Naomi Oreskes on Consensus
November 14th, 2006Posted by: Roger Pielke, Jr.
Naomi Oreskes, of the University of California-San Diego and a leading scholar of the history of science, wrote an excellent article on scientific consensus a few years ago as part of a special issue of Environmental Science & Policy which critiqued the debate over Bjorn Lomborg’s The Skeptical Environmentalist. This is of course the same Naomi Oreskes famous for her short essay reviewing abstracts on “global climate change” in Science (a subject I do not wish to discuss in this thread, thanks!). Below I have reproduced a few lengthy excerpts from Naomi’s paper relevant to recent discussions here, though I encourage you to read the whole paper, especially the three cases that she describes. You can find the entire set of papers in the special issue here.
Oreskes, N., 2004. Science and public policy: what’s proof got to do with it? Environmental Science & Policy, 7:369-383 (PDF).
In recent years it has become common for informed defenders of the status quo to argue that the scientific information pertinent to an environmental claim is uncertain, unreliable, and, fundamentally, unproven. Lack of proof is then used to deny demands for action. But the idea that science ever could provide proof upon which to base policy is a misunderstanding (or misrepresentation) of science, and therefore of the role that science ever could play in policy. In all but the most trivial cases, science does not produce logically indisputable proofs about the natural world. At best it produces a robust consensus based on a process of inquiry that allows for continued scrutiny, re-examination, and revision. . .
Most of us realize that proof—at least in an absolute sense—is a theoretical ideal, available in geometry class but not in real life. Nevertheless, many of us still cling to the idea that some set of facts—some body of knowledge—will resolve our problems and make clear how we should proceed. History suggests otherwise: earlier scientific wisdom has been overturned, earlier generations of experts have made mistakes. This is as true in physics and chemistry as in biology and geology. The criteria that are typically invoked in defense of the reliability of scientific knowledge—quantification, replicability, falsifiability—have proved no guarantee. Moreover, experts do not always agree. Even when there is no transparent political, social, or religious dimension to a debate, honest and intelligent people may come to different conclusions in the face of the “same” evidence, because they have focused their sights on different dimensions of that evidence, emphasizing different elements of the evidentiary landscape. Even when a scientific community reaches consensus on a previously contested issue—as earth scientists did in the 1960s over moving continents—there are always dimensions that remain unexplained. In the future, plate tectonics no doubt will be modified, perhaps overturned entirely. Indeed, there are a handful of scientists today who advocate Earth expansion to explain continental separation, and they are of course eager to detail the limitations of plate tectonics theory (e.g. Shieds, 2003). Nevertheless, for now plate tectonics remains the consensus of most Earth scientists: our best basis for understanding the Earth. . .
Scientific consensus is a complex process—involving a matrix of social, political, economic, historical considerations along with the epistemic—and history shows that its achievement typically requires a long time: years, decades, even centuries. But even when a stable consensus is achieved, scientific uncertainty is not eliminated. Rather, once we have deemed the remaining problems as “minor”—which is to say, insufficiently great as to warrant further concern—we simply live with them (Engelhardt and Caplan, 1987). Moreover, the grounds on which scientific communities have concluded that evidence is “good enough” to warrant living with the uncertainties have varied enormously throughout the course of history. A determined individual may choose to pursue these uncertainties, and that determination may successfully destabilize the prior consensus. In a “purely” scientific debate, that determination would, ideally, arise solely from the demands of empirical evidence, but no debate is ever “purely” scientific, given that, at minimum, credibility, reputation, and, perhaps future funding are at stake.
November 14th, 2006 at 12:06 pm
Naomi Oreskes? So, what.
Consensus science is not science. No quantification, no replicability, no falsifiability – no science. End of story. The use of scientific methods does not guarantee results, that are valid and falsificable or scientific in any way. (Noreskes paper on consensus science about “global climate change” is flawed, but this is another stroy).
But why is there so much excitement on “consensus science” today? Because it is nothing else than an dull instrument of the environmentalists to propagate their agenda, what will influence all of us.
Nobody cares about the scientific consensus on niche science e.g. moving continents, because nobody is affected by it in everey days life. It is nothing more than a elite academic sport on best thesis and ideas.
But todays “consensus science” is used to suppress dissent opinions from the main stream. Promoting “consensus science” is not scientific, instead it is consolidating the status quo. Not the so called “denialists” or “sceptics” are unscientific! The anthropogenic global climate change apologists are! It should be the duty of every scientist to question the so called “consensus” every day, and not to promote it. If we make science a part of a democratic process (nothing else is “consensus science”), than science is lost.
Hello to intelligent design. Here we go!
P.S.: please excuse my bad english, I am not a native english speaker.
November 14th, 2006 at 12:47 pm
Tomislav Rus-
Thanks much for aprticipating here. You might want to read Oreskes paper.
November 14th, 2006 at 1:13 pm
There is much to be said of the article by Oreskes. But the article is marred in my opinion by a facile and gratuitous comment in the second paragraph that caused to me only skim the article the first time I read it.
Oreskes writes: “Lomborg assures us that everyone is for the environment—just as everyone is for world peace and against hunger—but this facile assertion masks the fact that many individuals and institutions, particularly in the industrialized west, have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo.”
Oreskes’ judgement that Lomborg’s comments were “facile” and they they “mask the fact” seemed to me to be argumentative and facile. First, the point that I took from Lomborg was that we need to go far beyond facile explainations. Second, Oreskes assurances that institutions have vested interests seems to me to be at least as facile as Lomborg’s comments. And I fail to see how either idea “masks” the other.
Ironically it was this intemperate comment that “masked”, as it were, an otherwise commendable work the first time I read it a year or so ago.
November 15th, 2006 at 12:09 am
Hi Roger
Thank you very much for drawing our attention to Naomi Oreskes’ work. I read the paper you quoted from with great interest. I am curious to know more about which aspects of it you find relevant to recent discussions here.
Kind regards
David Low
understandascope.com
Australia
November 15th, 2006 at 5:45 am
I do not accept the premise in the opening sentences:
“In recent years it has become common for informed defenders of the status quo to argue that the scientific information pertinent to an environmental claim is uncertain, unreliable, and, fundamentally, unproven. Lack of proof is then used to deny demands for action.”
In many cases, those under attack are not demanding proof in the face of scientific uncertainty; they are requesting a reasonable establishment of the problem, supported by some real data (not speculation) and some indication that the action requested will mitigate the problem without causing more harm than good.
It is interesting that she choose DDT to make her case, and then claims that the resulting regulations fulfilled a public need. Which public? Certainly not the malaria infested third world. I am quite certain that if malaria returned to California and Oreskes could protect her children (if she has any) by spraying a little DDT on her walls, she would not hesitate to use it!
Defending Rachel Carson as a good scientist by saying her book ‘Silent Spring’, filled with bad science, was not really about science, is an amazing rationalization! Would she defend Michael Crichton the same way?
It is also interesting that she finds nothing illogical about placing the demand on manufacturers to show that their products are safe. If proving harm is an undo burden on environmentalist, isn’t proving no harm an impossible burden on manufactures?
One should also weigh the known benefits against the unproven harm, as in the case of DDT. The 6-month long EPA study on DDT in 1972 showed no harm to humans and no significant impact on the environment when used properly; yet the threat of some hypothetical future harm caused the West to ban its use and further restrict imports from counties that did use it. This caused the third world to abandon DDT, which certainly resulted in higher mortality rates from malaria. Even if DDT would have only prevented one in ten malaria deaths, that is still several million people over the last two decades!
Is Oreskes really arguing that it is better to let millions of children die than risk some potential future harm for which there is no real evidence? That is precisely what she and many other environmentalists argue.
The same mischaracterization of the argument is taking place in global warming. Skeptics have never demanded that we take no action until we scientifically prove a global warming disaster will happen. Instead, they are making the reasonable argument that we at least need some real world evidence that the AGW theory is the best explanation for the observed data, before taking actions that will significantly burden the entire population of the planet!
Skeptics have no problem with developing new technologies, improving efficiency and increasing adaptability to weather extremes. These are all beneficial actions regardless of future climate change, but doubly so if the AGW theory proves more or less correct.
In summation, I find Oreskes arguments little more than rationalizations for an environmental dictatorship. Since we can not prove that anything is perfectly safe, suggestions that there may be future harm is not a legitimate argument for taking actions that are knowingly harmful! We should still require some real world evidence that indicates the problem is more costly than the proposed solution. If we don’t have that, then prudence would suggest taking steps that are beneficial in themselves while improving our ability to handle the potential future threat.
While her observations of the history of science appear accurate, I question her interpretation of those observations for legitimizing unwarranted social actions.
November 15th, 2006 at 7:02 am
David- Thanks for your question. I have excerpted what I believe are the most relevant passages. The take home message from Oreskes is the following:
“But the idea that science ever could provide proof upon which to base policy is a misunderstanding (or misrepresentation) of science, and therefore of the role that science ever could play in policy.”
There is a strong message in her paper that efforts to advance political action by enforcing a single scientific view through consensus are misguided.
She writes, “many of us still cling to the idea that some set of facts—some body of knowledge—will resolve our problems and make clear how we should proceed.”
Her case studies bear this out. The consensus on climate change (however defined) does not tell us who has a right to speak, what science is relevant to action, or what actions are possible or worthwhile. Efforts to use a scientific consensus as a means to achieve any of these ends will like harm both science and the prospects for action.
November 15th, 2006 at 7:44 am
Roger,
I agree with a lot of what Jim Clarke said. While there is no room here for a detailed critique of Oreskes’ article, let me raise a couple of points.
1) While Jim Clarke disagrees with the opening sentence, I find the closing sentence even more outrageous: “there is no need to wait for proof, no need to demand it, and no basis to expect it.” In other words, what we have been told about AGW over the past 20 years (that it was proven beyond doubt, that the science was settled, etc.) was in the end not necessary. We should act without proof, based on suspicion alone.
2) It is ironic that she defends Rachel Carson’s book, saying it was “not written as a scientific paper to be published in a refereed journal; it was written as a popular book, indeed, a polemic.” But then, cannot the same be said of Bjorn Lomborg’s book? Yet he was accused of all evils, including scientific fraud. It seems double standards are not a problem for environmentalists.
3) About DDT, she makes it look like the banning of DDT was the result of a cool-headed, objective assessment of the associated potential danger. She overlooks all the political aspects involved in the decision, and the influence of environmental activists. By the time DDT was banned, the american industry had had time to adapt, so they suffered no harm. It was then easy and politically rewarding to please the environmentalists with the ban.
4) In the end, she doesn’t say whether the decision was “right” or “wrong”, and seems to imply that it doesn’t matter. But it does matter a lot! If a policy decision turns out to have been bad, or not to have produced more good than harm, then it should be reviewed, as well as the process that led to it.
5) She criticizes Lomborg on the fact that his focus is “on dimensions that can be quantified in terms of individual human lives lost (or saved)”, as opposed to “the quality of those lives”. But quality can also be “quantified”, something that a lot of environmentalists refuse to do. Quality of life may mean “purer air”, “less” stress, “closer to home” sources of drinking water, “less” sickness, “more” trees. By refusing to quantify, environmentalists ensure that all issues have the highest priority. But policy makers need to prioritize issues.
6) It would be too long to comment on her assessment of the continental drift debate. However, she deliberately avoids talking about how the geological scientific establishment, especially in the U.S., used its position to thwart the debate on Wegener’s theory, effectively making it dangerous for, say, a young scientist, to adhere to it. They, of course, had the right not to believe in it, even if they did so for non-epistemic reasons. Where they were wrong was in the way they put a lid on the scientific inquiry, for almost 40 years, until a new generation of earth scientists took power. In fact, the early “cracks” came not from geology, but from a physicist (P. Blackett) who, armed with a Nobel prize, and being outside of the field, had nothing to fear by supporting continental drift. That kind of ideological dictatorship has many similarities with what we see today in climate science, where it is dangerous for one’s carreer to openly investigate aspects that go against the “consensus” (for example the potential large influence of solar forcings). I have commented here before that it is not so much the fact that scientists have ideological or philosophical opinions that is dangerous. It is when a field (as a social institution, including the publication and grant system) is dominated and controlled by one such ideology promoted by a few influencial individuals. When that happens, the scientific standards are in danger of being relaxed in favor of one view of the world. What happened in paleoclimatology is symptomatic of that state of fact, and has been well documented in the “hockey stick” debate.
7) There is a lot of confusion about the meaning of a scientific “consensus”. That confusion is unfortunately maintained by environmentalists. There is a fundamental difference between scientists adopting a theory or a paradigm as a basis for a fruitful research program, and scientists agreeing on the results of a specific inquiry (like how much the Earth will warm if we double CO2). The former is just the beginning, while the latter is an end. Furthermore, scientists never establish panels to determine if, for example, plate tectonics is “true” or not. The research program based on the theory of plate tectonics is adopted by more and more scientists as it proves more fruitful than competing programs, until it becomes, de facto, the only one. AGW is not a research program.
This post is too long already, so I’d better stop. There would be much more to say about Oreskes’ infamous “survey”. Let’s just say to condlude that she clearly states her ideological position in the “proof” paper. She adheres to the environmentalist philosophy, and has no problem if science is distorted in favor of that point of view. That’s where she is clearly wrong.
November 15th, 2006 at 9:46 am
Francois-
Thanks for your comments. I agree that Oreskes is quite open about her ideological predispositions. But even if you don’t share these views, look past them at her analysis of the role of scientific proof in environmental policy — this is what makes her conclusion all the more strinking:
“But the idea that science ever could provide proof upon which to base policy is a misunderstanding (or misrepresentation) of science, and therefore of the role that science ever could play in policy.”
And
“There is no need to wait for proof, no need to demand it, and no basis to expect it.”
November 15th, 2006 at 10:02 am
Oreskes directs her arguments against “defenders of the status quo” who object to shouldering the costs of environmental interventions. Well, there are at least a few of us who have less pecuniary concerns on our minds when we question the science behind any number of policy recommendations. I, for one, find it insulting when, instead of receiving answers to questions about the soundness of the science, I’m told that my questions are just an attempt to avoid paying the piper. (this from people who know absolutely nothing about either my finances or my attitude toward the natural environment)
November 15th, 2006 at 6:46 pm
Roger,
Who is demanding proof before action?
Oreskes conclusions are true enough. If you want to get philosophical, nothing can be proven. Science, however, can supply substantial evidence.
Is it unreasonable for those who will ‘pay the price’ or ‘be restricted’ to require that the there is real evidence of the problem, that the problem is quantified and that the proposed solution will do more good than harm?
There is a big difference between demanding proof and demanding evidence. Oreskes seems to equate the two as an excuse for not requiring real-world evidence for more environmental regulations.
Scientific proof is not possible.
Those demanding proof are irrational.
Therefore, solid evidence is not required to impose my desires.
It is not a very logical or solid argument.
November 15th, 2006 at 9:51 pm
Presumably Oreskes intends this to apply to climate change, but it has much wider implications.
In the human health risk assessment area, the shoe is on the other foot. Irrespective of scientific advancement, regulatory agencies refuse to update their risk assessments (or their methods) if new science yields a lower risk estimate. Denials are based on one of the following three arguments:
1. When we reanalyze the new data enough times we can find a contradictory result.
2, We can’t find an error in the science, but we can’t be sure there isn’t one.
3. The new science raises new concerns we didn’t have before.
In addition to these three substantive grounds for denial, there is always denial by procedural defect (e.g., not peer reviewed; peer reviewed but not published in a good enough journal; published in a good enough journal but too late; based on data we deem unethically obtained; funded by third parties we don’t like).
It is the regulatory agency that uses uncertainty as a tool to prevent change. The existence of a genuine scientific consensus that the agency is scientifically wrong is insufficient.
November 16th, 2006 at 4:18 am
Richard, your anecdote about one facet of the many illogicalities plaguing our regulation of human health risks is surely correct, and one of the chief failures of the Bush administration was ignoring the opportunity to try to improve and rationalize such regulation and bureaucratic oversight, despite having majorities in Congress.
I fail to see the relevance of your anecdote to climate change policy – but perhaps you were not trying to draw any.
November 16th, 2006 at 4:30 am
Roger, thanks for posting this. I think that Orestes is correct, as far as she goes, about the limits of science (the science will ALWAYS be imperfect and subject to continual revision) and that other posters here are unfairly projecting onto her their legitimate concerns about how an issue concerning science is translated into policy.
Orestes offers no prescriptions about how the science is used by policy makers, but merely observes that those whose ox may be “Gored” can be expected to oppose policy changes, including by “attacking, impugning, or otherwise seeking to question the science” and by arguing that the science is “uncertain, unreliable, and, fundamentally, unproven.”
I think that this is a fair observation, but one that does not itself deny the legitimacy of the interests of those who oppose policy changes or argue that the scientific understanding is insufficiently complete to justify policy changes.
We definitely should be openly discussing what policies are justified by our scientific understanding of AGW, but that is ultimately a political, and not a scientific, matter.
November 16th, 2006 at 5:23 am
Thanks for the clarification, Roger, I think I see what you are getting at now. Let me see if I have it right. You seem to me to be suggesting that the politicisation of science by those who misunderstand its internal communicational commitments harms science if scientists buy into such politicisation and attempt to debate the professional debaters (who will win that one?…). Similarly, actions to address public concerns via social policy are made less effective through the existence of a compromised scientific community.
Best
David Low
http://www.understandascope.com
Australia
November 16th, 2006 at 7:12 am
David-
Thanks. Sounds just about right.
———-
Jim-
You ask, “Who is demanding proof before action?”
Answer: Everyone who invokes “consensus” (“debate is over, all scientists agree, etc.) as justification for action. And conversely those who deny a consensus are the basis for other actions. In short, just about everyone in the climate debate;-)
Thanks!
——-
Tom-
Thanks. (Note that it is “Oreskes”).
You write: “We definitely should be openly discussing what policies are justified by our scientific understanding of AGW, but that is ultimately a political, and not a scientific, matter.”
The relationship of various policy options and their expected outcomes is in large degree a scientific matter, in the sense that we believe that we can gain some insight as to that relationship beyond guesswork or hope. In the discussion of policy alternatives science and values are inextricably integrated.
November 19th, 2006 at 9:35 am
Jim Clarke appears to succumb to the superficial argument made regarding a course of action (I’m not sure the sarcasm of the “definition” was obvious) to be taken. Referring to an “Environmental Dictatorship” in terms of a battle against the “dreaded” anthropogenic global warming illustrates the need to understand the one truth inherent in all this – whether the end justifies the means needs to include the concept that the end *is included* in the means. Once deception is accepted by the pseudoscientists arguing that continued CO2 emissions are bad, they have voted to be enslaved by any subsequent variations of that deceptive group.
There is, to them, no potential that increasing CO2, the base of the food chain, could be a good thing – indeed cherry picked studies denying that abound and are freely quoted.
All that matters to them, realistically, is that a centralized government is formed to literally control power.
There is consensus – consensus that CO2 affects the lapse rate. Beyond that all claims of consensus, including other forcings, feedbacks (especially clouds), effects, etc. are propaganda.