Al Gore on Climate Policy
September 19th, 2006Posted by: Roger Pielke, Jr.
Al Gore gave a major speech on climate policy yesterday at NYU. Here are some excerpts and my reactions:
On the nature of climate policy debates:
Merely engaging in high-minded debates about theoretical future reductions while continuing to steadily increase emissions represents a self-delusional and reckless approach. In some ways, that approach is worse than doing nothing at all, because it lulls the gullible into thinking that something is actually being done when in fact it is not.
I could not agree more.
On what we should do first:
Well, first of all, we should start by immediately freezing CO2 emissions and then beginning sharp reductions. . . An immediate freeze has the virtue of being clear, simple, and easy to understand. It can attract support across partisan lines as a logical starting point for the more difficult work that lies ahead.
This seems to be in the realm of fantasy. Carbon dioxide emissions cannot simply be “frozen.” This seems like exactly the sort of “high-minded debate about theoretical future reductions” that he just warned us about.
On international climate policy:
A responsible approach to solving this crisis would also involve joining the rest of the global economy in playing by the rules of the world treaty that reduces global warming pollution by authorizing the trading of emissions within a global cap.
At present, the global system for carbon emissions trading is embodied in the Kyoto Treaty. It drives reductions in CO2 and helps many countries that are a part of the treaty to find the most efficient ways to meet their targets for reductions. It is true that not all countries are yet on track to meet their targets, but the first targets don’t have to be met until 2008 and the largest and most important reductions typically take longer than the near term in any case.
The absence of the United States from the treaty means that 25% of the world economy is now missing. It is like filling a bucket with a large hole in the bottom. When the United States eventually joins the rest of the world community in making this system operate well, the global market for carbon emissions will become a highly efficient closed system and every corporate board of directors on earth will have a fiduciary duty to manage and reduce CO2 emissions in order to protect shareholder value.
This is misleading. The Kyoto “bucket” is full of holes, and not just from those countries that are not participating. Most European countries are failing to meet their targets under the treaty. To suggest that if the United States joins the Kyoto Protocol it will lead to an “efficient closed system” fails to mention that most of expected future emissions are not covered by Kyoto and that there are no plans for them to be.
On the practical actions needed:
Third, a responsible approach to solutions would avoid the mistake of trying to find a single magic “silver bullet” and recognize that the answer will involve what Bill McKibben has called “silver-buckshot” – numerous important solutions, all of which are hard, but no one of which is by itself the full answer for our problem.
One of the most productive approaches to the “multiple solutions” needed is a road-map designed by two Princeton professors, Rob Socolow and Steven Pacala, which breaks down the overall problem into more manageable parts. Socolow and Pacala have identified 15 or 20 building blocks (or “wedges”) that can be used to solve our problem effectively – even if we only use 7 or 8 of them. I am among the many who have found this approach useful as a way to structure a discussion of the choices before us.
Gore repeats which has become a common myth – that if we reduce emissions by 7 or 8 of Socolow and Pacala’s “wedges” we will “solve the problem effectively.” This is incredibly misleading and grossly oversimplifies the challenge of stabilizing carbon dioxide emissions. We discussed this at length here.
On particularly promising options:
First, dramatic improvements in the efficiency with which we generate, transport and use energy will almost certainly prove to be the single biggest source of sharp reductions in global warming pollution. . .
To take another example, many older factories use obsolete processes that generate prodigious amounts of waste heat that actually has tremendous economic value. By redesigning their processes and capturing all of that waste, they can eliminate huge amounts of global warming pollution while saving billions of dollars at the same time. . .
. . . we should develop a distributed electricity and liquid fuels distribution network that is less dependent on large coal-fired generating plants and vulnerable oil ports and refineries.
Small windmills and photovoltaic solar cells distributed widely throughout the electricity grid would sharply reduce CO2 emissions and at the same time increase our energy security. Likewise, widely dispersed ethanol and biodiesel production facilities would shift our transportation fuel stocks to renewable forms of energy while making us less dependent on and vulnerable to disruptions in the supply of expensive crude oil from the Persian Gulf, Venezuela and Nigeria, all of which are extremely unreliable sources upon which to base our future economic vitality. It would also make us less vulnerable to the impact of a category 5 hurricane hitting coastal refineries or to a terrorist attack on ports or key parts of our current energy infrastructure. . .
. . . A second group of building blocks to solve the climate crisis involves America’s transportation infrastructure. We could further increase the value and efficiency of a distributed energy network by retooling our failing auto giants – GM and Ford – to require and assist them in switching to the manufacture of flex-fuel, plug-in, hybrid vehicles. . .
Shifting to a greater reliance on ethanol, cellulosic ethanol, butanol, and green diesel fuels will not only reduce global warming pollution and enhance our national and economic security, it will also reverse the steady loss of jobs and income in rural America. Several important building blocks for America’s role in solving the climate crisis can be found in new approaches to agriculture. . .
Similarly, we should take bold steps to stop deforestation and extend the harvest cycle on timber to optimize the carbon sequestration that is most powerful and most efficient with older trees. . .
His best line:
It is, in other words, time for a national oil change. That is apparent to anyone who has looked at our national dipstick.
On nuclear power:
Many believe that a responsible approach to sharply reducing global warming pollution would involve a significant increase in the use of nuclear power plants as a substitute for coal-fired generators. While I am not opposed to nuclear power and expect to see some modest increased use of nuclear reactors, I doubt that they will play a significant role in most countries as a new source of electricity. The main reason for my skepticism about nuclear power playing a much larger role in the world’s energy future is not the problem of waste disposal or the danger of reactor operator error, or the vulnerability to terrorist attack. Let’s assume for the moment that all three of these problems can be solved. That still leaves two serious issues that are more difficult constraints. The first is economics; the current generation of reactors is expensive, take a long time to build, and only come in one size – extra large. In a time of great uncertainty over energy prices, utilities must count on great uncertainty in electricity demand – and that uncertainty causes them to strongly prefer smaller incremental additions to their generating capacity that are each less expensive and quicker to build than are large 1000 megawatt light water reactors. Newer, more scalable and affordable reactor designs may eventually become available, but not soon. Secondly, if the world as a whole chose nuclear power as the option of choice to replace coal-fired generating plants, we would face a dramatic increase in the likelihood of nuclear weapons proliferation. During my 8 years in the White House, every nuclear weapons proliferation issue we dealt with was connected to a nuclear reactor program. Today, the dangerous weapons programs in both Iran and North Korea are linked to their civilian reactor programs. Moreover, proposals to separate the ownership of reactors from the ownership of the fuel supply process have met with stiff resistance from developing countries who want reactors. As a result of all these problems, I believe that nuclear reactors will only play a limited role.
Gore’s technological optimism on just about every other area of climate change policy does not square with his technological pessimism about nuclear power. My guess – and it is only an uninformed guess – is that Gore’s views on nuclear power provide the strongest signal that he is positioning himself for a run at the Presidency in 2008. His views on nuclear power seem carefully crafted so as not to offend his base of political support. Otherwise, why wouldn’t he call in grand fashion (as he has in every other area) for solving the problems of nuclear power that accompany its abundant carbon free energy? If we can freeze carbon dioxide levels we can sure keep nuclear material safe.
On coal:
The most important set of problems by that must be solved in charting solutions for the climate crisis have to do with coal, one of the dirtiest sources of energy that produces far more CO2 for each unit of energy output than oil or gas. . . Fortunately, there may be a way to capture the CO2 produced as coal as burned and sequester it safely to prevent it from adding to the climate crisis. It is not easy. This technique, known as carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) is expensive and most users of coal have resisted the investments necessary to use it. However, when the cost of not using it is calculated, it becomes obvious that CCS will play a significant and growing role as one of the major building blocks of a solution to the climate crisis.
Here we see the technological optimism that is absent in his views on nuclear power.
On adaptation:
Absolutely nothing.
September 19th, 2006 at 1:51 pm
There is an ill-founded notion among politicians (in general) that societies will not progress unless forced to do so. Politicians, like Al Gore, have no faith in the ability of the masses, given freedom and a relatively just rule-of-law, to make small, correct decisions that will lead to the general and continued welfare of society.
His ‘best line’: “It is, in other words, time for a national oil change…”, contains the assumption that society will not change its energy usage unless compelled to do so by the wisest among us, i.e. those who think like Al Gore.
The reality is that society has always changed the way it uses energy, with the market and innovation determining the most efficient steps in that change. These changes have been very gradual, but are proceeding at a faster pass than ever due to the explosion of information technology over the last 100 years. Certainly, the evolution in energy will continue, even though we can not foresee exactly which way it will go. Governments can help or hinder the process, but they should not determine it, as there is know way for a small number of politicians to have the same collective wisdom as billions of individuals. The same can be said for the leaders of large Corporations.
On the other hand, the history of ‘centralized decision making’ is not only one of colossal failure, but also of mass bloodshed. Yet, people like Al Gore continue to believe that THEY will get it right, if only given the chance.
His omission of ‘adaptation’ from this speech is telling. Adaptation is a vital process that is part of all successful life on this planet. It has been that way for billions of years, for we live on a dynamic planet with a very dynamic biosphere. The human race would do better to improve its adaptive skills regardless of what we do with CO2 emissions. The fact that Mr. Gore does not even mention it lends credence to the idea that, for him, AGW is more about control and power than about cost effective solutions to current and potential problems.
Aside from the other inconsistencies that Roger has already pointed out, I question our ability to ‘increase the use of biofuels’ and ’stop deforestation’ at the same time. The only way to increase the efficient use of existing farmland in order to open up more acres to the production of biofuels, would be to employ the most modern farming methods, including genetically modified foods; a notion that would not sit well with Gore’s constituency or the European Union. Otherwise, we are talking about a literal ‘drop in the bucket’.
September 19th, 2006 at 1:59 pm
“Newer, more scalable and affordable reactor designs may eventually become available, but not soon.”
It is more than a little frustrating to hear Gore’s pessimism about nuclear energy in light of a specific act of the Clinton administration — the cancellation of the Integral Fast Reactor in 1994. At the time, the project was nearing completion and had great promise for producing vast amounts of safe and inexpensive power from “spent” fuel rods, while solving a number of safety and environmental problems of older technology. Read about it here http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html and here
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integral_Fast_Reactor
Gore and his associates exhibit a self-contradictory pattern of behavior — active opposition to real solutions to the energy and environment needs of the United States and the world, coupled with active promotion of political “solutions” that don’t make environmental or economic sense — which suggests that either they’re not very bright, or that the objective is not environmental but political.
It doesn’t take a genius to figure out that control of the world’s energy production and consumption equates to control of the world’s economics, and control of the world’s economics equates with…let’s put it this way: are we willing to trade human freedom, bought by the blood, sweat, tears, genius, and blood of those who preceded us, for Gore’s “science”? Will we be duped into changing the organizing principle of our Constitution and government from human freedom to “the environment”?
September 20th, 2006 at 9:38 am
Hey Roger,
Just read this quote from you in the Loveland Colorado Reporter Herald:
“There are uncertainties. It’s not like you change your light bulbs today, you’re going to have better weather tomorrow.”
What exactly is “better weather”? And who is the judge? And if we could set the global thermostat anywhere we wanted (by changing light bulbs or other means), at what temperature would it be set and who would get to decide? (perhaps Gore would answer the call?)
If we could do this by changing atmospheric CO2 levels, at what level would we aim for? The level of 1990? 1960? 1930? 1850? Is Nature a better arbitor of what the Earth’s climate should be? If so, why?
Just some thoughts upon reflecting on your quote!
-Chip
September 20th, 2006 at 4:08 pm
I appreciate your comments, but have to say I have a quite different take on Gore’s ideas.
You suggest that:
“Carbon dioxide emissions cannot simply be “frozen.” This seems like exactly the sort of “high-minded debate about theoretical future reductions” that he just warned us about.”
I think there are many who believe that if the broad scientific consensus on global warming is credible, immediate efforts to level and reduce CO2 emissions are inevitable components of any plan to deal with the potential consequences, and that these efforts deserve to be treated as security issues (both national and global – which they certainly may be) . I would suspect that with programs supporting conservation and alternative energy research, development and distribution at a scale of, say, the interstate highway building program of the ‘50s and the Space program, emissions levels could be frozen within a few years. On alternative energy we’re not that far off except for the scale economy differentials that hamper any new entrants to a market. How much of a difference this would make in alleviating the climate situation must be evaluated keeping in mind that efforts such as Kyoto Protocol are intended as first steps to provide a foundation for further and more effective actions at emissions reductions. Kyoto focuses on the developed states partially because that is essentially where the current problems have emanated from, but also because it is expected that that developing states (from where much of the future increase in global emissions will emanate) will be more likely to follow suit with emissions commitments of their own in future negotiations if they see that developed states have taken the issue seriously and adopted proactive measures.
“Gore’s technological optimism on just about every other area of climate change policy does not square with his technological pessimism about nuclear power.”
I don’t think it’s a matter of tech optimism on nuclear power – he clearly states that he isn’t focusing on key tech issues such as “waste disposal or the danger of reactor operator error, or the vulnerability to terrorist attack.” He is focusing on economic and political factors that may be interrelated and that are not ultimately susceptible to technological control when he refers to, on the one hand the scale economics and, on the other had the increased likelihood of proliferation. Presumably, even if the size factor were to be solved and smaller, more plentiful and economic reactors were to become widespread, this would very likely lead to increased proliferation opportunities and problems.
Just my opinion,
Best,
MB
September 20th, 2006 at 6:36 pm
Roger Pielke Jr. wrote, “There are uncertainties. It’s not like you change your light bulbs today, you’re going to have better weather tomorrow.”
Chip Knappenberger responded, “What exactly is ‘better weather’? And who is the judge? And if we could set the global thermostat anywhere we wanted (by changing light bulbs or other means), at what temperature would it be set and who would get to decide?”
This is a very significant question, or set of questions.
1) Is there an “optimum” global *average* temperature?
We can pretty safely say that, for example, 2 degrees Celsius colder than today (i.e., colder than during the Little Ice Age), and maybe 4 degrees Celsius warmer, would be “worse” than now.
But within that range, especially the closer one gets to the middle, the more difficult it is to make a judgement.
2) Is there an optimum global temperature *distribution*?
For example, it seems reasonable that the hotter areas right at the equator get (except those in the high mountains, like Ecuador) the worse off they are.
But if the Yukon or Siberia warmed by 5-10 degrees Celsius, would that be “bad?”
If the climate of Chicago was like Nashville, or Nashville like Tallahassee…would one or both of those changes be good, or bad?
To my knowledge, such questions aren’t even considered in any of the IPCC’s Assessments…at least so far. In my mind, that’s just one more piece of evidence that the Assessments are not truly comprehensive or balanced.
September 20th, 2006 at 7:43 pm
Mark said:
“We can pretty safely say that, for example, 2 degrees Celsius colder than today (i.e., colder than during the Little Ice Age), and maybe 4 degrees Celsius warmer, would be “worse” than now.”
Well, definitely on the 2 deg C colder part, but maybe not on the 4 deg C warmer.
Lately I have begun to think of people who want to return to the climate of hundreds of years ago as Climate Luddites…
September 21st, 2006 at 1:00 am
#Comment of Chip Knappenberger
I leave the question if the “weather” of the 1930s or the 1950s should be defined as emission control objective here to the experts but for the moment it seems more important to avoid the comeback of the “weather” of the miocene. Cheers Georg
September 22nd, 2006 at 6:30 pm
The question about “what is the best climate anyway” is a red herring. The problem is rapid change.
http://illconsidered.blogspot.com/2006/02/whats-wrong-with-warm-weather.html
September 23rd, 2006 at 6:24 am
I wrote, “We can pretty safely say that, for example, 2 degrees Celsius colder than today (i.e., colder than during the Little Ice Age), and maybe 4 degrees Celsius warmer, would be “worse” than now.”
Steve Hemphill responded, “Well, definitely on the 2 deg C colder part, but maybe not on the 4 deg C warmer.”
Well, what number on the upper end *would* you give for what we could “pretty safely say…would be worse than now?”
September 23rd, 2006 at 6:35 am
Coby Beck writes, “The question about ‘what is the best climate anyway’ is a red herring. The problem is rapid change.”
So if the world gradually got 3 degrees Celsius colder over the next 100 years, that would be less of a problem than if the world decreased 1 degree Celsius in next 20 years, and then jumped up 3 degrees Celsius within one decade in 2030 (for a next change from present of plus 2 degrees Celsius)?
September 23rd, 2006 at 1:45 pm
Mark,
3oC in either direction in 100 years is a very rapid and significant change. Your other hypotheticals are rather strange. They also approach the timeframes one would more associate with weather.
For an example of a catastrophically large and fast change google for PETM, or search wikipedia for the paleocene-eocene thermal maximum.
If you look at the antarctic ice core records of glacial interglacial cycles you see what are more “normal” changes, extreme as they are. On average the temperatures rose at about 1/10th of the rapidity they are now rising at (~10oC over ~5Kyrs) and fell another order of magnitude slower.
September 23rd, 2006 at 10:34 pm
“3oC in either direction in 100 years is a very rapid and significant change.”
OK. So which is worse…cooling 3 deg C over the next 100 years, or dropping 1 deg C, then gaining 3 degree C from that point, within the next 100 years? What about dropping 2 deg C, then gaining back 4 deg C? Do you think that’s worse than simply dropping 3 deg C? Or even dropping 2 deg C, and staying there?
“On average the temperatures rose at about 1/10th of the rapidity they are now rising at (~10oC over ~5Kyrs)”
Well, who in the world thinks the earth is going to warm 10 deg C over the next couple hundred or thousand years? Who even thinks the world is going to warm 5 deg C?
Do you honestly think a rise of 2 deg C in the next 100 years (which works out to a RATE of 20 deg C over 1000 years) is any big deal?
September 23rd, 2006 at 11:19 pm
Mark Bahner asks:
“Well, what number on the upper end *would* you give for what we could “pretty safely say…would be worse than now?”"
That is indeed the ultimate question. The answer lies within totally unknown and even unquestioned change. We know, for example, the Pliocene was … much warmer than today (how much warmer? I don’t know.) but the tropics were virtually the same as now. Was it a problematic clime? No indications thereof.
Then, even to get there we have to ask if indeed convection is the big buffer in all this anyway, which would make the tropics the same as now. Hmmm… sound familiar? Why does there appear to be a max ocean temp, and what does that mean for albedo and clouds?
I really don’t know, but the answer in terms of the biosphere itself is undoubtedly higher than the answer in terms of Homo sapiens. So we have a few choices. Some are the Luddite climate, the existing climate, the max in terms of technological food distribution, or the max in terms of biospheric robustness.
Whoever knows the answer to that is … intellectually incoherent.