Debbie Cenziper has written a very interesting series of investigative articles in the Miami Herald on hurricane research and operations. There is a four-part series with numerous sidebars and accompanying vignettes (part 1, part 2, part 3, part 4 is forthcoming). The overarching thesis of the series is that the performance of NOAA’s National Hurricane Center (NHC) and the Hurricane Research Division (HRD) has suffered because of funding limitations, and that this performance has had material effects on real-world outcomes such as forecasts and warnings. Here are a few interesting excerpts accompanied by my commentary:

“Buoys, weather balloons, radars, ground sensors and hurricane hunter planes, all part of a multibillion-dollar weather-tracking system run by the federal government, have failed forecasters during nearly half of the 45 hurricanes that struck land since 1992.”

Interestingly, the hurricane research community has not (to my knowledge) conducted the research that would indicate, quantitatively, the effects of the lack of data or observations on forecast skill. Such information would seem to be essential to argue effectively for more resources.

There is a clear, long-term and highly troubling pattern of the stifling of discussion on this subject among NOAA employees. According to the Herald,

“In 40 Hurricane Center forecast verification reports reviewed by The Herald, almost nothing has been mentioned about vulnerable radars, the diversion of hurricane hunter planes, dropwindsonde failures, broken buoys, gaps in upper-air observations. Going public with such problems would have consequences, said former Hurricane Center Director Neil Frank. ”Woe be to me if I phoned a senator,” said Frank, now a television meteorologist in Houston. ‘There was all this internal pressure. I wasn’t free to call and say, `We need more money down here.’ ” A 2004 agency memo drives the point home: NOAA chief Conrad Lautenbacher told employees not to talk with lawmakers about budget issues without explicit approval, saying the agency must provide “a unified message.” Mayfield, a 33-year NOAA employee, said he has been told repeatedly to work within the bureaucracy’s budget process. He’s chosen his words carefully, at times drawing criticism from some who say he should have been more outspoken. ”I could be fired,” Mayfield said.”

I have heard similar concerns from NOAA employees who I asked to comment on the Herald series. My advice to the NOAA community is to address these issues empirically. That is, to conduct the research needed to connect federal investments (or lack thereof) with actual performance metrics like miles-of-coastline warned and forecast skill. Absent such information, it is very hard to argue that a particular level of investment is better than another. The funding constraints are very real. I am helping Kerry Emanuel to convene a special session on Hurricane Katrina at the fall meeting of the American Geophysical Union, and we have been unable to secure the participation of a NHC forecaster because the agency has no funds for travel. I understand that no NHC staff may be attending next year’s American Meteorological Society annual meeting for the same reason. This strikes me as absurd, given the critical importance of these scientists to the nation.

According to the Herald, “Since 1995, NOAA’s Hurricane Research Division lost 11 scientists and has replaced just four, leaving 31 people and a base budget that hasn’t topped $3.5 million in more than two decades. A former director and two senior researchers say they’ve pleaded for 10 years for an increase of at least 50 percent, but NOAA has granted only incremental bumps that barely kept pace with inflation — or no increases at all. ”Our requests were dead on arrival,” said former Hurricane Research Division Director Hugh Willoughby, who quit the post in 2002 after seven years of denials. ”Basically, it was a fool’s errand.””

My view is that the performance of NHC and HRD suffers because of limited resources. But the hurricane research and operations community should do their part by conducting rigorous research that establishes a clear connection between resources and performance to allow policy makers to more effectively scale investments with desired performance. In my experience, you can’t find a group of more dedicated and competent public servants than in the hurricane community, and it shows in their performance. But for this to sustain requires that we pay close attention to the connections of decisions about science and the consequences of those decisions for outcomes in society.