Obama Administration Breaks with IPCC, Focuses on Art of the Possible
March 5th, 2009Posted by: Roger Pielke, Jr.
Todd Stern, chief US climate negotiator in the State Department, gave a speech two days ago in which he laid out some of the principles that will guide the Obama Administration’s approach to climate policy. In it he recognizes that what is politically possible will be the most important factor guiding the pace of policy implementation. He says the following:
. . . at the same time we are being guided by the science and doing the math, we cannot forget that we are engaged in a political process and that politics, in the classic formulation, is the art of the possible. Of course we cannot afford to be passive in our understanding of that principle – we need always to push the envelope of what is possible. But we ignore the principle at our peril.
Let me apply this principle in a couple of ways. Some assert that the United States can only meet its responsibility if it agrees to reduce emissions 25-40% below 1990 levels by 2020, equivalent to at least a 40% reduction below where we are right now (a much deeper cut than the EU would have to make compared to where they are now). But, first, as a matter of substance, this is not necessary. What counts is getting on a viable path between now and 2050. Reducing 25-40% below 1990 levels would be a good idea if it were doable, since it would allow a less steep reduction path in the 2020-2050 time period. But it is not independently necessary; a somewhat steeper path in the latter period could make up for the slightly slower start.
In addition, a 25-40% requirement for the United States would garner very little support here, because it would appear both unnecessary, for the reasons I just noted, and beyond the realm of the feasible. The most ambitious proposals that have been seriously considered here, both those introduced in Congress last year and the objective that President Obama has endorsed, call for reductions equivalent to 1990 levels by 2020 and 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. These would equate to around 15% below 2005 levels by 2020, and over 80% below those levels by 2050. So insisting on a 25-40% cut below 1990 for the United States is a prescription not for progress but for stalemate. Again, we need to be guided both by science and by common sense.
There are two important points to make about this passage.
First, in rejecting a 25-40% emissions reduction by 2020 target as unnecessary and unachievable Stern is openly departing from the both the conclusions and implications that many have taken from the 2007 IPCC report, including its head, Rajendra Pachauri:
We [in the IPCC] have estimated that to stabilize global temperature increases at just 2° to 2.4° Celsius, we have only about seven years to turn around global emissions of greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide. By 2015 they’ll have to peak. By 2020, we’ll need to put in place a 25 to 40 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.
While many people have pointed to the fact that the science of climate change has advanced since the 2007 IPCC report, far more importantly, the ongoing discussion of policy options has rendered the IPCC obsolete. Pachauri has criticized the Obama Administration for its climate policies, so it will be interesting to see how the broader IPCC community reacts to the scaling back of expectations being set forth. This will be especially interesting as many IPCC scientists gather in Copenhagen later this month to “influence policy.” Will the Obama Administration be criticized by the scientists?
The second important point to take from this passage is a realization that climate policy must be governed by common sense and what is politically “possible” and “feasible.” This realpolitik approach is a healthy one for climate policy as it moves debate beyond aspirations and exhortations to what can actually be accomplished. However, at the same time it is also a slippery slope, as what is politically possible at present is, to be honest, not much. What will the Obama Administration do if it learns that a 15% reduction by 2020 is not possible or feasible?
March 5th, 2009 at 8:49 am
I agree that a 15% reduction by 2020 is aggressive but plausible, while a 25% reduction is not.
But if we pursue this path, two questions immediately come to mind:
1. Will the rest of the world, China and India in particular, agree to emissions caps if the US is only reducing emissions by 15% percent. Right now neither nation seems willing to consider caps on emissions, even at levels that are substantially higher than their current emissions but substantially lower than western per capita emissions.
Without ANY binding commitments from China and India, it seems unlikely that the US will agree to make its own commitments binding (and therefore capable of persisting beyond 2016). This will become even more problematic as time passes and Americans realize that China is becoming the world’s dominant economy.
There is an irrational American urge to be number 1 (even if it requires us to have an economy that is 5 times larger per capita than the Chinese). Advocating environmental policies that give a dominant China an economic advantage over a declining United States is not a sustainable political position.
2. If we “only” reduce emissions by 15% through 2020, we will have to reduce emissions by more than 2.5% per year annually from 2020 to 2050 in order to achieve a goal of an 80% total reduction. Is that compatible with an increasing population and continued economic growth? Certainly not without some transformational change in the way society and technology function.
In this context 80% has to be regarded as empty rhetoric.
March 5th, 2009 at 8:56 am
Has anyone yet looked at the engineering-process-reality-based rate at which emission reductions can be expected to occur? Are there any data from anywhere? 2020 is only 11 years from now.
solman, on what data or calculations do you base the plausibility of achieving 15 % reduction from 2005 levels for the US; data or calculations, not speculation.
Thanks for all pointers.
March 5th, 2009 at 9:08 am
-2-EDaniel
I have looked at the UK along these lines and will soon have the same sort of analysis for the US, see:
http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/admin/publication_files/resource-2717-2009.02.pdf
March 5th, 2009 at 9:09 am
Roger
There is an interview with Chu in “Chemical and Engineering News March 2, 2009 Volume 87, Number 09 Web Exclusive” where he dicusses future R&D on energy. I’m a ACS member and can send you the article. Sounds like he is betting the future on Solar Thermal and biofuels. He also mentioned electric grid investments. Mike McHenry
March 5th, 2009 at 9:11 am
-4-Mike
Thanks, please do .. pielke@colorado.edu
March 5th, 2009 at 10:21 am
It will be interesting to watch how the Obama folks approach this TAX (that’s all it really is, after all). No matter what they propose, there will be a fight, especially given the sad state of the economy. But they will have to propose more than they actually will be satisfied with, to give them room for compromise. But that has some potentially very damaging political consequences, when people are really hurting financially. If Obama blows this, I’ll bet the Republicans will regain Congressional majorities in two years (likely, anyway), and he will not be re-elected.
And all this without any sound scientific basis that CO2 is having some effect on climate. Unbelievable!
Scary times, but also interesting.
March 5th, 2009 at 10:48 am
The ’science’ is the first element to consider in determining risks and what might possibly be done to mitigate those risks .
The ART of GOOD politics is to lead external and domestic constituencies to, in turn, understand those possibilities, and THUS make the reduction of risks achievable – even if somewhat painful.
Let’s hope Todd Stern, Chu, Holdren and Obama really understand this.
March 5th, 2009 at 10:49 am
-3- Roger
Thanks for the info. I have attempted to ask my question several times and apparently have not yet been sufficiently clear.
In the paper you say;
“In practical terms this could be achieved, for example, with about 30 new nuclear plants to be built and in operation by 2015, displacing coal and gas fired electrical generation.”
About which you say:
“Simply making progress to the targets requires steps of a magnitude that seem practically impossible, e.g., such as the need for the UK to achieve a carbon efficiency of the economy at a level equal to France in a time period less than a decade.”
These are the kinds of calculations that I think are critically important. What are the time scales required to displace carbon at the rate required to meet the “politically possible and feasible goals”.
My rough estimates indicate that it can’t be done for any of the goals so-far put forward. Let’s face it, we are talking about roughly a decade of time remaining until the first goals are to be met. Even if all the necessary displacement systems were, let’s say, shovel-ready today, they can’t be physically constructed in the time scales needed. And, generally, at least a decade is required to get to the shovel-ready stage. And then there are the almost-sure-to-occur NIMBY delays that start as soon as the tip of the shovel hits the ground.
So, what I’ve been trying to ask is what are the real-world, actually-feasible goals that have even a small probably of being attained? These will be significantly smaller than “politically possible and feasible goals”.
It is very unfortunate that our “leaders” so far have refused to be level with the public on the reality of carbon displacement. They continue to refuse to address the actual physically-realizable goals. An additional indication that, like our “energy policy”, politics is the real goal. And now we have reached the intersection of our so-called energy policy and our environmental policy. Politics will obtain.
At the present time (data for circa 2005) the global-average carbon emissions due to transportation are about 23 % of total emissions. In countries having a large fraction of electricity production by hydro / fission / renewables, the fraction is quite larger; up to 45 %. To get some idea of the magnitude of the overall problem, meeting 80% reduction ( of just about any reference year ) by 2100 is roughly equivalent to displacement of the entire carbon-based energy systems of the entire planet plus parts of the entire transportation systems in less than 90 years; all other factors remaining fixed. Utter nonsense.
March 5th, 2009 at 10:57 am
I think it’s clear what Obama is thinking. He has been briefed on the brutal facts of what it would take to keep CO2 at 450ppm in 2050. He has decided it’s non starter. He does see an opportunity to raise some tax revenue and create some new industries. Utilities will create some interesting dilemma’s for him. Since wind, solar, etc cannot fill the gap in demand their only other choice is nuclear. That is because of caps coal or gas are more expensive to build than nuclear. They could provide a loop hole for gas but that push up prices for residental and industrial customers. I expect howls from coal states representatives. I expect larger howls from Hansen, McKibben, et.al.
March 5th, 2009 at 10:57 am
-8-EDaniel
This is a really important question and I agree has not really received as much research as it needs. The following is from a paper by Baksi and Green and gets at some of this:
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2007.08.018
Calculating economy-wide energy intensity decline rate: The role of sectoral output and energy shares
Soham Baksia, Corresponding Author Contact Information, E-mail The Corresponding Author and Chris Greenb, 1, E-mail The Corresponding Author
aDepartment of Economics, University of Winnipeg, 515 Portage Avenue, Winnipeg, Canada R3B2E9
bDepartment of Economics, McGill University, 855 Sherbrooke Street (W), Montreal, Canada H3A2T7
Received 14 October 2006;
accepted 13 August 2007.
Available online 24 October 2007.
Abstract
We specify formulas for computing the rate of decline in economy-wide energy intensity by aggregating its two determinants—technical efficiency improvements in the various sectors of the economy, and shifts in economic activity among these sectors. The formulas incorporate the interdependence between sectoral shares, and establish a one-to-one relation between sectoral output and energy shares. This helps to eliminate future energy intensity decline scenarios which involve implausible values of either sectoral share. An illustrative application of the formulas is provided, using within-sector efficiency improvement estimates suggested by Lightfoot–Green and Harvey.
Keywords: Energy intensity decline; Energy efficiency improvement; Sectoral change
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6V2W-4R00FTR-1&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&view=c&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=e007f992ce8973bd7be3c317ff85e175
March 5th, 2009 at 12:35 pm
Regarding the question of available mitigation options, I assume that everyone here is familiar with McKinsey & Company’s publication of its “Pathways to a Low Carbon Economy” report, which contains version 2 of their Global Greenhouse Gas Abatement Cost Curve. If not, it’s available here (free download, but registration required): http://globalghgcostcurve.bymckinsey.com/default.aspx
Page xiii of the Executive Summary document contains a copy of their graph breaking down potential abatement sources for a U.S. Mid-Range abatement scenario. Interestingly, their projection indicates that 40% of the projected abatement could be achieved at “negative marginal costs” (i.e., pursuing these abatement options would produce positive economic returns, entirely apart from CO2 mitigation). One of the many news article discussing the report is at http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2009/01/30/what-is-be-done-about-global-warming
March 5th, 2009 at 1:29 pm
Let us remmber that McKinsey was a big fan of Enron.
March 5th, 2009 at 1:57 pm
-11-lgcarey
One problem with the McKinsey report (although exactly how large I am unclear) is the assumed spontaneous decarbonization present in scenarios of future business as usual economic activity. While I am sure that there is a lot of low-hanging fruit, I also think that the uncertainties on costs are very large and biased toward the higher end.
With access to the underlying report assumptions we could actually tease this out.
March 5th, 2009 at 2:12 pm
There seems to be a lot of CCS in the McKinsey report. That’s a big leap considering a coal CCS plant hasn’t been built. There is a large debate over actual cost per ton.
March 5th, 2009 at 3:58 pm
EDaniel:
I couldn’t agree more. The public (and the Congress) have no idea of the scale and scope of the transformation needed in energy systems to reduce global emissions significantly. DOE came up with a nifty ‘how big is a gigaton of CO2′ chart. It’s pretty eye-opening. For example, reduction of a single gigaton of CO2 would require construction (in lieu of typical coal-fired power plants) of either 130 1-GW nuclear power plants OR 170,000 1.5-MW wind turbines operating at a capacity factor of 0.45 OR 320 “0″ emissions 500-MW coal plants. That’s a lot of stuff.
lgcarey:
On the McKinsey report, I’m always suspicious of claims that energy efficiency does not come at a cost. It may provide a return on investment, but in some cases that return may have an opportunity cost associated with it. I’m not sure if or how McKinsey deals with this.
Roger:
What I find amusing about the reation to the Stern speech is that when the Bush Administration reached the same conclusions about emission goals profferred by the EU and acted on them in Bali, its negotiator was being “obstructionist.” Now that the Obama Administration’s negotiator is saying pretty much the same thing, it is “realistic.” Hmmmm. The more things change . . .
March 6th, 2009 at 6:20 am
Whether something is politically possible or not is a subjective judgement; not an absolute truth. If you’re unwilling to put certain measures into place, it’s common rhetoric to say that they’re “impossible”. Indeed a slippery slope, because you can use that argument till infinity if you’re so inclined.
As Len Ornstein (7) alludes to, the risk and costs (and benefits) of taking certain measures should be compared to the risk and costs (and benefits) of not taking those measures.
Bart
The future costs of unmitigated climate change are often underestimated (or undervalued) by those opposing strong measures. To the detriment of those having to endure the risks and costs in the future.
March 6th, 2009 at 7:00 am
-16-Bart
“Whether something is politically possible or not is a subjective judgment; not an absolute truth.”
I don’t want to debate the meaning of truth, but there are some political realities every bit as real as the laws of thermodynamics. I agree that risks and benefits should be compared in discussing policy options, and these have their subjective elements as well.
March 6th, 2009 at 10:12 am
I agree with 16 above. If the situation demands it, anything is possible.
The sentiment from Stern that the IPPC goals were, “not demanded by science” and the ensuing discord with IPCC mark “the end of the beginning” of AGW hysteria.