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Earthquakes and Weather: Lessons for Policy and ScienceThomas A. Birkland Scientists who deal with weather impacts are well positioned to help decision-makers make more effective policies to prepare for future tragedies like Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew, or the Midwest flood of 1993. However, my research on the politics of extreme events suggests that many weather experts are not highly visible in making key decisions on hazard preparedness and mitigation. Consequently, policy makers make decisions, particularly relating to the social and economic costs of extreme events, with relatively little input from the very scientists involved in learning the most about these phenomena. Extreme events result in significant social and economic costs. Much of this cost is attributable to decisions that create greater hazard vulnerability, such as building on barrier islands and floodplains, and using structural mitigation such as levees, groins, and seawalls. These measures result in significant long-term costs without creating a proportional increase in the safety of property "protected" by these measures. The scientific community is aware of these problems and a lively debate and discussion continues over the most effective alternatives to ineffective policies. Nevertheless, other voices in Washington often dominate this expertise. I found relatively little participation in congressional fact finding from meteorological and other experts following significant hurricanes as well as between events. This contrasts with earthquake policy, in which considerable scientific expertise has been mobilized in the aftermath of major events to provide information to Congress and other elected officials about earthquake hazards and their mitigation. In response to Hurricane Andrew, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) created a Hurricane Program focused on mitigation. NOAA established the Weather Research Program to "weatherproof the nation," but both the Hurricane and Weather Research programs are small and lack the statutory status and congressional attention afforded the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP). Indeed, the NEHRP was the product of the kind of scientific coalition and group effort focused on the needs of policy makers that should be developed to deal with extreme weather as well. Why is scientific expertise less important in dealing with hurricanes? First, scientists and other technical experts often find their voices drowned out after a hurricane by the much louder and persistent calls for disaster relief and a return to "normal." These demands come from residents, development interests, and state and local governments that seek disaster relief to restore the status quo ante, not a new development mode in which vulnerability is reduced. Congress has historically shown more interest in these interests than in applying sound science. In my research (published in my 1997 book, After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy and Focusing Events), I found that between 1960 and 1996, over 60 percent of the people who testified before Congress on hurricanes hazards did so before a committee on public works. In the earthquake case, the single most active committees were those dealing with science and technology, with 35 percent of that testimony heard by science and technology committees, and the remaining testimony spread among a variety of committees. While disaster relief concerns dominate both post-earthquake and post-hurricane discussions, between large events the earthquake science community has been much more active in claiming a place on the policy agenda. In my review of congressional testimony I found that, between earthquakes, the dominant issues on Congress's agenda related to earthquakes focused on scientific and technical matters, while Congress's hurricane agenda is dominated by issues of disaster relief and structural mitigation, regardless of whether an event is fresh in the news or is a more distant memory. Second, many scientists simply are not involved in the public policy making process because there are often few professional rewards that come from participating in policy making. Moreover, many scientists are frustrated with the seemingly irrational, illogical way in which Congress and other organizations appear to do their work. Scientists find that, even when they make the effort to provide timely and useful information to Congress, it is either ignored or, in some cases, treated with hostility, because this participation would slow and perhaps change the flow of disaster relief funds and the return to normal. Fortunately, there are ways for the "weather hazards community" to come together and make its expertise available to government and the media to educate all of us about cost effective, safety enhancing methods of weather hazard mitigation. Such a community would amplify the voices of experts, provide strength in numbers, and work with our allies to help us press the case for more effective and smarter hazard mitigation. Again, an apt model for this might be found in the earthquake hazards community. While there are many disciplines involved with several aspects of earthquake hazards such as soil failure, ground motion, and structural responses to earthquakes, the earthquake hazards community is led by the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (EERI), which works to translate scientific knowledge into practice. The creation of a "Weather Research Institute" could serve as the beginning of an effort to elevate weather issues to a higher level on the federal government's agenda than the current programs. One goal of this effort might be the creation of a "National Weather Hazards Research Program" parallel to the NEHRP that would gain the statutory and scientific authority needed to influence weather hazards policy. Finally, social scientists play an important role in this field, particularly in bridging the gaps between the natural sciences and the policy making process. EERI has long included social scientists who work together with scientists and engineers on earthquake mitigation. Connections between natural and social scientists are also growing in the weather hazards field, and it is vital that all of us who are concerned with weather hazards maintain communication to share in what I believe will be the daunting but ultimately rewarding task of reducing our vulnerability to extreme weather. — Thomas A. Birkland Comments? thunder@ucar.edu WeatherZine #21 Home Page
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