Comments on: Sheila Jasanoff on The Honest Broker http://cstpr.colorado.edu/prometheus/?p=4375 Wed, 29 Jul 2009 22:36:51 -0600 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.9.1 hourly 1 By: George Tobin http://cstpr.colorado.edu/prometheus/?p=4375&cpage=1#comment-9652 George Tobin Fri, 18 Apr 2008 17:22:03 +0000 http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/prometheusreborn/?p=4375#comment-9652 1. I stand corrected. Jasanoff is a policy professor with a law degree who writes a great deal about the use of scientific evidence. 2. In “Science at the Bar” and elsewhere she expresses disagreement with the Daubert decision. In practice she favors allowing juries to decide what is or is not science. That is the essence of a pro-junk science position. 3. I find her writings ends-oriented and rather protean. You cite her approval of the UK giving technocrats the right to set environmental regulations on fuels. Had those technocrats not come to such a PC decision, Jasanoff would in all likelihood have cited it as an instance where science failed to be more inclusive, that it relied on a kind of false consciousness of its own certainty etc. I get the impression that for Jasanoff, the idea that one policy alternative may have more substantive scientific support than another is either (a) an odious act of hubris if it is not the right choice or (b) an affirmation of the broader views of the community from the perspective of a different community of interest if it is the correct outcome. 4. In the samples Pielke cites there is the theme that there is no such thing as a non-political or non-agenda drive scientist. There is the need to bring science into the politically defined universe where everyone’s motives and methods are subject to political scrutiny (except, presumably, for tenured “STS” professors) is tiresome and intellectually unproductive. The only issue ought to be whether the scientist can back up a statement in a manner that other scientists would agree was scientific with logic, experiment, quantification, mathematical confirmation. The sociology of science is useless as a measure of the validity of science. 5. I agree that scientists don’t get to make policy just because there is a scientific issue involved. I agree that credentialism is not a valid basis for policy. Jasanoff is justifiably quick to limit the contribution of science where science overstates its role or competence. What I don’t get from her is what happens when there is a high degree of certainty? What is the weight of that circumstance? Does ideology still define the facts when science disagrees and can back it up? Does the “community” still get to decide that Bendectin causes birth defects as in the Daubert case? Is Jasanoff (or the politically defined community as a whole) ever required to judge science on science’s terms or can it always make up its own criteria? Science has to have the "humility" to participate in policy on Jasanoff's terms but does she in turn have to evaluate science on its own terms? 6. Pielke is right that scientists should strive to adhere to that which makes them scientists and in so doing be of more value to any discussion that benefits from or relies upon scientific insight. That puts the scientist in an inherently imperfect state of knowledge as any college sophomore knows. But it is an imperfection that is made transparent by its own methods and rules unlike politicization masquerading as method. It is an intellectual inversion of the highest order that those whose methods impose no discipline nor any test of validity other than ideological preference to presume to judge the worth of the works of those who do accept such discipline. 7. The replacement of the philosophy of science with the sociology of science makes for shallow treatment of scientific knowledge. I don't get from Jasanoff any scientific sense of relative certainty or fit or that it even matters. It's easy to demote science when it has no substantive answers but what is the response when it does? 1. I stand corrected. Jasanoff is a policy professor with a law degree who writes a great deal about the use of scientific evidence.
2. In “Science at the Bar” and elsewhere she expresses disagreement with the Daubert decision. In practice she favors allowing juries to decide what is or is not science. That is the essence of a pro-junk science position.
3. I find her writings ends-oriented and rather protean. You cite her approval of the UK giving technocrats the right to set environmental regulations on fuels. Had those technocrats not come to such a PC decision, Jasanoff would in all likelihood have cited it as an instance where science failed to be more inclusive, that it relied on a kind of false consciousness of its own certainty etc. I get the impression that for Jasanoff, the idea that one policy alternative may have more substantive scientific support than another is either (a) an odious act of hubris if it is not the right choice or (b) an affirmation of the broader views of the community from the perspective of a different community of interest if it is the correct outcome.
4. In the samples Pielke cites there is the theme that there is no such thing as a non-political or non-agenda drive scientist. There is the need to bring science into the politically defined universe where everyone’s motives and methods are subject to political scrutiny (except, presumably, for tenured “STS” professors) is tiresome and intellectually unproductive. The only issue ought to be whether the scientist can back up a statement in a manner that other scientists would agree was scientific with logic, experiment, quantification, mathematical confirmation. The sociology of science is useless as a measure of the validity of science.
5. I agree that scientists don’t get to make policy just because there is a scientific issue involved. I agree that credentialism is not a valid basis for policy. Jasanoff is justifiably quick to limit the contribution of science where science overstates its role or competence. What I don’t get from her is what happens when there is a high degree of certainty? What is the weight of that circumstance? Does ideology still define the facts when science disagrees and can back it up? Does the “community” still get to decide that Bendectin causes birth defects as in the Daubert case? Is Jasanoff (or the politically defined community as a whole) ever required to judge science on science’s terms or can it always make up its own criteria? Science has to have the “humility” to participate in policy on Jasanoff’s terms but does she in turn have to evaluate science on its own terms?
6. Pielke is right that scientists should strive to adhere to that which makes them scientists and in so doing be of more value to any discussion that benefits from or relies upon scientific insight. That puts the scientist in an inherently imperfect state of knowledge as any college sophomore knows. But it is an imperfection that is made transparent by its own methods and rules unlike politicization masquerading as method.
It is an intellectual inversion of the highest order that those whose methods impose no discipline nor any test of validity other than ideological preference to presume to judge the worth of the works of those who do accept such discipline.
7. The replacement of the philosophy of science with the sociology of science makes for shallow treatment of scientific knowledge. I don’t get from Jasanoff any scientific sense of relative certainty or fit or that it even matters. It’s easy to demote science when it has no substantive answers but what is the response when it does?

]]> By: Jonathan Gilligan http://cstpr.colorado.edu/prometheus/?p=4375&cpage=1#comment-9651 Jonathan Gilligan Wed, 16 Apr 2008 20:13:09 +0000 http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/prometheusreborn/?p=4375#comment-9651 I have studied much of Jasanoff's writing in depth and have taught it for over 10 years and I can't see where in Jasanoff's actual work Tobin gets his idea that she favors junk science, refuses to acknowledge the special status of scientific activity in producing reliable knowledge, or argues that all knowledge is an arbitrary social construct. Nothing I have read remotely resembles Tobin's characterization. Jasanoff does not seem to me to have any ax to grind, but looks at different examples of how science is used in the policy and judicial arenas without trying to reduce all cases to a single principle. In some cases (e.g., U.K. decision to ban leaded gasoline in the mid 1980s, described in "Acceptable Evidence in a Pluralistic Society") she writes about how the U.K.'s technocratic approach of deferring the decision to expert scientists worked much better than the U.S. approach of treating the scientific question in adversarial proceedings as though it were a lawsuit. In other cases (MAFF's dishonesty about BSE and vCJD, discussed in "Civilization and Madness") she looks at how the abuse of expertise in a technocracy (i.e., arguing by appeal to authority rather than from evidence) undermines trust in the experts and disrupts the smooth function of markets. If Tobin disagrees it would be useful for him to provide a reasoned argument, supported by evidence (quotations from Jasanoff's writing) instead of making unsubstantiated personal attacks. Oh, and on a factual matter, Jasanoff is not a law professor, as Tobin asserts, but a professor of Science and Technology Studies at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, with secondary appointments in Public Health and History. For what it's worth, I do not know Jasanoff personally, have never collaborated with her, and am moved to post this defense out of respect for her scholarly writing and not for any other reason. I have studied much of Jasanoff’s writing in depth and have taught it for over 10 years and I can’t see where in Jasanoff’s actual work Tobin gets his idea that she favors junk science, refuses to acknowledge the special status of scientific activity in producing reliable knowledge, or argues that all knowledge is an arbitrary social construct.

Nothing I have read remotely resembles Tobin’s characterization.

Jasanoff does not seem to me to have any ax to grind, but looks at different examples of how science is used in the policy and judicial arenas without trying to reduce all cases to a single principle.

In some cases (e.g., U.K. decision to ban leaded gasoline in the mid 1980s, described in “Acceptable Evidence in a Pluralistic Society”) she writes about how the U.K.’s technocratic approach of deferring the decision to expert scientists worked much better than the U.S. approach of treating the scientific question in adversarial proceedings as though it were a lawsuit.

In other cases (MAFF’s dishonesty about BSE and vCJD, discussed in “Civilization and Madness”) she looks at how the abuse of expertise in a technocracy (i.e., arguing by appeal to authority rather than from evidence) undermines trust in the experts and disrupts the smooth function of markets.

If Tobin disagrees it would be useful for him to provide a reasoned argument, supported by evidence (quotations from Jasanoff’s writing) instead of making unsubstantiated personal attacks.

Oh, and on a factual matter, Jasanoff is not a law professor, as Tobin asserts, but a professor of Science and Technology Studies at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, with secondary appointments in Public Health and History.

For what it’s worth, I do not know Jasanoff personally, have never collaborated with her, and am moved to post this defense out of respect for her scholarly writing and not for any other reason.

]]> By: George Tobin http://cstpr.colorado.edu/prometheus/?p=4375&cpage=1#comment-9650 George Tobin Fri, 11 Apr 2008 18:55:24 +0000 http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/prometheusreborn/?p=4375#comment-9650 To understand her critique you must understand that Prof. Jasanoff (a law professor) begins with an ideological resentment of science's "privileged" status in law. In the policy debates about the use of scientific evidence and the gatekeeper role of judges in preventing junk science from being presented to juries, Ms. Jasanoff is more or less in favor of junk science. If a community (i.e., "juries") wants to believe a particular cause and effect narrative, why should a bunch of guys in lab coats get to stop them by limiting the evidence to approved "privileged" narratives from arbitrary social groupings and language games like medicine, chemistry, physics or math? At the heart of her critique is an utter refusal to acknowledge in any way that the methods and outcomes of scientific activity is in any way qualitatively different from the activities of hockey players, salesmen or street mimes. All is social construct. There are no tests, no standards, no possibility of objective feedback that creates a state of knowledge that can be "privileged" in any way. All is politics. All is value-laden. All is subject to the Will of the Community. I believe at least 2 Star Trek episodes were based on that philosophy.... Pielke is talking about scientists' using scientific understanding to recognize when policy preferences start to supplant the role of evidence and experimental confirmation as a source of relative confidence or certainty. Jasanoff would find the search for such relative certainty to be an offense against The Community unless the Will of the Community is the basis for that certainty. Hence the need for "humility" on the part of scientists who are not of the body... Hail Landru!! To understand her critique you must understand that Prof. Jasanoff (a law professor) begins with an ideological resentment of science’s “privileged” status in law.

In the policy debates about the use of scientific evidence and the gatekeeper role of judges in preventing junk science from being presented to juries, Ms. Jasanoff is more or less in favor of junk science. If a community (i.e., “juries”) wants to believe a particular cause and effect narrative, why should a bunch of guys in lab coats get to stop them by limiting the evidence to approved “privileged” narratives from arbitrary social groupings and language games like medicine, chemistry, physics or math?

At the heart of her critique is an utter refusal to acknowledge in any way that the methods and outcomes of scientific activity is in any way qualitatively different from the activities of hockey players, salesmen or street mimes. All is social construct. There are no tests, no standards, no possibility of objective feedback that creates a state of knowledge that can be “privileged” in any way. All is politics. All is value-laden. All is subject to the Will of the Community. I believe at least 2 Star Trek episodes were based on that philosophy….

Pielke is talking about scientists’ using scientific understanding to recognize when policy preferences start to supplant the role of evidence and experimental confirmation as a source of relative confidence or certainty. Jasanoff would find the search for such relative certainty to be an offense against The Community unless the Will of the Community is the basis for that certainty. Hence the need for “humility” on the part of scientists who are not of the body… Hail Landru!!

]]> By: David Bruggeman http://cstpr.colorado.edu/prometheus/?p=4375&cpage=1#comment-9649 David Bruggeman Thu, 10 Apr 2008 20:19:17 +0000 http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/prometheusreborn/?p=4375#comment-9649 I have a suspicion that Dr. Jasanoff is talking past your arguments and is trying to insert her concerns over scientists not opening up their thinking and problem choices to more democratic governance. That's a distinct, though related, issue from foreclosing policy options through appeals to scientific authority. Her comments are of a kind with her short piece on science and politics in the latest issue of Seed (which I don't think is yet online). She avoids a discussion of the current political race's avoidance of science to talk about the same kinds of things she does in her review. I have a suspicion that Dr. Jasanoff is talking past your arguments and is trying to insert her concerns over scientists not opening up their thinking and problem choices to more democratic governance. That’s a distinct, though related, issue from foreclosing policy options through appeals to scientific authority.

Her comments are of a kind with her short piece on science and politics in the latest issue of Seed (which I don’t think is yet online). She avoids a discussion of the current political race’s avoidance of science to talk about the same kinds of things she does in her review.

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