Advocates for action on climate change are in an interesting double bind. One the one hand, some may feel that motivating action requires strong statements, such as we saw in comments from James Lovelock reported in The Independent earlier this week, that human-caused climate change has “passed the point of no return.” On the other hand, if it becomes generally accepted that we have indeed passed the “point of no return” then this condition would render irrelevant the central objective of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), under which the Kyoto Protocol is negotiated, requiring a new debate on the basic objectives of international climate policy.
The central objective of the FCCC is described in its Article 2 as “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” But if dangerous anthropogenic interference has already occurred or is inevitably on its way, then “prevention” is not in the cards and Article 2 becomes meaningless. And re-opening up Article 2 for revision would be extremely contentious, which in my view would not necessarily be a bad thing. So to be consistent with the FCCC, those calling for action have to walk a careful line between rendering the FCCC obsolete yet still making a strong case for immediate action, hence the double bind.
I would expect that we will see this double bind play out implicitly in the context of the next report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), as well as in the public statements of scientists on climate change. For scientists who support the FCCC, the only “politically correct” interpretation of the state of climate science is to claim that we are approaching a point of no return, and that we have a brief window of, say, 10 to 20 years to take action. Any other position on the science of climate change could be interpreted as rendering the Framework Convention moot (i.e., past the point of no return), or not generating a sufficient motivation for near-term action (e.g., a longer time-frame for action).
We should fully expect to see this dynamic play out as a debate among those advocating action on climate change. Those who are hip to the implications of claiming that we are “past the point of no return” will find themselves contradicting those who are unaware of the political consequences of such strong statements. I’d bet that there already such statements from politically-savvy scientists in response to Lovelock’s recent claims. All of this might be good for climate policy as re-opening discussion of Article 2 is desperately needed (e.g., see this paper in PDF for more discussion of the pathologies associated with the FCCC and its Article 2).