. This finance would be a crucial step towards achieving the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets, which aim to halve poverty by 2015. But it is still only 0.36 per cent of rich countries’ incomes – just half of the 0.7 per cent target they signed up to in 1970. Importantly, it is also a target that does not account for the costs of climate change. Two years on, aid to poor countries is falling, not rising and, if current trends continue, Oxfam calculates that the G8 will miss their promised increase by a staggering $30bn. This funding deficit would be a major concern even without climate change.

On top of this deficit, climate change will make it harder to realise the MDGs because it threatens the prospects of reaching every one of them. As the Stern Review states, the scale of additional funding needed for adaptation 'makes it still more important for developed countries to honour both their existing commitments to increase aid sharply and help the world’s poorest countries adapt to climate change.'

Mitigation and adaptation as complements, what an idea! The continued opposition to adaptation among advocates for action on climate change -- whether scientists or members of the media -- remains as baffling as ever to me.

Science and the Developing World

At SciDev.net, David Dickson has a thoughtful editorial on how the scientific community and others advocating increased investments in S&T in the developing world should temper expectations on what these investments in alone can achieve. Here is an excerpt:

The current danger lies in promoting policies that see S&T as drivers of social progress and economic development, rather than components of innovation programmes in which other factors — from regulatory policy to education and training — are just as important.

The scientific community is particularly prone to this one-dimensional approach. Arguing that heavy investment in research and development is enough to promote economic growth naturally appeals to those keen to see scientific laboratories flourish across the developing world.

But experience has shown that such investment is only part of the solution. The real challenge lies in embedding science in all spheres of government policy, and introducing educational, regulatory and fiscal measures to enable innovation to flourish across the economy.

Until this happens, demands for more money for science will inevitably be seen as little more than self-interested pleading from the scientific community. [emphasis in original]

Richard Benedick on Climate Policy

The always excellent Issues in Science and Technology (and if you don’t subscribe you should) has a great essay in its winter issue by Richard Benedick, former deputy assistant secretary of state and chief U.S. negotiator of the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Protect the Ozone Layer. The essay is titled "Avoiding Gridlock on Climate Change" and appears on pp. 37-40. Mr. Benedick knows something about international environmental agreements. His essay is not yet online, but I have excerpted some key passages below.

He begins by leveling some string criticism at the annual gatherings under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

These UN mega-conferences have by now developed a predictable pattern. Considerable time is occupied by tedious problems of coordinating positions and tactics, both inside the huge national delegations and within blocs of countries such as the European Union and other regional or "like-minded" coalitions. There are the usual dire warnings— fully justifiable—of impending global catastrophe. There are trivial protocol debates and ritualistic ministerial speeches exhorting complicated and unrealistic actions. There are cultural diversions such as boat rides on the Rhine or dance performances in Marrakech. As the end nears, all-night negotiating sessions contribute to a sense of destiny. But despite the customary self-congratulatory finale, the results at Nairobi, as at preceding meetings, were embarrassingly meager. . .

Part of the problem, as he sees it, is a short-term obsession with targets and timetables.

The climate meetings, obsessively focused on short-term targets and timetables applying only to industrialized nations, have become trapped in a process that is unmanageable, inefficient, and impervious to serious negotiation of complex issues that have profound environmental, economic, and social implications extending over many decades into the future. . .

He suggests that that the UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol actually serves the interests of industry, oil-producing countries, and the Bush Administration. These views qualify him for instant "non-skeptic heretic" status (sorry, couldn’t resist;-).

The Kyoto Protocol, lamely defended by its proponents as “the only game in town,” now best serves the interests of politicians whose rhetoric is stronger than their actions and of those commercial interests and governments that want no meaningful actions at all—notably, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Near East oil producers, and the U.S. administration, which is not unhappy with the treaty’s lack of progress. . .

In a crucial passage, Mr. Benedick goes a long way to dispelling some of the myths of the ozone experience. Reading the following closely.

It is worth recalling that the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, later characterized by the heads of the UN Environment Program and the World Meteorological Organization as “one of the great international achievements of the century,” was negotiated by only about 30 nations in nine months, with delegations seldom exceeding six persons and with minimal attention from outside observers and media. I doubt whether the ozone treaty could have been achieved under the currently fashionable global format.

We might draw some useful lessons from the ozone history. In the late 1970s, the ozone science was actually much more disputed than the climate science of today, and the major countries that produced and consumed chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) were hopelessly deadlocked over the necessity for any controls at all. In this situation, the first international action on protecting the ozone layer was neither global, nor even a treaty. Rather, it was an informal accord among a loose coalition of like-minded nations, including Australia, Canada, Norway, Sweden, and the United States, to individually and separately ban the use of CFCs in aerosol spray cans.

This measure alone resulted in a temporary 30% drop in global CFC consumption (temporary because these “wonder chemicals” were continuing to find new uses in numerous industries.) But the action was nevertheless significant for the future. The resultant technological innovations demonstrated to the skeptics (in this case the European Community, Japan, and the Soviet Union) that controls were feasible, at least for this class of products. It also gave the United States and other proponents of a strong treaty the moral and practical high ground in later negotiations to restrict all uses of CFCs. Yet, if anyone had actually proposed a 30% reduction target, it would surely have been rejected as impossible.

An important lesson here is that a specific policy measure, not an abstract target, could stimulate unanticipated technological innovation. The policy measure drove the agreement on targets in the later ozone protocol, not vice versa. In contrast, the half-hearted performance of most governments with respect to climate policy measures has not matched their political rhetoric about the urgency of targets.

Another important lesson from the Montreal history was that not all countries need to agree in order to take a substantial step forward. It is also relevant to note that, in contrast to Kyoto, developing nations did accept limitations on their CFC consumption, but only when they were assured of equitable access to new technologies. Technology development is the missing guest at the Kyoto feast. . . [Emphasis added. –RP]

He makes a case that climate change needs to be grappled with piecemeal, eschewing the fantasy of a single global agreement that will drive policy and technology. As highlighted above, experience suggest that the direction of causality is precisely backward -- it is the presence of smaller scale agreements and technological innovation that makes global agreements possible. This is the lesson drawn by Pielke and Betsill (1997) (PDF).

The climate problem could be disaggregated into smaller, more manageable components with fewer participants—in effect, a search for partial solutions rather than a comprehensive global model. An architecture of parallel regimes, involving varying combinations of national and local governments, industry, and civil society on different themes, could reinvigorate the climate negotiations by acknowledging the diverse interests and by expanding the scope of possible solutions. To be sure, even here success would require a degree of genuine political will among at least a significant number of key governments. Nonetheless, by focusing on specific sectors and policy measures in smaller, less formal settings with varying combinations of actors and by not operating under UN consensus rules, the possibilities for achieving forward motion would be increased. The process and results could be termed protocols or forums or agreements, but their essential character would more closely resemble a pragmatic working group than a formal diplomatic negotiation. . .

He discusses some details on issue areas where he thinks that subglobal cooperation and coordination might take place. I don’t reproduce any of the details here, other than to list these issue areas:

Energy research and development Transportation Power generation Agriculture, coal, and adaptation technologies Other technology R&D agreements Government procurement policies Regional cooperation

He concludes by observing that we need to be expanding our options, not foreclosing them, a view often advocated here.

There are no easy answers; we could begin by admitting that over a decade of global negotiations has not brought notable progress. We should be open to new ideas.

Ever the diplomat, in the end he offers some conciliatory words to the UNFCCC suggesting that his vision might operate in parallel. My reading of his argument is that the reality is that progress on climate change won’t be made until we break free from the current approach.

Class Copenhagen Consensus Exercise: Feedback Requested

This Post Will Stay at the Top through 24 Nov, New Posts Will Still Appear Below

This semester in my graduate seminar Policy, Science, and the Environment we have spent a good share of the semester replicating and critiquing the Copenhagen Consensus exercise. With this post we’d like to solicit some feedback on the class term projects reporting and justifying their results

For those of you unfamiliar with the Copenhagen Consensus, its homepage describes its efforts as follows:

The Copenhagen Consensus Center (CCC) is a center under the auspices of the Copenhagen Business School. Through the commissioning and conveying of research, we work to improve the foundation for prioritizing between various efforts to mitigate the consequences of the World's biggest challenges. In particular we focus on the international community's effort to solve the World's biggest challenges and how to do this in the most cost-efficient manner.

The idea is simple, yet often neglected. When financial resources are limited you need to prioritize your effort. Everyday, from policymakers to business leaders, at all levels, priorities are made between investing in one project and not another. However, many times, and particularly at the political level, decisions on priorities are made not based on facts, science or calculations but on which issue gets the most media coverage or is most politisized. The Copenhagen Consensus approach works to improve the foundation of knowledge, to get an overview of research and facts within a given problem, so that the prioritizing of efforts to solve this problem is based on evidence and is comparable with solutions across problems.

We are focusing on repeating the Copenhagen Consensus analysis in my class. This is the first time I’ve attempted this exercise, so this year I am very fortunate to have an extremely hard-working and thoughtful set of students in my class. Most importantly they have been extremely gracious in playing along as guinea pigs with a complete redesign of this course.

Here is what we’ve done. In our class we divided up into four groups – the Wolfpack, Troika, Great Danes, and the Savvy World Affairs Troubleshooters (SWAT). The first task for each group was to identify the two most important topics that were not on the Copenhagen Consensus list of 10 world problems. Each group presented two subjects and the students then voted among the recommendations to identify the two we would add to the list. We added Energy and Land Degradation.

The next task for the groups was to allocate $50 billion among the now 12 issue areas. Their assignment was to produce an allocation as well as a justification for their allocation. We have spent much of the semester focused on two tasks. One was learning from each other about the substantive issues involved with each problem area. The second was discussing the nature of cost-benefit analysis as a tool for producing information relevant to establishing priorities. We focused in particular on valuing human lives and discounting.

In producing their allocations and justifications, the groups were free to use whatever approach or method that they saw fit. We are posting the group reports here online to stimulate some feedback from our readers to the class on their reports. Note that the dictator professor disallowed efforts to spend the money over time or investing it in hopes of gaining a larger return, among other rules put in place to simplify and standardize the assignement. You will find a range of approaches to the allocation and a range of results.

Great Danes final report webpage
Troika final report webpage
SWAT final report webpage
Wolfpack final report webpage

Here is a spreadsheet summarizing the group allocations and comparing the class averages to three exercises run by the Copenhagen Consensus in 2004, 2006, and by the UN.

Whether or not you agree with their allocations, we would find useful any feedback on the group reports. How understandable are they? Are their arguments well supported and well justified? Are their reports credible?

It is a lot of work to read through the class projects, so we are grateful for whatever responses that our readers provide.

In closing, I wish to emphasize that in posting the reports the class is very interested in feedback but also wanted me to emphasize that many of the students are uncomfortable with the notion of cost-benefit analysis, and a few simply reject it as a legitimate basis for decision making altogether. We use the Copenhagen Consensus exercise as a pedagogical tool, not as an endorsement of the approach as a means of setting priorities. If I had $50 billion to spend, I certainly wouldn’t allocate it using the Copenhagen Consensus approach. Nonetheless, as an exercise for learning about global problems, the challenges of priority setting, and the difficulty of trade-offs, at least from the standpoint of the professor, the Copenhagen Consensus has some worthwhile qualities in the classroom. After the semester I’ll be happy to editorialize a bit more on the class and the Copenhagen Consensus, but for now I’d like the attention focused on the work of our students.

Willful Ignorance

I find this just amazing:

Beginning next month, Florida researchers won't be able to travel to Cuba to carry out any studies. Although the United States allows such interactions, the state has banned faculty members at Florida's public universities from having any contact with the island nation under a law enacted last week. "This law shuts down the entire Cuban research agenda," says Damián Fernández, director of the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University (FIU) in Miami.

Cuba is one of six countries that the U.S. State Department has designated as a "sponsor of terrorism," although U.S. scholars can travel to Cuba for research if they first obtain a government license. The Florida measure, which passed the state legislature unanimously, essentially closes that loophole by disallowing state-funded institutions from using public or private funds to facilitate travel to such countries. (The list includes North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Sudan.)

"Florida's taxpayers don't want to see their resources being used to support or subsidize terrorist regimes at a time when America is fighting a war on terror," says David Rivera, a Republican Cuban-American state legislator who introduced the bill. Florida researchers won't miss out on anything by not going to Cuba, he adds: "I don't think there's anything there that cannot be studied in the Dominican Republic or other Caribbean islands."

Except Cuba. Duh.

An Outsourcing Urban Myth

In today’s New York Times David Leonhardt has a column which debunks the supposed exodus of radiology work to India, finding such claims to be vastly overstated:

A few years ago, stories about a scary new kind of outsourcing began making the rounds. Apparently, hospitals were starting to send their radiology work to India, where doctors who make far less than American radiologists do were reading X-rays, M.R.I.'s and CT scans.

It quickly became a signature example of how globalization was moving up the food chain, threatening not just factory and call center workers but the so-called knowledge workers who were supposed to be immune. If radiologists and their $350,000 average salaries weren't safe from the jobs exodus, who was?

On ABC, George Will said the outsourcing of radiology could make health care affordable again, to which Senator Charles E. Schumer of New York retorted that thousands of American radiologists would lose their jobs. On NPR, an economist said the pay of radiologists was already suffering. At the White House, an adviser to President Bush suggested that fewer medical students would enter the field in the future.

"We're losing radiologists," Representative Sherrod Brown, an Ohio Democrat, said on CNN while Lou Dobbs listened approvingly. "We're losing all kinds of white-collar jobs, all kinds of jobs in addition to manufacturing jobs, which we're losing by the droves in my state."

But up in Boston, Frank Levy, an economist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, realized that he still had not heard or read much about actual Indian radiologists. Like the once elusive Snuffleupagus of Sesame Street, they were much discussed but rarely seen. So Mr. Levy began looking. He teamed up with two other M.I.T. researchers, Ari Goelman and Kyoung-Hee Yu, and they dug into the global radiology business.

In the end, they were able to find exactly one company in India that was reading images from American patients. It employs three radiologists. There may be other such radiologists scattered around India, but Mr. Levy says, "I think 20 is an overestimate."
Some exodus.

Nonetheless, Leonhardt suggests that issues related to outsourcing remain:

For now, the practical effect on radiology is small. At its highest levels, the United States health care system may be the best the world has ever known. India doesn't even have many radiologists today, let alone a large number who measure up to American standards.

But that's going to change. Eventually, Indian doctors will be able to do the preliminary diagnoses that are a big part of radiology. Something similar will happen in accounting, architecture, education, engineering and the law, as Mr. Levy and his colleagues suggest in the coming Milken Institute Review.

These fields tend to be regulated already, giving them noble excuses — like certification, client privacy and legal accountability — to put up trade barriers. But the real reason will usually be a simple desire to protect jobs and salaries.

When factory workers have asked for that kind of protection, the country has told them no. So why does the answer change when the request comes from a wealthier, more influential group of workers?

Uranium Enrichment and Stem Cells

Yesterday’s New York Times had an interesting article on uranium enrichment research in Iran. It begins as follows:

There are times when even a little bit of research can be a bad thing, especially if it centers on Iran and the bomb. On Tuesday, a wide range of nuclear scientists and analysts faulted as dangerous Moscow's tentative proposal to let Tehran do small amounts of research on uranium enrichment, with some comparing it to being a little bit pregnant. "After a while, you tend to wind up having a baby," said Peter D. Zimmerman, a professor of science and security in the war studies department of King's College, London. "I do not believe the Iranians should have any access to enrichment technology until they prove to be a more responsible partner than they've been so far." The Iranians have strenuously objected to such characterizations, saying the West wants to deprive them of atomic knowledge and expertise that they have a right to acquire for a peaceful program of nuclear power. They see it as nothing less than a devious plot by outside powers to keep their country from modernizing. In an interview with Al Arabiya television last month, for example, Ali Larijani, Iran's top nuclear negotiator, said, "The problem is that they look at the Islamic nations as being inferior, that we should not have modern technology, and it is enough for us to produce tomato paste and mineral water."

The international issue of nuclear research in Iran is in my mind exactly analogous to the debate at the federal level over stem cell research in the United States in the follow ways:

1. A group in society – the researchers -- wants to conduct research that has potential positive benefits to outcomes that they value.
2. Another group in society – the restricters -- wants to restrict that research because of its potential negative impacts with respect to outcomes that they value.
3. Both groups seek to impose their values on the other, but both cannot succeed at the same time as their goals are in direct conflict.
4. In both cases the restricters have the upper hand from a political perspective.
5. In both cases the researchers are seeking ways around the research restrictions.
6. The researchers assert that this is about the right to conduct research.
7. The researchers accuse their opponents as being morally challenged.
8. In both cases the decision to conduct the research or not is 100% political.

These debates are about what research gets to be conducted, by whom, and how paid for. Did I miss anything? I’m interested in reactions.

Scientific Protectionism or Globalization?

Last month the National Research Council released a report titled "Rising Above The Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing America for a Brighter Economic Future." The report argues, "The unmatched vitality of the United States' economy and science and technology enterprise has made this country a world leader for decades, allowing Americans to benefit from a high standard of living and national security. But in a world where advanced knowledge is widespread and low-cost labor is readily available, U.S. advantages in the marketplace and in science and technology have begun to erode. A comprehensive and coordinated federal effort is urgently needed to bolster U.S. competitiveness and pre-eminence in these areas so that the nation will consistently gain from the opportunities offered by rapid globalization."

Writing at SciDev.net Caroline S. Wagner and Calestous Juma take issue with the report's focus on science as a area of competition among nations. They write, "The National Academy of Sciences report encourages an 'us and them' mentality within knowledge systems that can only exacerbate political instabilities and resentment."

Instead, Wagner and Juma argue for a collaborative approach to realizing the benefits of global knowledge,

"Although each countries' individual scientific output is still duly attributed to them, knowledge transcends national boundaries. And the new knowledge networks are being continually created within global networks of colleagues sharing resources and ideas. It would be highly inefficient for every country to recreate the entire infrastructure needed for a robust knowledge economy. Success is defined by the ability to forge links that largely depend on one's attractiveness as a partner. And this is a two-way street. Any nation that sees science and technology as a way to build national strength discovers that the knowledge available from the global network is an asset that can be used, added to, and exploited locally. Scientific protectionism, on the other hand, denies nations access to knowledge that forms the lifeline of any innovation system."

The debate between the NRC and Wagner/Juma is over what sort of problem the United States faces, or even if there is a problem. Before we can understand what sorts of actions make sense, it is important to know what kind of problem those actions are to deal with. The debate is complicated not only because of the complexities of international economics and politics, but also because the supply and demand for scientific expertise have been used somewhat disingenuously by the U.S. scientific community (e.g., see this exchange) in the early 1990s as a Trojan horse argument to justify more funding for research. The issue of national competitiveness and scientific innovation takes the form of debates over immigration policy, science policy, innovation policy and even tax and trade policies. It also manifests itself in debate over the "outsourcing" of jobs, patent and intellectual property rights and the broader debates on globalization and development.

Clearly, this is an important area of discussion with practical implications, and even in the context of decades of discussion of technology policy, we seem to be in the early stages of deciding what sort of issue we are grappling with. Those of us with interests in science and technology policy should be spending some time thinking about these issues, as they are certain to occupy an increasing amount of attention among decision makers.

To learn more about this area, check out this syllabus from a course taught at Harvard by Calestous Juma, "Technological Innovation and Development Policy."

Dust Up Over MDGs

Amir Attaran asks in PLoS Medicine of the UN's Millennium Development Goals, "Could it be, despite an appearance of firm targets, deadlines, and focused urgency, that the MDGs are actually imprecise and possibly ineffective agents for development progress?" He answers this question with,

"I argue that many of the most important MDGs, including those to reduce malaria, maternal mortality, or tuberculosis (TB), suffer from a worrying lack of scientifically valid data. While progress on each of these goals is portrayed in time-limited and measurable terms, often the subject matter is so immeasurable, or the measurements are so inadequate, that one cannot know the baseline condition before the MDGs, or know if the desired trend of improvement is actually occurring. Although UN scientists know about these troubles, the necessary corrective steps are being held up by political interference, including by the organisation's senior leadership, who have ordered delays to amendments that could repair the MDGs. In short, five years into the MDG project, in too many cases, one cannot know if true progress towards these very important goals is occurring. Often, one has to guess."

Jeffrey Sachs and colleagues disagree, responding:

"Although Attaran raises important points on the poor quality of data for some indicators used to measure progress on the MDGs, he uses these findings to draw the wrong conclusions. Of course the data on the world's poorest people are weak, as is just about every other effort regarding the poor. Rich countries invest little in helping save the poor from dying of malaria and tuberculosis. It is therefore no surprise that developing countries and the international system lack the resources to measure the diseases' effects well. Attaran's criticisms in this regard are justified, and have been made by many others before him, including many professionals working for the UN system. The world leaders who attended the 2000 Millennium Summit committed to halve poverty in its many forms by 2015, and the MDGs are the result of that political commitment. Attaran ignores that broad goals adopted by world leaders are distinct from the technical question of how to define and measure progress toward those goals."

Attaran offers a rejoinder:

"Writing in response to my article, Jeffrey Sachs and colleagues at the UN Millennium Project, admit that my criticisms are justified. They concede that the same criticisms "have been made by many others before including many professionals working for the UN system". So it does not seem debatable that what I am arguing is truthful: that progress (if any) towards the MDGs is not being measured as the UN claims. I therefore find it hard to understand why Sachs and colleagues have sought to refute my article in such negative terms. Maybe they are rebutting its political implications, which - if you have chaired the UN Millennium Project as Sachs has - and pinned your legacy on that, must touch a nerve. Certainly they do not deny the facts underpinning my argument, which when published in PLoS Medicine referenced 41 articles. Sachs and colleagues' reply contains zero references to the literature - zero references to the evidence. A reply that contains no contrary evidence is not a rebuttal but a polemic."

Read the full text of this exchange here. From where I sit Attaran has both the moral and intellectual high ground here, concluding,

"Imagine if the US president set a Millennium Unemployment Goal to halve the number of people without jobs by 2015. Then suppose some years later, an academic asked the government: "So, how much unemployment is there?" If the government's answer were, "We never measured that, and you're right that we don't know, but shame on you for blaming us", the public outcry would be huge. So would the realisation that the government was unaccountable and disdainful of the people it is meant to protect. This is exactly where the UN finds itself today over several of its most important MDGs: it pushed for goals that its own scientists knew it could not measure. Largely it gets away with that because world's poorest people are seldom in a position to complain. Rebuking me for drawing attention to it is shooting the messenger. This does not solve the problem - which Sachs and colleagues concede exists. We all want the MDGs to succeed, but defending their existence with polemic is not the way. Setting measurable goals, measuring them to guarantee progress, and celebrating the progress as it happens - not just celebrating the goals because they are comforting - is the proper way to dignify and protect the lives of the world's neediest citizens."

Science and Policy Guidelines in the UK

The U.K. Office of Science and Technology has recently issued a “consultation (PDF)” requesting guidance on an update to its guidelines on the interface of science and policy. Specifically, “The Guidelines on Scientific Analysis in Policy Making is a high-level document addressing the way in which Government departments obtain and use analysis and advice in policy-making.” It seems to me the that community of scholars who study science and decision making might have some useful input to this consultation.

The draft update observes, “The environment in which Ministers must make decisions is continually changing. In recent years we have seen the level of public interest in evidence based issues increase, and in some cases the level of public confidence in the government’s ability to make sound decisions based on that evidence has decreased. It is therefore essential that an effective advisory process exists which allows decision-makers access to a high-quality and wide-ranging evidence base. This will enable them to make informed decisions, to deal effectively with crises and to ensure that all opportunities are explored to their full potential. In short, we must ensure that:
• key decision makers can be confident that evidence is robust and stands up to challenges of credibility, reliability and objectivity
• key decision makers can be confident that the advice derived from the analysis of the evidence also stands up to these challenges
• the public are aware, and are in turn confident, that such steps are being taken

The principles laid out within these guidelines are consistent with the current better policy making guidelines to which policy makers adhere. They aim to further highlight the importance of the role of evidence in policy making, and to increase the awareness of policy makers on how best to seek good quality evidence from the most credible sources at the most appropriate time.”

Here are the specific questions that input is being requested on.

“In this consultation document the Government invites responses to the following questions:
Consultation Question 1
Peer review and publication can be important factors in the robustness of the evidence used by government departments in policy making decisions, so:
• What should the CSA guidelines say about this? Should we say that best practice is for each department being responsible for ensuring all research/evidence is peer reviewed unless there are very exceptional circumstances? What might those circumstances be?
• How should we deal with ‘breaking news’ where the new evidence might be radically different?
• How should policy makers mitigate the impact of radical evidential change on existing bodies of evidence?
• Should we suggest they attempt a fast track peer review in parallel and share with key experts who can seek to replicate?

Consultation Question 2
Departmental use of the guidelines will be difficult to measure. The guidelines are principle based and in most cases will be woven into departmental guidance on better policy making. It is also important to recognise that departments are subject to a considerable amount of evaluation already, so:
• How should we evaluate? Do we simply say here that OST will work with senior policy makers in each department to ensure that the principles of the guidelines are fully embedded in departmental policy procedures?
• Do we say this will be followed up in greater detail under Science and Innovation Strategy Assessments?
• Should we suggest we will sample significant policy documents/publications to see what they tell us?”

The full “consultation (PDF)” document has instructions for submission of input.

Dangerous Ideas

The September/October 2004 issue of Foreign Policy is a special issue focused on "The World's most Dangerous Ideas". Foreign Policy describes this issue as follows:

"Ideas matter, and sometimes they can be dangerous.

With this simple conviction, FOREIGN POLICY asked eight leading thinkers to issue an early warning on the ideas that will be most destructive in the coming years. A few of these ideas have long and sometimes bloody pedigrees. Others are embryonic, nourished by breakthroughs in science and technology. Several are policy ideas whose reverberations are already felt; others are more abstract, but just as pernicious. Yet, as the essays make clear, these dangerous ideas share a vulnerability to insightful critique and open debate."

Two of the eight articles, by Robert Wright and Fareed Zakaria, are available without a subscription.

A question follows from Foreign Policy's exercise: How does the knowledge represented in the "dangerous ideas" compare to how we organize ourselves to produce and deal with knowledge? One answer to this question is that there is a considerable mismatch between how we organize the knowledge enterprise and how we organize ourselves to deal with the consequences of knowledge.

Aspects of this problem are discussed by Lightman et al. in their volume "Living with the Genie: Essays on Technology and the Quest for Human Mastery" published by Island Press.

Population, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and US-Europe Negotiations

Have international negotiations on climate change failed to adequately address the role of population growth in they structure of international policies?

Consider that the Kyoto Protocol is currently being negotiated on the basis of individual countries contributions to global greenhouse gas emissions based on a 1990 reference point. But this approach biases the Protocol in favor of countries with low population growth rates, as population growth is a significant factor in growing greenhouse gas emissions. Consider these facts:

According to the Population Reference Bureau from 2004 to 2025 the United States is expected to increase in population from 294 million to 349 million (1990 = 249 million). Over this same period, Europe is expected to decrease in population from 728 million to 722 million (1990 = 722 million).

What this means is that assuming that European greenhouse gas emissions remain constant on a per capita basis, then Europe need only follow business-as-usual to equal its 1990 emissions in 2025, as its population is expected to decrease back to 1990 levels. By contrast, the United States is projected to see a 40% increase in its population between 1990 and 2025. This means that for the U.S. to revert back to its 1990 level of emissions it would need to see about a 30% decrease in its per capita emissions.

Based on expected population trends, any treaty based on the total greenhouse gas emissions of countries will strongly favor Europe over the United States. Perhaps this helps to explain not only why U.S. policy makers have not signed on to Kyoto, but also why it has been so easily embraced by European policy makers.

(On per capita emissions see this post.)

A Perspective on Scotland’s S&T Policy

John Blundell, director general of the Institute of Economic Affairs in the United Kingdom, writes a perspective in The Scotsman criticizing government investment in science and technology.

The mission of the Institute for Economic Affairs “is to improve public understanding of the fundamental institutions of a free society, with particular reference to the role of markets in solving economic and social problems.” So it is not too surprising that its director is critical of government funding for science and technology. Even so, his arguments are worth a look.

Here is an excerpt:

“The official consensus, Right or Left, bright or dim, is that although the results of scientific applications can never be predicted, brainy people given leisure and resources must benefit the rest of us. The economic jargon is that science is a "public good"… The chemist Terence Kealey produced something of a jolt to all this when he published The Economic Laws of Scientific Research in 1996… One of the superstitions Dr Kealey has challenged is the amorphous assumption that state science will enhance or accelerate economic growth. It does not. Ask a few more questions and you wonder why such a mistaken view is so widespread.”

Here is a link to the opinion piece by John Blundell.

Beyond Dominance

It is almost a matter of faith among U.S. policy makers and scientists that the United States should dominate the global scientific enterprise. Concerns are frequently expressed about the U.S. losing it dominance. In a commentary in yesterday’s Financial Times Caroline Wagner, of the Rand Corp and the University of Amsterdam, and Yee-Cheong Lee, president of the World Federation of Engineering Organisations, challenge this perspective. They write:

“…some still see the quest for scientific advancement and technological innovation as a race between nations. A recent report by the National Science Board of the US raised questions about whether America is at risk of losing its role as the world's centre of science and technology innovation.

This is the wrong question to ask in the 21st century. Today science has become a global phenomenon. Nations are part of an expanding knowledge network that has no borders. In the 21st century, security requires sharing rather than protecting knowledge. No country can work at the frontiers of all fields of science. The expanding knowledge frontier means that co-operation is the means of knowledge creation…

The US needs to break out of the "dominance" box of the last century and think beyond a national model of scientific or technological capacity… America stands to benefit more from knowledge and ideas flowing through a networked world than from a world in which countries are competing against each other.”

This op-ed will no doubt be warmly received by those who think that too often science and technology policy is portrayed as a competition – for more funding, for more publications, for more citations, for more prestige, etc., rather than as a means to organize the scientific enterprise to better achieve society’s goals. Wagner and Lee raise some important questions worth thinking about. Their commentary can be found here.

Follow Up on Politics and the Kyoto Protocol

Today, Andrei Illarionov, advisor to Russian President Vladimir Putin, was quoted in the Moscow Times today as saying, “[President] Putin didn't say he supports the Kyoto Protocol, he said he supports the Kyoto process."

Last month I posted the following perspective on Russia and Kyoto:

“Politically, there are plenty of reasons for Russia to participate in Kyoto. By committing to participate in the Kyoto process without giving up very much at all as Russia effectively negotiated for other outcomes it desires in the international arena.

Similar incentives exist for the United States to participate, particularly now as the U.S. looks to the international community for help in Iraq. Before you dismiss this argument consider this amazing fact: if President Bush in 2001 had, instead of pulling out of the Kyoto process, simply committed the United States to participate and then did nothing else differently since that time, then the United States would be closer to meeting its Kyoto targets than EU members Ireland, Spain, Austria, Portugal, and about even with Denmark.”

What will the U.S. do on Kyoto under an administration of John Kerry or George W. Bush’s second term?

An op-ed in the International Herald Tribune last April by Nigel Purvis, who served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans, Environment and Science under Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, makes some very good points about the U.S. and Kyoto:

“On global warming, Bush is on the wrong side of history. Europe is not, but its focus on the Kyoto process as the vehicle for engaging the United States is unhelpful. While the climate policies of the United States would improve with a Kerry presidency, Kyoto is not in the cards for the United States, regardless of who sits in the White House.”

Making predictions is a dodgy business, but here is one that may be a pretty good bet, even though is runs contrary to conventional wisdom:

While the United States is all but certainly not going to ratify the Kyoto Protocol under any conditions, is just a matter of time, perhaps less than a year, before the United States reengages in the Kyoto process under the Framework Convention on Climate Change. I think that this reengagement in the process will likely occur under a President Kerry or a President Bush. (Of course the terms of reengagement would be like night and day under the two different administrations.) The politics of participation are just too compelling.

China’s Technology Policies

The Sunday, July 4, 2004 New York Times Magazine has a good essay on technology and industrial policy, innovation, and the 21st century economy of China.

An excerpt:

“The government is pouring resources into creating the world's largest army of industrialists. China has 17 million university and advanced vocational students (up more than threefold in five years), the majority of whom are in science and engineering. China will produce 325,000 engineers this year. That's five times as many as in the U.S., where the number of engineering graduates has been declining since the early 1980's. It is hard to imagine Americans' enthusiasm for engineering sinking lower. Forty percent of all students who enter universities on the engineering track change their minds.

The case for the ability of American industry to stay ahead of its international competition rests on the national gifts and resources that the U.S. devotes to innovation. Certainly, the confidence of big American companies like Motorola, General Motors and Intel, all of which have billion-dollar-plus stakes in China, is based on the brainpower they have at home. The research gap between the U.S. and China remains vast. In December, Washington authorized $3.7 billion to finance nanotechnology research, a sum the Chinese government cannot easily match within a scientific infrastructure that would itself take many more billions (and years) to build. Yet, when it comes to more mainstream, applied industrial development and innovation, the separation among Chinese, American and other multinational firms is beginning to narrow.

Last year, China spent $60 billion on research and development. The only countries that spent more were the U.S and Japan, which spent $282 billion and $104 billion respectively. But again, China forces you to do the math: China's engineers and scientists usually make between one-sixth and one-tenth what Americans do, which means that the wide gaps in financing do not necessarily result in equally wide gaps in manpower or results. The U.S. spent nearly five times what China did, but had less than two times as many researchers (1.3 million to 743,000).”

Read the whole thing.

Note: The discussion in the excerpt above on how “wide gaps in financing do not necessarily result in equally wide gaps in manpower or results” provides an excellent example of the differences between market exchange rates (MER) and purchasing power parity (PPP) discussed in an earlier post.

Last Note: For a perspective on the Chinese government’s position on technology policy see this post.

Chinese Science and Technology Policy

A news release from the Chinese Academy of Sciences announces that the Academy plays an important role in informing Chinese government decisions.

"Over the past one year or so, the Academic Divisions of CAS (CASAD), being the top-level advisory body of the State in science and technology, have actively taken part in the strategic studies for, and review of, the national long and medium-term plan for scientific and technological (S&T) development. Prof. Lu Yongxiang, CAS President, made the remarks at the on-going CAS General Assembly."

You might ask, as Shep Ryen (aka Father of Prometheus) asked me, so what?

This matters a great deal because it also means that science and technology policy – decisions about science and technology in support of decision making – takes on added significance in China. The press release also notes:

"The national long and medium-term plan for S&T development, which is currently under preparation, will be China's first governmental document in the new century to guide the national S&T development, and also the first such plan after the establishment of China's socialist market economy and China's entry into the WTO."

Science and technology policy matters. It matters more than ever in our increasing global, technology- and science-based society. Consequently science and technology policy research as a boundary activity between scientific and technological research and decision making also takes on greater importance.

A Lesson in International Politics

Russia's commitment to accelerate its ratification of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change provides George W. Bush and John Kerry with a lesson in international politics.

Last week Russia reached an agreement with the European Union (EU) to gain entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in exchange for, among other things, a commitment from Russia to move toward ratification of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. Russia’s membership in the WTO requires the support of the EU. The EU wants Russian participation the Kyoto because it cannot come into effect without either United States or Russian participation. So with both George Bush and John Kerry on the record as being opposed to participation to the Protocol, Russia has a powerful bargaining chip.

Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, commented, "The fact that the EU has met us halfway in negotiations on the WTO could not but have helped Moscow's positive attitude to the question of ratifying the Kyoto Protocol," and he committed Russia to "support the Kyoto process . . . [and] we will try to speed up Russia's ratification."

President Putin and his advisors are no doubt aware that almost all countries participating in the Kyoto Protocol are struggling to meet their commitments. For example, Japan committed to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 6% from its 1990 levels and has instead seen them rise by 8% causing Japan's environment minister Yuriko Koike to comment last week that Japan faces an uphill battle meeting its Kyoto target.

And many EU countries face challenges to meeting their Kyoto targets. In December 2003 European Environment Agency reported that while Great Britain and Sweden were on target to meet their targets, "all other Member States, including Germany, the EU's biggest emitter, would miss their Kyoto targets. Denmark, Spain, Ireland, Austria and Belgium would all exceed theirs by more than 20 %." Last week the EU's environment minister announced plans to initiate legal action against six EU countries for not submitted required plans for meeting Kyoto targets. Because Russia has seen its emissions actually decrease since 1990 it has emissions "credits" to sell to Japan and the EU. Having these credits available via Russian participation would help Japan and the EU meet the accounting requirements of Kyoto as an alternative to actual emissions reductions.

Russia must see the difficulties faced by countries meeting Kyoto targets, meaning that Russia would likely face little criticism if it participates but falls short of any renegotiated Kyoto targets. Politically, there are plenty of reasons for Russia to participate in Kyoto. By committing to participate in the Kyoto process without giving up very much at all as Russia effectively negotiated for other outcomes it desires in the international arena.

Similar incentives exist for the United States to participate, particularly now as the U.S. looks to the international community for help in Iraq. Before you dismiss this argument consider this amazing fact: if President Bush in 2001 had, instead of pulling out of the Kyoto process, simply committed the United States to participate and then did nothing else differently since that time, then the United States would be closer to meeting its Kyoto targets than EU members Ireland, Spain, Austria, Portugal, and about even with Denmark.

Ironically, expressing support for the Kyoto process but not taking dramatic action to implement it is the exact climate policy pursued by the Administration of Bill Clinton whose approach to climate policy is substantively very similar to the approach of the Bush Administration. But the two administration's approaches to climate politics could not be more different.

Of course, success in international politics does not necessarily mean good policy will result. The challenge of climate will be with us for the foreseeable future because even if it is fully and successfully implemented it can only result in a very small step. It is what happens next that matters more. From the perspective of those who seek emissions reductions new policy options will be needed no matter what happens with the Kyoto Protocol. It is almost a certainty that the United States will be involved at some level whatever process follows Kyoto.

For all of these reasons, as Russia has apparently decided about its participation, there is exceeding little political reason for the U.S. not to participate in the Kyoto process. And as the Clinton Administration learned, within that process there would be plenty of room to debate differences in climate policy in such a manner so as to shore up either Bush's or Kerry's electoral bases, some member of which care about Kyoto.

Of course, climate policy matters beyond its role in international politics because whether the cause greenhouse gas emissions or something else there is very little doubt that climate will change and vary in coming years and decades, perhaps significantly. We need only look to the past to observe that the term "climate change" is redundant.

More fundamentally, we continue to place ever more property and people in vulnerable locations both in the developed and developing world. The challenge of climate will require thoughtful action over many decades not just in energy policy, but also in addressing our vulnerabilities to the vagaries of climate. Meeting this policy challenge will not be easy. It will be just about impossible without greater sophistication in international climate politics.

International Competition

Monday's New York Times runs this article on reductions in patents, publications, and Nobels from within the US. Is science in trouble in the US? Or do these measures suggest that science is in better shape world-wide?

The clear and growing competition from overseas suggests that dominance in all fields of science is a public policy goal that needs to be questioned. As well as the belief that basic science funding will get us there, and bring in the patents to boot.

Another straw on the "linear model" camel's back.

Some quotes:
"Foreign advances in basic science now often rival or even exceed America's, apparently with little public awareness of the trend or its implications for jobs, industry, national security or the vigor of the nation's intellectual and cultural life."

"Analysts say comparative American declines are an inevitable result of rising standards of living around the globe."

"A major question, they add, is whether big spending automatically translates into big rewards, as it did in the past."