There is an interesting dispute over the role of scientists in politics that has been simmering for a while up in Alaska that was chronicled this week by Inside HigherEd (Thanks JA). The controversy involves Rick Steiner of the University of Alaska and the National Sea Grant Program, run by the federal government. Steiner openly advocates certain political positions, at times in opposition to his employer.

It is not his advocacy that is at issue, however. Steiner openly admits to being an advocate and his university supports his advocacy as a matter of academic freedom. The issue is his advocacy work in the context of being financially supported by the Sea Grant program, which stipulates that its funding should not be used to support advocacy.

Here is an excerpt from the handbook on Fundamentals for a Sea Grant Program, which has some smart and nuanced things to say about advocacy under its program (here in PDF):

Maybe the trickiest and potentially most dangerous pitfall of outside collaboration in SGE [Sea Grant Extension] outreach programs is that of advocacy. The SGE ideal of being a neutral source of science-based information is very difficult to achieve in actual practice. . . as neutral providers of science-based information to decision makers, we do not suggest what those decision should be. We help them understand their choices and the implications of those choices. We do not take positions on issues of public debate . . . As Bruce Wilkins pointed out in Views on Sea Grant Advisory Service Work, (1980), “[SGE] workers are frequently tempted to take on the role of advocate. Urging people to take a particular action or adopt a particular idea, although alluring, should generally be avoided in [SGE] work.”

There are at least four reasons advocacy can be so seductive.

1. The advocate gains support. Taking a position naturally wins favor among those who agree with the position.
2. Advocacy is easy to do. Taking a position doesn’t require all of the facts or even an understanding of the situation.
3. Advocates may be seen to be more helpful. Answering the “should we?” question helps the questioner carry the burden of the decisions.
4. More can be achieved in a shorter time. Advocating a single solution rather than fully examining the advantages and disadvantages of several alternatives makes it possible to move towards a solution more quickly.

Although advocacy can be seductive, there are many reasons SGE professionals avoid it at all costs.

1. Advocacy of a one position alienates those on the other side(s). That in itself may not be bad (after all, they may be wrong!), but we may lose our credibility with those clients who in good faith come to a different decision. There are few absolutes in much of science , and none in matters of public policy.
2. We –SGE—don’t know the proper decision. The improbability of knowing with certainty the value of change to any individual or group means that we can seldom say what decision is best for someone else.
3. Research is not needed for advocacy. This, of course, is the flip side of “advocacy is easy to do.” Exhortation, misinterpretation, and misrepresentation are all techniques frequently used in strong advocacy situations. Indeed, science-based information can often be an impediment to and emotional advocate’s role.
4. We lose objectivity. Rejecting research finings that conflict with a given position, and even distorting research to generate desired results, has historically been problematic for groups or individuals who are advocates.
5. We are blamed for failure. If an idea that we advocate is adopted and fails, we receive, and deserve, the blame for its failure.

Effective SGE professionals avoid the trap of advocacy by striving to provide the best information available while recognizing that the persons who benefit, or lose, must make the decisions.

The remedy taken by the University of Alaska and Sea Grant in this case was to substitute other funding for the Sea Grant funding in support of Steiner’s salary, which he is guaranteed as a tenured faculty member. This solution allows the advocacy efforts to continue and removes any conflict with the aims of the Sea Grant Program’s stated objectives. In response, Steiner called the action a “new de facto gag order from NOAA Sea Grant” and PEER argues that Steiner has been “de-funded for advocacy” (source). Somewhat more substantively:

Rick Steiner freely admits that he engages in advocacy. But his point is that so, too, does virtually everyone else affiliated with the Sea Grant program, at Alaska and elsewhere — they just advocate for different things.

“Their work is generally in support of commercialization of the oceans rather than conservation,” he says, noting that he “never had any problems from Sea Grant” when his early work focused on developing commercial fisheries across Alaska or when he advocated for safer shipping.

The question here is more about University policy rather than advocacy. No one has questioned the right of faculty members to speak out or champion favored causes. The question is whether universities should accept funds in support of research if those funds come with a stipulation that the work done under that funding should be done as Honest Brokering or Science Arbitration (using terms from The Honest Broker), rather than as Issue Advocacy (whether stealth or open). If they accept such funds under the stipulations, are then then bound to follow the stipulation? Presumably most public universities have stipulations in place about overt political campaigning, which usually means using public money or time to advocate for a candidate or specific legislation. The issue here is quite a bit broader.

The Sea Grant case is an interesting case study, and aside from the merits of the case, understanding it and discussing it can probably help everyone become a little bit more aware of the practical challenge of being an expert in service of decision makers in highly politicized contexts.