

Subnational Carbon Governance in the US – focus on land use

Lisa Dilling **ENVS** March 8th, 2012

Quick review: Which of the following is a carbon sink?











c)


























An Opportunity?

Inadvertent carbon management

- · Existing for millennia
- · Will continue to dominate C management
- · Depends on land type, land use, actors, markets, policy

??

FUTURE

Carbon Governance?

- Both deliberate and inadvertent
- Rules TBD
- Effective across scales
- Role of public policy
- Role of markets

Deliberate carbon management

- Increasing interest in past 20 yrs
- Small scale
- Pilot projects
- Voluntary efforts





Carbon Governance

- "The planning, influencing and conducting of the policy and affairs of institutions that aim to minimize the amount of carbon dioxide released to the atmosphere or maximize the amount of carbon stored stably away from the atmosphere."
- Governance does not always = government
- Effective carbon governance is being able to control the amount of carbon in the atmosphere.

What kinds of governance mechanisms can you think of?

Carbon sequestration


- Terrestrial
 - Management practices
 - Land conservation/restoration
- Oceanic
 - Ocean fertilization
 - Deep ocean injection
- Geologic
 - Injection into confined geologic medium (e.g. aquifer)
 - Reaction to form new stable mineral




Big claims for terrestrial C sequestration

- 70-221 MMT (million metric tonnes) additional C in agricultural soils
- 214 MMT additional C stored in forests
- Economic estimates
 1-44 MMT per year @\$10/T
 10-70 MMT per year @\$50/T

Paustian et al. 2006, USDA 2008






Carbon governance through land use


- Diverse landscapes and land uses
- Highly distributed control/ ownership
- Not managed for climate or carbon storage as main purpose
- Multiple actors at multiple scales






Diverse Landscapes and Land Uses










Potential Carbon Decision Makers



A wide array of potential users at a variety of scales:

- Land users (agriculture, forestry, urban development)
- Energy providers (utilities, fuel producers)
- Policy makers (local, state, federal)
- Specialized sectors (carbon traders, NGOs)

What interests would these groups have?

What other things (besides carbon) do we manage land for now?







Commonalities

- No decision maker has a "climate protection" mandate
- No-one is managing for carbon exclusively:
 - Multiple interests and incentives
 - Multiple goals
 - Multiple scales
- Private sector decisions dominated by "responses to economic opportunities as mediated by institutional factors" (Lambin et al. 2001)

Voluntary markets


Voluntary Policies, local scale


Private Sector Examples:

- The Climate Trust, Oregon
 - Non profit broker of offset projects, both energy and sequestration
- Chicago Climate Exchange
 - Market-based emission reduction and trading program now ceased trading
- World Bank Prototype Carbon Fund
 - Experimental, pilot production of Emission Reductions within the framework of Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) – a global trading program.
- Many individual projects done as agreements between parties


Carbon awareness- private sector

- Mixed response to voluntary market engagement
 - Difficulty of changing practices
 - Low financial incentive
 - Questioning efficacy
 - "anything to help me keep the farm going"
- In Colorado, Farmer's Unions enrolled farmers in CCX-linked program and the State had a plan as well—but, as of 2011, CCX stopped.





Chicago Climate Exchange (Voluntary market)



Sale of Chicago Climate Exchange to ICE Reinforces Weak Carbon Market

By JOEL KIRKLAND of **ClimateWire** Published: May 3, 2010

Richard Sandor spent the past decade peddling a big idea: that capitalism has a solution for global warming. The trading house he launched in 2003, the Chicago Climate Exchange, would be the locomotive pulling an American environmental revolution into the 21st century as smokestack industries bought and sold a commodity called greenhouse gas emission allowances. Carbon futures and options, so his theory went, would turn financial speculators into tree-huggers.

More News From ClimateWire

- Obama Administration Advances Cape Wind, but Challenges Remain
- U.N. Advisers Push Annual \$35b-\$40b Global Plan to Expand Energy Use and Reduce Carbon
- Predicting Wind Power's Growth
 -- an Art That Needs More
 Science
- Immigration Debate May Be on Sidelines for a While, Obama
 Says
- Sen. Graham Has Backing at Home, but Not on Climate

On Friday, Sandor and the other shareholders of parent company Climate Exchange cashed out of this big idea for about \$600 million. The IntercontinentalExchange (ICE), an electronic futures and derivatives platform based in Atlanta

and London, announced it had agreed to purchase the three exchanges, the Chicago Climate Exchange, Chicago Climate Futures Exchange and European Climate Exchange.

The combination brings the still-small U.S. carbon market closer to the profitable world of global over-the-counter (OTC) energy trading, which ICE specializes in. It also consolidates carbon emissions trading under the tents of two major commodity exchanges, ICE and CME Group, which operates the New York Mercantile Exchange's nascent platform for carbon trading, the Green Exchange.

"The combination of Climate Exchange's emissions markets and ICE's futures and OTC energy markets is an important and logical strategic

Green Inc.

NY Times

Source: http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/market/data/summary.jsf

□ E-MAIL

品 PRINT

SEND TO

PHONE

SINGLE PAGE

NEVER LET ME GO

NOW PLAYING

WATCH TRAILER

European Carbon Market – not voluntary



International Continental Exchange

REUTERS

» Print

This copy is for your personal, non-commercial use only. To order presentation-ready copies for distribution to colleagues, clients or customers, use the Reprints tool at the top of any article or visit: www.reutersreprints.com.

California approves carbon market rules

Fri, Oct 21 2011

By Rory Carroll

SACRAMENTO (Reuters) - California regulators on Thursday approved final regulations for a carbon market that is one of the biggest U.S. responses to climate change.

The state believes the market for greenhouse gases, which starts in 2013, will let it address global warming in a low-cost way and become the center of alternative energy industries, like solar, although some businesses fear higher energy prices.

The most populous U.S. state is moving ahead with the plan years after federal regulators rejected a similar idea for the nation, partly on concerns of the effect on businesses.





The California Air Resources Board voted 8-0 to adopt the market regulations, which officials said are critical to the state's goal of cutting carbon emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 -- about a 22 percent reduction from forecasted business-as-usual output.


Power companies and factories will be able to trade a gradually decreasing number of permits to emit carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases under the so-called cap-and-trade plan, which counts on market forces leading companies to find the cheapest way to cut emissions.

About 350 companies representing 600 California factories and oil refineries must begin complying with the program in 2013. By 2015, when transportation fuels are brought under the cap, the system will cover 85 percent of the California economy, the eighth largest in the world.

Thinking about Scale









Example influences on Federal landowner decision making

Global	Policy
National	Regs, Congress. authority, mission, economic interests
State	Resource management goals, fire
County/Regional	Economic interests, recreation, regional authority (districts)
City	Quality of life

Example influences on private landowners

Global	Commodity markets, climate, policy
National	Subsidies, incentives, regulations, water compact
State	Water, environmental, population growth
County	Zoning, local policies, cultural trends
City	Zoning, local policy

Leakage

- Problem of displacing undesirable activity elsewhere; e.g. if forest is planted in one area, thereby sequestering carbon, but demand for agricultural land results in removal of forest in another location
- Estimated amounts can be significant, depending on activity and region (Murray et al. 2002)

The problem of scale for carbon governance

- To be effective, carbon governance must be consistent across scales
 - Must account for leakage
- Variety of policy scales involved
- If C information is to inform decisions about carbon governance, potential problem of scale mismatch (e.g. Cash and Moser 2000)

Environmental effects and linkages

- Are there "win-win" sequestration options? E.g. reduced tillage practices
- Full system must be considered; water use, pesticides, generation of other GHGs
- Biodiversity, food webs
- Precautionary principle for oceans?
- Decisions to manage the C cycle cannot be made in isolation



Policy problems of carbon sinks

- Quantification
- Additionality/Separation
- Permanence
- Leakage
- Unintended consequences
- Competing or conflicting values

Permanence

- For how long is carbon stored?
 - Terrestrial sequestration vulnerable to natural and human land management
 - Ocean sequestration accelerates natural uptake but still comes to a new equilibrium-- not permanently removed from contact with the atmosphere
 - Geologic disposal could be most permanent-- issue of leakage rate and public acceptance
- Some sequestration could "buy time" towards longer term solutions
- Unique monitoring challenges

Additionality

- Is the measured carbon storage additional to what would have happened otherwise, and can the deliberate actions be quantified?
 - Baseline
 - Documenting mechanisms
 - "tracking carbon" difficult

1. Diversity and distribution of decision makers

- Policies can target either public or private lands, or both but must be consistent
- If policy emphasizes education/ information strategy, enormous job to reach all important stakeholders
- Since majority of land users are private owners, market forces dominate
- Private sector trading may succeed on individual project level but remains to be evaluated

2. Commodity that people do not need or relate to

- Demand for land services other than C continues to increase
- Real possibility of leakage preservation of carbon in one location with activity displaced elsewhere
- Implies payments for maintaining sinks as well as for creating or enhancing them
- In some cases, may be positive co-benefits

3. Technically challenging to measure and value

- Baseline difficult to establish
- C sequestration depends on many factors
- Estimates of costs per ton thus far vary widely
- C storage heterogeneous- monitoring costs can be high
- Some issues beyond science capabilities (e.g. separation)
- C sequestration outcome many years hence uncertain (and difficult to value)

4. Long time scale problem

- Long-term management requires trust in constancy of institution providing incentive (e.g. holding timber without cutting)
- Markets, population and drivers of land use are dynamic
- Carbon sequestration vulnerable to natural causes (e.g. fire) and changing demands for land use permanence an issue
- A role for sequestration to "buy time"?
- Institutional rules must span over generations

5. "Governance without government" across scales?

- Voluntary and/or Controlled
- Informational and/or direct reduction strategies
- In absence of regulatory framework, voluntary incentives will compete against other potential uses for the land
- Market for credits only work in scarcity
- No incentive to make accounting and valuing credits rigorous – danger of low quality trades